Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Category: Foreign Policy

  • Trump Presidency: What priorities for US-Caribbean Economic Engagement?

    Trump Presidency: What priorities for US-Caribbean Economic Engagement?

    Alicia Nicholls

    The United States’ position as most Caribbean countries’ largest economic partner and an important foreign policy ally means that constructive engagement with the incoming Trump administration is not just a choice but an imperative. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and individual Caribbean governments have all expressed congratulatory messages, emphasizing their willingness to work with Mr. Trump and continuing the harmonious US-Caribbean relationship.

    But in contrast to the idealism attending then Senator Barack Obama’s “Yes we can” message eight years ago, a spectre of profound uncertainty shrouds the President-elect not just because of his extreme rhetoric on trade and foreign policy, undergirded by his “Make America Great Again” and “America First” refrains, but also the lack of policy specificity.

    In this article, I will outline what I believe are five key priorities which will likely frame US-Caribbean economic and foreign policy engagement for the foreseeable future:

    1. Correspondent Banking/De-Risking

    A first order of business will be continuing the conversation that CARICOM governments and stakeholders have started with US officials and regulators on the de-risking activities of US-based international banks, including the withdrawal and restriction of correspondent banking relationships. These relationships are Caribbean’ lifeline to the global financial and trading system, critical for the trade, investment and remittance flows which buoy our small open economies and sustain households.

    US foreign policy orientation towards the Caribbean has constantly recognized that an economically secure “third border” complements US’ strategic security interests. Any threat therefore to the region’s economic and financial inclusion is something which should be of mutual concern. Unfortunately, there appears to be limited progress on the correspondent banking issue.

    While de-risking is a cost-benefit decision for banks, it is also partly fuelled no doubt by ambiguous regulations and the Caribbean’s undeserved reputation in some quarters as a high risk place for doing business. To their credit, the US Treasury and Federal Banking Agencies released a Joint Factsheet on Foreign Correspondent Banking. Additionally, the US Treasury has reiterated that the de-risking issue is a “key priority”.

    However, actions by US authorities which unfairly label Caribbean countries as “tax havens” contribute to the perception that Caribbean jurisdictions and banks are higher risk. In 2015 the state legislature of Montana, and the District of Columbia, had included several Caribbean countries among their proposed lists of tax havens. This is despite Caribbean countries’ having taken steps to ensure their compliance with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and our clean bill of health by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).Continued engagement with US states and federal authorities on this issue is a must.

    1. International Financial Services & FATCA

    Although President-elect Trump has promised to lower the US federal corporation tax rate from 35% to 15% and  provide a deemed repatriation of corporate profits held offshore at a one-time tax rate of 10%, his orientation towards international financial centres (IFCs) in general is not well-known.

    The Obama administration has not been friendly to Caribbean IFCs, and that is putting it mildly. On the other hand, Mr. Trump’s background as a businessman may make him more appreciative of the role IFCs play in making US businesses more efficient and profitable, which in turn facilitates their contribution to US economic and job growth. Moreover, conventional wisdom holds that Republican governments are usually friendlier to the Caribbean than are Democratic governments, and there is good anecdotal evidence to support this.

    Additionally, continued engagement with US authorities will be necessary to iron out any implementation and reporting issues under FATCA.

    1. Caribbean Basin Initiative & Other Market Access Issues 

    Manufacturers in most Caribbean countries enjoy non-reciprocal duty-free access to the US market for most goods under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), an initiative of the Reagan administration in the 1980s which had both economic, ideological and geopolitical imperatives. The CBI is unilateral which means that the benefits can be unilaterally revoked and the criteria for eligibility changed at any time. However, CBI is generally believed to be beneficial to US manufacturing and jobs and Caribbean has a large trade deficit with the US, which should keep CBI off the President-elect’s immediate radar.

    One sticking point in US-Caribbean trade relations is the cover over subsidies which the US Federal government pays to the US territories of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands out of excise taxes it collects from imported rums, which has made Caribbean rums less competitive in the US market. Turning to merchandise trade in general, non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary and labelling requirements have also been a constraint on market access.

    Caribbean workers benefit from temporary employment under the US Farm Workers and Hospitality Workers programmes. However, outside of this, Caribbean service providers have no preferential access to the US market. The CBI does not cover services trade. Caribbean business persons seeking to supply a service in the US instead rely on non-immigrant visas. Mr. Trump has promised to tighten the US’ border and control policy. It is not certain whether this will be extended to non-immigrant visas as well.

    1. Immigration & Workers’ Programmes

    Mr. Trump made tightening immigration one of the cornerstones of his campaign platform. While his ire was directed towards Mexican and Muslim immigrants, Caribbean immigrants will be collateral damage. For instance, undocumented immigrants who had come to the US as children and had identified themselves in good faith when applying for protection under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme might have unwittingly made themselves prime targets for deportation if Mr. Trump goes through with his plans.

    Most Caribbean immigrants are law-abiding citizens who are making sterling contributions to the American society. However, another pertinent concern is Mr. Trump’s vow to accelerate the deportation of those immigrants convicted of crimes to their country of birth, which has been a sticking point in US-Caribbean relations for some time. Caribbean governments have criticised the deportation of persons who were born in the Caribbean but socialised in the US with only superficial Caribbean roots. They have also linked these deportations to increased violent crime in the Region.

    Mr. Trump has also spoken earlier about reforming legal immigration. This will make it difficult for Caribbean persons to emigrate legally to the US. This also has implications for remittances, a lifeline for many poorer Caribbean households.

    5. Mobilising Climate Finance

    Climate finance is needed to assist countries, particularly poorer and most vulnerable countries, in their climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. It is something which the Small Island Developing States in particular were adamant upon during the negotiations leading up to the eventual signing of the Paris Climate Change Agreement.

    Developed countries committed themselves to mobilising 100 billion USD in climate finance from a variety of sources each year by 2020, a pledge which dates back to Copenhagen in 2009 and one which President Obama has supported. Caribbean countries have also received climate change aid under USAID programmes.

    Mr. Trump, however,  is not a believer in anthropogenic (man-made) climate change, and has vowed to “cancel the Paris Agreement”, to ramp up fossil fuel production and to defund the clean energy initiatives. Further US contribution to the Green Climate Fund, which was established to assist developing countries like those in the Caribbean, is now in question.

    Conclusion

    Mr. Trump’s election has evoked an aura of uncertainty over what will be the future paradigm of US-Caribbean relations. Although the Caribbean had not featured in the policy discussions during the campaign, Mr. Trump’s populist rhetoric illustrated a marked departure from the tenets of current US economic and foreign policy. He has, however, been light on specifics. If implemented, his proposals will be a strong departure from current US policy, particularly in the area of climate change which I addressed in a previous post.

    Nonetheless there are two sparks of hope. Firstly, President-elect Trump is a businessman at heart and should be more attuned to a ‘dollars and cents’ argument. Secondly, Mr. Trump’s malleability in regards to his positions evinces some pragmatism on his part. It is worth remembering that for much of his public life, Mr. Trump has espoused liberal views until becoming an independent and then a Republican in later years. He has also softened some of his most ardent positions during the campaign and since winning the election, and has also been rumored to be considering some of his former Republican opponents for Cabinet positions.

    These two factors suggest that there may be more scope for discussion with a Trump administration than may initially be perceived. What will the emerging Trump Doctrine mean for the Caribbean? And whether we will see a “hard” or “soft” Trump, to borrow the clever nomenclature employed by former WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, no one knows. A clearer sense of Mr. Trump’s true policy orientation will be more discernible when more of his Cabinet picks are revealed and his proposals are elaborated upon.

    While these issues I have highlighted will not be policy priorities for the Trump Administration, they are issues of importance to Caribbean countries. As such, Caribbean governments and other stakeholders must be pro-active in their engagement with the Trump administration from day-one when he assumes office in January 2017.

    Alicia Nicholls is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • New Canadian Government Presents New Opportunities to Strengthen Caribbean-Canada Relations

    Alicia Nicholls

    The Canadian Federal election campaign and the resultant election of a new federal government have barely made a ripple in news coverage here in the Caribbean. It is a curious fact given that in the words of former CARICOM Secretary General, Edwin Carrington, Canada has always been perceived as a ‘special friend‘ to the Caribbean. This friendship, of course, has endured through consecutive Liberal and Conservative governments, including under the outgoing Conservative-led Stephen Harper administration. Given the current recession in Canada, most of the debates during the 78-day long federal election campaign focused on domestic issues,while foreign policy topics centred mostly on the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition, the Syrian refugee crisis, the Keystone XL pipeline and broader US-Canada relations. Suffice it to say, Canada’s relationship with the Caribbean did not feature in the election campaign, nor was it expected to. In spite of this, the campaign platform of the majority elected Trudeau-led Liberal Party and its young charismatic leader’s call for a “more pro-active diplomacy”, do potentially bode well for enhancing Canada-CARICOM relations.

    Trade Ties

    One of the areas on which this relationship can be deepened is trade. The volume of two-way merchandise trade between Canada and the countries of the Caribbean is admittedly small. As stated in a report, Caribbean trade represents less than one percent of Canada’s total annual trade and as such it is not surprising that the Caribbean is not on the radar of Canada’s current trade priorities. On the flip side, Canada represents the third largest market for CARICOM goods trade, only behind the US and EU markets and CARICOM actually enjoys a rare trade surplus with Canada, helped by the Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement – CARIBCAN.

    Inaugurated on June 15, 1986, CARIBCAN is a preferential agreement which gives one-way, duty free access for most goods exports originating from beneficiary countries in the Caribbean with the aim of enhancing Caribbean export trade and promoting their economic development. This agreement is limited to countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean namely: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

    There are several reasons why this current trading arrangement needs to be addressed and replaced by a free trade agreement. Firstly, as a non-reciprocal arrangement which favours only Commonwealth Caribbean countries, CARIBCAN is not compatible with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) non-discrimination rules (more specifically Article 1(1) of the GATT 1994 which deals with Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment) and has had to receive successive waivers from the WTO’s membership.

    Secondly, not all goods are afforded duty-free access under CARIBCAN. Those exceptions are products of HS Chapters 50 to 65 inclusive and products subject to MFN rates of duty which are more than thirty-five per cent (35%).Thirdly, CARIBCAN is limited to goods and does not include services-trade, which constitutes the crux of most CARICOM economies. Financial services and tourism are two major areas of services trade between Canada and the Caribbean. According to Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO) data, Canada is the region’s third largest source market of long stay arrivals, accounting for 12.3% in 2014, after the US (49.1%) and the UK (19.1%).  In regards to temporary movement of persons, Caribbean countries benefit under the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme ‘Farm Labour Programme.

    Fourthly, CARIBCAN does not provide rules on investment protection or promotion. Canadian companies are major investors in the Caribbean region, particularly in the area of financial services. Three Canadian banks have a strong presence in the Caribbean: First Caribbean (CIBC), the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia. Caribbean low tax jurisdictions like Barbados are preferred domiciles for Canadian offshore businesses. However, only two CARICOM states (Barbados and Trinidad) currently have a bilateral investment treaty with Canada, while only Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago have a tax treaty with Canada.

    Under the Stephen Harper government, Canada proactively expanded its trade and investment treaty network considerably, including the recently signed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. CARICOM countries have traditionally not shown much interest in pursuing a free trade agreement with Canada but finally agreed to discussions on a free trade agreement to replace the CARIBCAN arrangement in the 2000s. After seven disappointing rounds of negotiations beginning in 2007, Canada decided to end the negotiations due to the lack of an ambitious liberalisation target by CARICOM. In March 2015, Canada acceded to CARICOM’s request to seek another WTO waiver for CARIBCAN (until 31 December 2023).

    The pros and cons of a CARICOM-Canada trade agreement have already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. However, broadly speaking, a trade agreement would help create predictability for CARICOM-Canada goods trade and also allow for trade rules on investment protection, liberalisation and promotion and services trade (including mobility of skilled workers). CARICOM countries should use the election of a new Canadian government as impetus to re-engage with Canada on the negotiation and successful conclusion of a mutually beneficial trade and development agreement.

    Marijuana

    Another more ‘taboo’ area is the issue of marijuana. Trudeau has promised to legalise marijuana, a stark shift from the Conservatives’ stance. Jamaica has passed the Dangerous Drugs (amendment) Act which decriminalises possession of two ounces or less of marijuana and more recently, in May Jamaica’s University of Technology received a licence officially authorizing the cultivation of marijuana for scientific research. Under this new environment, there is scope for investment and cooperation between Canadian and Jamaica companies, researchers and research institutions on marijuana research, including medical marijuana, and marijuana-based products.

    Climate Change

    Due to shared values and common interests, Canada and the Caribbean have always had each other’s support on issues of a hemispheric and global significance. The Liberal Party Platform included a more pro-active stance on climate change and Mr. Trudeau repeatedly criticised Mr.Harper’s lack of leadership on climate change issues. This shift in Canadian climate change policy could be of benefit to the Caribbean small island developing states which are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including sea level rise, coral bleaching and rainfall variability. A Trudeau-led Canada therefore could be a power ally for the Caribbean in continuing global awareness of the vulnerability of SIDS to the effects of climate change. At the same time, some developed countries’ climate change mitigation policies and environmental taxes run the risk of directly or indirectly affecting developing countries. A recent example is the UK’s air passenger duty (APD), which had an adverse effect on Caribbean tourist arrivals from the UK and was mitigated only after much lobbying by Caribbean governments. As such, Caribbean countries will have to lobby to ensure that any climate change mitigation strategies implemented by the new Canadian government help but do not hinder the region.

    Development Aid

    Canada has been an important development partner for the region. Trudeau’s campaign pledge to boost Canada’s foreign aid is encouraging and it is likely that some of the aid initiatives implemented under the Harper administration, such as the Improved Access to Justice in the Caribbean, Judicial Reform and Institution Strengthening in the Caribbean project announced at the Summit of the Americas in April 2015 in Panama City, Panama  will be continued.

    Immigration

    Canada has traditionally had a pretty ‘open door’ immigration policy, of which the Caribbean has been able to benefit. The Harper administration saw the introduction of several controversial measures which Trudeau criticised during the campaign. Caribbean immigrants in Canada have contributed to Canadian society in a variety of fields, including the highest corridors of government. The Haitian-born Michaelle Jean, former Governor General is just but one example. It should be noted that there are Canadians living in and contributing to the Caribbean as well. Trudeau’s platform includes a number of policies aimed at reforming Canada’s immigration policy and includes policies promoting family reunification, restoring the maximum age of dependents and repealing aspects of Citizenship Act under Bill-C-24 which he argued created “second class citizens”.This is encouraging for Caribbean immigrants living and contributing in Canada.

    Taxation

    There is however one area of concern. In a marked shift from Harper’s tax policy, Mr.Trudeau has proposed a middle class tax cut financed by raising taxes on the ‘one percent’ and corporations. Canadian tax policy is of importance to offshore financial centres in the Caribbean, especially Barbados which has traditionally been one of the most attractive jurisdictions for Canadian businesses due to its low taxes. There has been concern that Canada’s widening network of tax information exchange agreements has undermined the attractiveness Barbados has had to Canadian businesses. In an effort to boost revenue collection, it is likely that there will be greater emphasis by a Trudeau administration not just on tax evasion (which is illegal), but also tax avoidance (which is legal), including Canadian companies’ use of Caribbean low tax jurisdictions for more efficient tax management. As such, this is something which Caribbean offshore jurisdictions will have to monitor closely to ensure they are not unfairly branded or punished as ‘tax havens’.

    The economic challenges Canada currently faces, exacerbated by low oil prices and sluggish global growth, will all ultimately determine the new Canadian government’s trade and foreign policy priorities. In spite of this, Canada and the Caribbean’s ‘special’ friendship has been embraced by successive Canadian governments, including under Mr. Harper. Given the tone of Mr. Trudeau’s foreign policy campaign rhetoric, it is unlikely this will change. While not specifically directed to the Caribbean, Mr. Trudeau’s campaign policy proposals appear promising for Canada-Caribbean relations and the many Caribbean descendants living in Canada. They potentially provide scope for greater Canada-CARICOM engagement in a variety of fora, something which Caribbean leaders should continue to actively promote.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and international relations.