Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Category: International Law

  • Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in Review Part I: The Investment Chapter

    Alicia Nicholls

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is the largest regional free trade deal concluded to date, creating a free trade area which encompasses 12 Pacific-rim countries and which accounts for 40% of global GDP. The TPP in its preamble speaks of the goal to establish a comprehensive regional agreement that promotes economic integration to liberalise trade and investment, bring economic growth and social benefits, among other things. However, like NAFTA over two decades ago, the TPP Agreement has been mired in controversy from its embryonic stages, with opinion sharply divided on whether it truly advances global trade or whether it sets the clock back on development issues such as labour rights and the environment. This article attempts a sober look at some of the main provisions of the investment chapter of the TPP and is the first in a series of articles which will examine some of the key aspects of the Agreement.

    Framers of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) have to play a delicate balancing act between protecting the rights of investors while at the same time preserving the right of host states to regulate in the public interest and in the interest of fulfilling policy objectives.

    The TPP’s investment chapter shares many striking but unsurprising similarities with the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 2012. It includes a long list of definitions followed by substantive provisions detailing investor rights and finally a separate section on procedural provisions providing for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).

    Definition of “investment”

    The definition of “investment”  in the TPP Agreement is broad akin to that in the US Model BIT 2012. It defines an investment as “every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk”. It outlines some of the forms which an investment for the purposes of the Agreement may take. The definition of “investor” is standard and does not merit much discussion for present purposes.

    Treatment

    The TPP includes national treatment and Most Favoured Nation treatment clauses, which are standard clauses in nearly all IIAs. The National treatment provision (Article 9.4) provides that parties are to accord to investors of another Party and their covered investments treatment no less favourable than that they accord in like circumstances, to their own investors and their investors’ own investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. It establishes pre-establishment rights, which is typical of US BITs and US-modelled IIAs.

    In recent years the inclusion of the Most Favoured Nation clause in IIAs has been controversial as it allows for treaty shopping. Investors who are claimants in disputes have sought to rely on these clauses to benefit from more favourable treatment provided by the respondent state in treaties with third parties. In Maffezini v Spain, a precedent was established where an investor was able to benefit from more favourable dispute settlement provisions in a treaty which the respondent state had entered into with a third party state. As a result, a few IIAs have opted to omit MFN clauses.

    One of the criticisms which have been levelled at the TPP is that the MFN clause potentially negates any progress made on rebalancing the rights of investors with states’ rights to regulate by allowing investors to cherry pick from provisions in older and more investor-friendly agreements.

    To their credit, the drafters of the TPP have sought to build in several safeguards. Firstly, at section 9.5(3) a carve-out is made exempting procedural provisions such as those in Section B (ISDS) from applicability of the MFN clause. Secondly, it uses the qualifier term “in like circumstances”, although a broad interpretation by an arbitration tribunal may still be possible.

    Minimum Standard of Treatment

    The minimum standard of treatment provided for under the TPP is similar to those found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and IIAs in general. Per Article 9.6, each Party must accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.

    The FET provision in many BITs has been the cause of headache for many states due to its vagueness. This has made it open to interpretation by tribunals which have tended to expand the scope of FET to encompass rights beyond customary international law standards. The proliferation of FET cases brought by investors under NAFTA’s ISDS prompted the NAFTA Commission to release an interpretative note which declared definitively that fair and equitable standard of treatment was no more than the minimum standard of treatment afforded to aliens under customary international law. This language was also included in the US and Canada model BITs.

    The TPP drafters sought to mitigate this in several ways. Article 9.6(2) clearly states that the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. For greater certainty, the framers go further to define what they mean by “FET” and “full protection and security”.

    The framers also go to lengths to define what does not constitute a breach. Article 9.6(3) states that determination of a breach of another Article does not establish a breach of Article 9.6. Furthermore, neither the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations nor that a subsidy or grant has not been issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or reduced, by a Party, do not constitute breaches of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.

    Expropriation and Compensation

    One of the most pervasive threats posed to foreign investors in a foreign country is direct or indirect expropriation of their investment by the host state without compensation being paid. Similar to standard BITs, the TPP provides that state parties may take measures which directly or indirectly expropriate a covered investment but only in the circumstances outlined under Article 9.7(1) and with compensation.

    Performance Requirements

    In its preamble, the framers of the TPP talk about recognising the differences in the levels of development and diversity of economies of member states. However, how has this been borne out in the provisions? Performance requirements have been typically used by countries to ensure that investors add value to the local economy. These include requirements on the investor to buy local goods and services, set levels of exports of goods and services, technology transfer and domestic content requirements. The TRIMS Agreement prohibits trade-related performance requirements. However, it has been common practice for US-based FTAs to include prohibitions against all performance requirements. The TPP follows this approach. Four of the twelve parties to the TPP are developing countries.  This therefore will have an effect on those developing countries members of the Agreement as their ability to ensure investors make a contribution to their economies through the use of non-trade related performance requirements will be compromised.

    Free Transfer

    One of the basic assurances investors look for is the ability to move their assets, such as repatriated profits, freely and without delay into and out of the host country. A standard provision in BITs, Article 9.8 of the TPP protects this right and is subject to the exceptions in 9.8(4). Of concern is that no exception is included for where the host state is encountering exceptional economic or financial challenges, such as currency and balance of payments difficulties. The omission of an exception for financial and economic difficulties is typical of US treaty practice but some treaties such as some UK BITs allow a carve-out for this. Such a provision would be particularly useful for developing countries which are generally more vulnerable to balance of payments difficulties.

    Special Formalities and Information Requirements

    Article 9.13 of the TPP provides carve-outs from National Treatment and MFN for special formalities and information requirements. It includes a carve-out from the National Treatment provision, allowing a Party to adopt and maintain measures which prescribes special formalities in connection with a covered investment, such as residency requirements for registration and requirements that a covered investment be legally constituted under the laws or regulations of the Party, provided that these formalities do not materially impair the protections afforded by the Party to investors of another Party and covered investments under the Chapter.

    It also makes a carve-out from the National Treatment and MFN provisions allowing a Party to require an investor of another Party or its covered investment to provide information concerning that investment solely for informational or statistical purposes. However, such information is to be kept confidential from any disclosure which would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or the covered investment.

    Carve-outs for Regulatory Objectives

    Investment Agreements are a balancing act between the rights of investors and the rights of host states to regulate in the public interest and in the interest of fulfilling policy objectives. Article 9.15 attempts to make a carve-out by providing that nothing in the Agreement should be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives. However, what happens if the measure in question is not consistent with this Chapter. The inclusion of the phrase “otherwise consistent with this Chapter” is a loophole which potentially negates the efficacy of this carve-out.

    Corporate Social Responsibility

    The provision on CSR in Article 9.16 is rather weak; it is drafted in best endeavour language and is not enforceable. It simply reaffirms the importance of each Party to encourage enterprises operating in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognised CSR principles into their internal policies. A stronger CSR provision would have been ideal here, particularly a requirement that investors comply with all applicable laws in the host State, comply with international labour standards and adopt environmentally sustainable practices.

    ISDS

    The most disdain for the TPP’s investment chapter has been targeted at the ISDS provisions. ISDS systems allow an investor to bring a claim directly against the host state. A feature of investment law, they are an innovation in public international law as there is no requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies and the investor can bring the claim directly without having to go through its state of nationality.

    Critics argue that ISDS provisions only serve to give investors the ability to sue host States for introducing public policy legislation deemed to hurt their investment. The truth is that the majority of BITs have ISDS provisions. In this regard the TPP is neither unique nor more onerous. ISDS systems are more efficient, while the use of an arbitration tribunal instead of the local courts ensures that decisions are rendered fairly and free of political bias.

    That withstanding, the ISDS has many well-documented flaws. ISDS cases are a costly exercise and have been a painful experience for those States which have found themselves on the wrong end of an arbitral award. However, UNCTAD data shows that of the 356 known cases concluded, 37 percent were won by the State, 25% by the investor and 28% were settled. Therefore, it is not an automatic case that the investor wins.

    The TPP provides several options of arbitral forum and includes several provisions which attempt to address some of the criticisms made about the ISDS. There is the requirement that the parties to the dispute attempt to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation. Claims cannot be made after more than three years and six months have elapsed from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach alleged.

    Lack of transparency has been one of the biggest criticisms leveled at the ISDS system as many arbitral proceedings and awards are not made public. Article 9.23 which deals with transparency in arbitral proceedings, provides that certain documents are to be made public “promptly”. What constitutes “prompt” is not defined and will likely depend on the circumstances. The tribunal is to conduct hearings in public, a marked departure from what is provided in most IIAs. However, Article 9.23(3) makes exceptions for protected information and information that may be withheld under the articles on security exceptions and disclosure of information. The TPP’s ISDS allows for the consolidation of claims arising out of the same set of events or circumstances.

    In determining whether to make an award to the prevailing disputing party of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection.is warranted, the TPP provides that the tribunal is to consider whether either the claimant’s claim or the respondent’s objection was frivolous, and is to provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to comment. If the tribunal determines such claims to be frivolous, the tribunal may award to the respondent reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.

    My verdict on the Investment Chapter

    The investment provisions in the TPP are generally no more generous to investors than those found in most standard BITs, including the US Model BIT 2012. Indeed, in several cases the TPP’s framers have attempted to close some of the loopholes which have been so troublesome in older BITs, such as with the FET clause. There are some weaknesses and grey areas in the Agreement. The biggest concern is the MFN clause which if a liberal interpretation by an arbitral tribunal is given may ultimately undo a lot of the improvements made in the TPP by allowing investors to rely on more favourable provisions in other agreements concluded by the host state. While there are some exceptions and additions, the influence of the US model BIT 2012 on the language and content of the TPP’s Investment Chapter is quite strong. The TPP also falls into the same trap many IIAs do in that strong investor protections are not matched by strong obligations on the investor to adhere to local laws, follow environmentally sustainable practices or labour standards. Perhaps the framers missed a chance here to advance investment treaty practice on this. While the TPP is not as development-friendly as one would wish, its investor protections are generally no more generous than most traditional BITs. However, the real test will be in the Treaty’s operation once it comes into force.

    More articles in this TPP article series are available here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • A step towards progress between Haiti and the Dominican Republic?

    Alicia Nicholls

    The news this week of progress in the talks at Jimani between Haiti and the Dominican Republic to address, inter alia, the long-standing migration issue between the two countries is welcomed news. The fragile diplomatic relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti took a sharp turn for the worse in the latter part of last year following a controversial ruling by the DR’s Constitutional Court  on September 23.

    The DR’s Constitutional Court had been called on to consider an application made by Ms. Juliana Deguis Pierre that the Electoral Office be ordered to issue her with a national ID card which she had been denied on the basis that she was the child of Haitian parents and not Dominican. Ms. Pierre was born and raised in Los Jovillos, an area in Yamasa municipality (in Monte Plata province) where many persons of Haitian origin live. Denying her request, the Court ruled that Ms. Pierre was not a Dominican citizen but a child born of ‘foreigners in transit’. Using the case as an opportunity to elaborate on Dominican nationality law, the Court applied the restriction on the jus soli principle per Article 18 of the 2010 Constitution, holding that under Dominican law birth on Dominican soil did not automatically confer citizenship on an individual and that for a person born after 1929 to be deemed a citizen of the Dominican Republic, he or she must have been born to at least one parent with legal status in the country. All other persons who did not meet this criterion would be classified as being ‘extranjeros en transito” (foreigners in transit) and therefore as never having had Dominican citizenship.  A copy of the court’s judgment can be read here (in Spanish).

    The principle in Dominican immigration law of “foreigner in transit” is not new as it was included in the Constitution of 1929 and in subsequent constitutional reforms, including as recently as in Article 18.3 of the reformed constitution of January 26, 2010. However, prior to the 2010 Constitution, citizenship in the Dominican Republic was conferred on an absolute jus soli basis as evidenced by the language used in previous constitutions, which excluded any reference to the requirement of being born of Dominican parentage. The Court’s retroactive ruling which applies the jus sanguinis principle, established in Article 18 of the 2010 Constitution, to those born after 1929 (and not just to those born after 2010) leaves several generations of Dominicans of foreign descent in a legal limbo as to their status. The retroactive application by the Court of Article 18 to this case seems especially harsh given that the 2010 constitution itself does not indicate that it is meant  to apply retroactively, evidenced by Article 18.2. which states that “Dominicans [also] include those who enjoyed nationality before the entry into force of the Constitution”. A copy of the 2010 Constitution may be found here (in Spanish).

    While persons born to parents of other nationalities will be affected, it is persons of Haitian descent who make up the overwhelming majority of persons to whom this ruling would apply.  Some human rights groups estimate that as many as 200,000 persons of Haitian descent may be affected by the ruling. Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which share the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, have always had a tense and complicated relationship which has its roots in the colonial era and in subsequent historical events. These events include the 22-year Haitian occupation of the Dominican Republic in the immediate post-colonial period before the latter attained its independence, and the slaughter of thousands of Haitians by the Trujillo dictatorship in 1937. The socioeconomic disparities between the two states and their cultural, religious, linguistic and racial differences, a legacy of colonialism, have only helped to further deepen the gulf between these two sister nations. A constant source of tension between the two states has been undocumented Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic. Ever since the 1920s when Haitian workers were actively recruited to work in the Dominican Republic’s sugar industry, the Dominican Republic has been an attractive employment market for seasonal and long-term Haitian workers searching for a better life for themselves and their families. Many of those affected by the ruling include Haitians who had been brought in to work on Dominican farms during the 1920s and their descendants born and raised in the DR.

    Haitian emigration to the Dominican Republic has helped to foment anti-Haitian sentiment among some Dominicans, a sentiment which is also boosted because of the Dominican Republic’s own racially stratified society where darker skin is still synonymous with being poor and uneducated.

    The immigration policy of states is always a touchy subject because of the importance it has for national security. Indeed, it is no doubt that inherent in being a sovereign nation is the right of the state to protect its borders. Both customary international law and the Montevideo Convention of 1933 provide that no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another. Further, international law gives states the right to dictate their own policies in regards to conferring nationality.

    However, these rights are not absolute as they are subject, inter alia, to the various international human rights treaties which States, like the DR, have acceded to, and by which they agree to respect human rights and to be held accountable for any violation thereof. The human rights implications of the constitutional court’s ruling cannot be overlooked on the basis that the ruling is solely in the province of the DR’s internal affairs. The ruling has been condemned by CARICOM states (of which Haiti is a member) and by various human rights groups as being ‘racist’ and ‘xenophobic’ in nature and with potentially devastating human rights consequences.

    Although Dominican authorities deny that the ruling leaves anyone stateless and argue that a plan for naturalisation of affected persons would be implemented, the Court’s retroactive application of Article 18 of the 2010 Constitution does have the effect of stripping those affected of citizenship, depriving them of the rights inherent with nationality, such as the right to vote, the ability to get married and the right of access to basic services such as education, employment and health care, and bringing with it the possibility of expulsion from the land of their birth. Like Juliana Deguis Pierre, many of those three generations of Haitians who are affected were born in, and have lived in the Dominican Republic all their lives, have little or no ties to Haiti and speak no Haitian creole.  In light of the ruling, CARICOM has agreed to indefinitely defer consideration of the Dominican Republic’s longstanding application to accede to CARICOM.

    Happily, it appears tentatively that some progress is being made to address this unfortunate state of affairs. Both countries have agreed to establish a Joint Commission to discuss not just issues relating to migration, but also matters of trade, the environment, security, among others. The Dominican Republic has stated that it will as shortly as February 27th bring legislation to address the situation of those born in the Dominican Republic but who currently have no documentation. It is hoped that such legislation will undo the human rights injustice which this ruling portends, affirming the right of those affected to Dominican nationality and being a needed step towards addressing and correcting  the discrimination which many native born Dominicans of Haitian  descent continue to face.

    Alicia Nicholls is a trade policy specialist and law graduate. She can be followed on Twitter at @Licylaw.