Category Archives: Investment

ECJ rules arbitration clauses in Intra-EU BITs contrary to EU Law

Alicia Nicholls

In a landmark and much-anticipated judgement delivered on Tuesday, March 6th, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that arbitration clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded between European Union Member States were incompatible with, and had ‘an adverse effect’ on EU law.

The background to the judgement involved a claim brought against the Slovak Republic by a Dutch private sickness insurance services subsidiary, Achmea, after the former had briefly prohibited the distribution of profits generated by private sickness insurance activities. This prohibition was later ruled unconstitutional by that country’s Constitutional Court, and Achmea subsequently brought a claim for damages under the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia (Netherlands- Slovak Republic BIT), to which the Slovak Republic had succeeded upon Czechoslovakia’s dissolution.

In 2012 an arbitral tribunal established in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Netherlands-Slovak Republic BIT found in favour of Achmea and ordered the Slovak Republic to pay 22.1 million euros in damages. As German law applied (since Frankfurt am Main was the chosen place of arbitration), the Slovak Republic turned to the German courts to have the arbitral award set aside.

The Slovak Republic argued that the arbitration clause in Article 8 of the Netherlands-Slovak Republic BIT was compatible with Articles 18, 267 and 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Given the importance of this question and its implications for the many remaining intra-EU BITs in force, the German Federal Court of Justice referred this question to the ECJ

In its judgment, the ECJ held that

Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States, such as Article 8 of the BIT, under which an investor from one of those Member States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Member State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tribunal whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept.

The ECJ came to its decision based on the fact that arbitral tribunals established under such treaties may be called on to interpret and apply EU law, but could not be classified as a court or tribunal ‘of a Member State’ within the meaning of Article 267 of the TFEU. The tribunals had no power to refer matters to the ECJ and could stop disputes from “being resolved in a manner that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law even though they might concern the interpretation or application of that law”. The Court went further by stating that Article 8 of the BIT in question “has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law” and was not compatible with the principle of sincere cooperation.

Unlike state to state dispute settlement, ISDS allows an investor of a party who believes its rights have been violated to bring a claim directly against the host State before an arbitration tribunal. The rationale was that it precluded investors from having to convince their home State to bring a claim on their behalf, and was also borne out of distrust of the courts in host States (usually mainly developing countries).

ISDS has come under much fire, particularly due to inconsistent arbitral rulings (which are final under most BITs with these clauses), the lack of transparency in the process, and the concern about the system’s implications for States’ regulatory flexibility and authority in the public interest, particularly with regard to the protection of public health and the environment. Moreover, for small States, such as those in the Caribbean, the financial and reputational burdens of an adverse judgement are magnified.

In the EU context, intra-EU BITs have long been a controversial issue due to treaty shopping; investors have often favoured the ISDS provisions in intra-EU BITs over EU judicial channels for the settlement of disputes. This is costly for EU Member States having to defend themselves against claims and has implications for the uniform interpretation of EU law.

Newer investment agreements, including BITs,  have increasingly included express language regarding a party’s right to regulate in the public interest,  have considerably narrowed the scope of applicability of ISDS clauses, or have abandoned ISDS altogether. In light of the growing backlash against ISDS within the EU, the European Commission has already signalled that it is moving away from the ISDS model of dispute settlement in favour of an investment court as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada shows.

Implications for Caribbean BITs with EU countries  

The ECJ ruling is clear that the ISDS clauses in the nearly 200 BITs currently in force between EU member states inter se are incompatible with EU law. What is not so clear-cut is whether this also applies to BITs concluded between individual EU member countries and third States, such as those in the Caribbean. In such cases, the governing law in such disputes might not be EU law but the law of the third State.

While there is little evidence that the existence of a BIT is a major factor in a European investor’s decision to invest in the Caribbean, given that the BITs existing between European and Caribbean countries are generally of an older vintage and in need of modernisation, the time is ripe to have a relook at the regime for the protection and promotion of investment between the EU and CARIFORUM countries which is currently fragmented. Such a review is provided for under Article 74 of the Agreement.

At the time of the negotiation of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement, the European Commission only had competence to negotiate market access for investment, which explains why the investment chapter (Chapter 2: Commercial Presence) of the EPA is limited mainly to market access, national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, with some provisions on investor behaviour and a requirement that parties do not lower standards to attract FDI. More extensive investment protection provisions, such as the controversial fair and equitable treatment clauses, are covered in the BITs between individual EU and Caribbean States, many of which were signed before the EPA and also lack the more development friendly provisions of newer BITs.

Conclusion

The ECJ’s ruling is significant and may be considered another nail in the ISDS coffin. It is worth considering what, if any, impact this ruling may have for EU Member States’ BITs with third States, such as those in the Caribbean, and whether it is time to re-examine the regime for EU-CARIFORUM investment as provided for under Article 74 of the EPA.

The full judgement may be viewed here.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

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Has the Caribbean Basin Initiative Outlived its Usefulness to CARICOM countries?

Alicia Nicholls

This September the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) released its biennial report on the operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic and Recovery Act (CBERA), one of the components of the Caribbean Basin Initiative under which CARICOM countries currently enjoy non-reciprocal, preferential access to the US market for most merchandise exports.

Three years ago I authored an article questioning whether the CBI was still relevant and beneficial to CARICOM countries. In that article I had highlighted that while the CBI still has relevance for CARICOM countries, its structure meant that CARICOM countries have benefited unequally and risk losing any margin of preference if its WTO waiver is not extended. I had concluded that a reform of the CBI would have been a preferred option but that a CARICOM-US FTA which had a trade and development focus could be more beneficial in the long term to CARICOM countries once it allows for special and differential treatment and capacity building assistance.

The USITC reports that average CBERA utilisation rates fell in 2014 and that the impact, though positive, has been small and again limited to a few exports and a few countries. This prompts two questions: has the CBI outlived its usefulness and is it time for CARICOM countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US?

Current CARICOM-US Trading Arrangements

Most CARICOM countries currently enjoy non-reciprocal duty-free or reduced duty access for most merchandise exports (about 5,700 HTS 8-digit tariff lines) to the US market under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The CBI is comprised of CBERA (non-expiring) and CBTPA (expiring September 30, 2020). Haiti also enjoys additional preferences under the HOPE Acts (Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts of 2006 (HOPE I) and of 2008 (HOPE II)) and the Haitian Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 which give preferential treatment to Haitian apparel, textiles, and certain other goods.

The stated goal of the CBI is to contribute to the economic growth and development of beneficiaries. The seventeen Caribbean beneficiary countries and territories are: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Though a CARICOM country, Suriname is not a CBERA beneficiary.

In May 2013, CARICOM countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in Port of Spain, Trinidad following a meeting between CARICOM Heads of Government and US Vice President Joe Biden. The TIFA, an updated agreement to one signed in 1991, is not an FTA. While it outlines several objectives and goals, it does not create binding commitments or market access. It does however create a CARICOM-US Trade and Investment Council which will be charged with executing the agreement. An annex to the Agreement called the Initial Action Agenda sets out priority areas for action. Currently, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago are the only CARICOM countries which currently have bilateral investment treaties in force with the US.

Current Level of CARICOM-US Trade

The US is CARICOM countries’ largest trading partner for goods and services trade and a major tourism source market for CARICOM countries. However, the $8.5 billion USD worth of total US exports from CBERA countries (with and without preferences) only accounted for 0.36% of total US’ imports from the world, and declined from $8.9 billion in 2013 and $12 billion in 2012 (USITC 2015).

US product imports from CBERA countries are concentrated primarily in the energy and mining and manufacturing sectors (USITC 2015). Trinidad & Tobago, Haiti, The Bahamas, and Guyana jointly accounted for 89.1 percent of the value of US CBERA imports in 2014 (USITC 2015).

The USITC 2015 reports that CBERA utilisation rates, that is, CBERA imports as a percentage of total US imports from that country, have fluctuated over the past five years and have varied by country. After rising to 26.5% in 2013, average CBERA utilisation rates fell to 23.1% in 2014, although a few countries saw an increase in their utilisation rates during this period. This means that of the CBERA countries’ exports to the US in 2014 ($8.5 billion), only 23.1% ($1.97 billion), or less than a quarter, were done under CBERA. Most CARICOM merchandise exports to the US are therefore not under the CBERA but are either under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or under Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied rates.

According to the USITC Report, while Belize had the highest CBERA utilisation rate (62.5%) and was the fifth largest source of US imports under the CBERA in 2014, Trinidad & Tobago was the leading source of US imports under CBERA but registered the 6th highest CBERA utilisation rate for the same period. Trinidad & Tobago which has been the main beneficiary of CBERA due to its energy exports (mainly methanol and crude petroleum) has seen its total imports and utilisation rate decline due to declining US consumption, increased US production of crude oil and maintenance and shutdown of some factories in Trinidad (USITC 2015).

CBERA is of less importance for smaller islands of the region whose economies are services-based, mostly tourism and financial services. St. Lucia’s utilisation rate dropped from 51.7% in 2010 to just 7.5% in 2014. While Barbados saw its utilisation rate increase from a mere 3.8% in 2013 to 10.6% in 2014, this still is down from its rate of 17% in 2010.

The good news is that despite my prediction back in 2012, the WTO Council for Trade in Goods considered and approved the US’ waiver request for CBERA again and it is now up to the General Council to adopt it. Additionally, some of the products which are eligible for dutyfree access under the CBERA are not eligible under the GSP. However, more sobering is that the weaknesses of the CBI remain, including the exceptions in its product coverage, the lack of eligibility for services trade and certain stringent product eligibility requirements. Another problem is its unpredictability due to its unilateral nature. A beneficiary’s status may be revoked or the programme discontinued at any time. As an example, the US recently indicated it will suspend South Africa’s benefits under AGOA, a preferential programme for African countries, for allegedly failing to make continual progress towards eliminating barriers to U.S. trade and investment.

Generalised System of Preferences

Besides CBI, certain CARICOM countries also currently benefit under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the oldest of the US’ trade preference programmes. Similar to the CBI, the GSP is a unilateral arrangement providing non-reciprocal duty-free access to eligible products originating in qualifying countries. Unlike the CBI which currently applies only to Caribbean countries, according to the USTR Report 2015, as of January 1, 2015, there were 122 designated GSP beneficiary developing countries, of which 43 were LDCs.

Under the GSP less tariff categories and products benefit from preferences than under the CBERA. However, LDCs, such as Haiti, are entitled to additional product coverage.

The only CARICOM countries currently eligible for benefits under the US GSP are Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Eligibility of a country for beneficiary status is subject to both economic and political considerations. Among other things, the US President is prohibited by statute from designating any communist countries (with exceptions) or countries which have expropriated, imposed taxes or other measures on US property as GSP beneficiaries.

If he/she finds that a country is sufficiently competitive or developed, the President may withdraw, suspend or limit the GSP status of any beneficiary country. Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad & Tobago are not currently GSP beneficiaries.

The GSP expired on July 31 2013 and was renewed retroactively on June 29, 2015. It has been extended to December 31, 2017. The future of the GSP beyond December 2017 is uncertain. However, some in the US believe GSP benefits should only be extended to LDCs, in which case only Haiti would benefit among current CARICOM beneficiary countries. Some so-called import sensitive products for the US, especially those in which developing countries have a competitive advantage such as most textiles and apparel, are not eligible. GSP imports are also subject to more stringent rules of origin than those under CBERA.

Would an FTA with the US be the answer?

Several former CBERA beneficiaries have concluded FTAs with the US, including five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR in 2004) and Panama (US-Panama FTA in 2012). Given the issues outlined with both the CBI and the GSP, should CARICOM countries do the same?

Since the failure of the CARICOM-Canada negotiations, CARICOM still only has one FTA with a developed partner (the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU). CARIFORUM’s negotiation position during the EPA negotiations was strengthened by the presence of the Dominican Republic. Such would not be the case in FTA negotiations with the US.
US FTAs, even those with developing countries such as CAFTA-DR and US-Panama, are generally light on development provisions and strong on those which provide protection for US investors and their investments, and for intellectual property rights.

For a sense of the US’ negotiation prowess, just take into consideration that with just a few exceptions the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)’s investment chapter agreed to by 11 other negotiating partners is practically a carbon copy of the US’ Model BIT 2012. CARICOM countries will have to be strategic and clear on what they want to achieve and what are their deal breakers.

Priorities for CARICOM would be recognition of CARICOM countries’ small size and economic vulnerability and asymmetry in the commitments. As such they would likely be lobbying for special and differential treatment, development cooperation provisions, including technical assistance and capacity building to assist them, especially CARICOM lesser developed countries, in taking advantage of the market access opportunities an FTA with the US would open. With regards to services trade, CARICOM countries would likely seek enhanced commitments from the US in regards to (Mode 4) temporary entry for CARICOM natural persons.

Under the CBI, Caribbean countries are not required to extend duty-free treatment to like US imports into their territories. One of the main drawbacks to an FTA with the US will be the loss of tax revenues from the removal and reduction of tariffs on US imports as would be required under an FTA. One way to mitigate this would be lobbying for asymmetric and phased tariff removal, similar to what was committed to under the CARIFORUM-EPA with the EU. However, US FTAs, including CAFTA-DR are always ambitious in their scope in regards to liberalisation. Under the EPA, CARIFORUM was able to exclude a number of their most sensitive sectors from liberalisation. A deal breaker for any FTA with the US would be the extent to which CARICOM countries are able to protect nationally-important and sensitive industries from the stiff competition and possible death of these sectors and job losses if liberalised to competing US products too quickly. Civil society and industry consultations thus would be crucial to determining which sectors are most sensitive.

While an FTA with the US will likely increase the volume of US goods into CARICOM, the reverse is not necessarily guaranteed. Most CARICOM merchandise goods exports are already competing with other countries’ exports under normal trade conditions (i.e. at the MFN applied rate), and not under preferences. Therefore, the margin of preference secured for some CARICOM goods under a trade agreement may be negligible.

Investment treaty practice has evolved since the days when Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago signed their BITs with the US. The investor protections provided by a comprehensive investment chapter in a US-CARICOM FTA, coupled with robust investment promotion provisions, could serve as a signal for greater US investment to the region, while at the same time include development-friendly provisions and provisions which reinforce the right of the State to regulate.

As CARICOM service providers enjoy no preferential access to the US market, they face competition from service providers of countries which already have FTAs with the US. However, even when market access is created under an FTA for cross border services trade, there will be the need for mutual recognition agreements and visa waiver agreements in order to translate market access into market penetration.

The US will likely insist on a negative list approach to market access liberalisation of service sectors, the approach used in NAFTA and its subsequent FTAs. The negative list approach requires liberalisation of all sectors unless a reservation is specifically made in a country’s list of reservations. CARICOM countries and other developing countries have preferred to use the positive list approach used under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is a more development friendly approach which means only sectors specifically listed in a country’s schedule of commitments are liberalised and thus allows for the gradual liberalisation of sectors in keeping with each country’s development goals.
The US will also likely insist on no less favourable treatment than what CARICOM countries had agreed to with the EC under the EPA. CARICOM will also have to bear in mind that given a provision in the MFN clause in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the EU can insist on any more favourable treatment given to US than was given the EU under the EPA.

US treaty practice typically includes binding commitments on non-trade issues, such as labour. It has an on-going claim against Guatemala before the CAFTA-DR dispute settlement body in which it claims Guatemala has failed to meet its obligations under the CAFTA-DR agreement relating to effective enforcement of labour laws.

There are currently three main trade issues between the US and CARICOM countries which have to be addressed expeditiously even without an FTA. CARICOM rum exports are losing market share in the US market because of large subsidies given to rum producers in two US territories: the USVI and Puerto Rico. Secondly, the US/Antigua & Barbuda cross border gambling services dispute remains unresolved despite a WTO ruling in Antigua & Barbuda’s favour. An FTA will not necessarily resolve these issues as the DR which is a part of CAFTA-DR has complained about the rum issue as well.

Thirdly, the US has for a long time criticised copyright protection and enforcement in the Caribbean, a possible issue which might trigger disputes under any future US-CARICOM FTA. Caribbean countries constantly feature on the US Watch Lists under its annual Special 301 Report. The 2015 Special 301 Report is no different.

The Bottom Line

CARICOM countries should continue to take advantage of the non-reciprocal duty-free access to the US market provided by the CBI for their goods while these benefits last. However, while I do not think the CBI has outlived its usefulness just yet, it has several deficiencies which means it should not be treated as a long term strategy for boosting CARICOM trade with the US.

As mentioned, CBERA exports as a proportion of total CARICOM exports to the US are small and declining. The beneficial impact on regional exports has been unevenly spread and its unilateral nature, like the GSP, means benefits may be discontinued by the US at any time.

For the short term, the updated TIFA presents the best opportunity for CARICOM through the US-CARICOM Trade Council to lobby for reform of the CBI, address the long-standing rum and internet gambling disputes, and to negotiate concrete frameworks for increasing trade and investment between the US and CARICOM countries. Success on this front will not be automatic and will require strong regional cooperation, as well as effort on the part of both CARICOM and the US to ensure that concrete initiatives and commitments come out of these efforts.

However, given the importance of the US market for CARICOM and the growing importance of services-trade to regional economies, CARICOM will at some point  in the future have to consider, albeit cautiously, negotiating an FTA with the US as part of a long term plan to create a more predictable trade framework for US-CARICOM trade.

I say in the future because negotiations are an expensive and human-resource intensive exercise and require extensive research and stakeholder consultations. At the moment CARICOM countries are still grappling with the lingering effects of the 2008/2009 crisis on their economies and are also still struggling to implement many of the commitments made to the EU under the EPA. Progress on deepening CARICOM integration itself has ground to a halt and it would be easier to formulate a consolidated negotiating position as a more integrated region. I say cautiously because based on its current treaty practice the US is unlikely to extend the same level of special and differential treatment or development assistance which CARIFORUM was able to secure from the EU.

An interesting space to watch would be the on-going Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the US and EU. The EU is currently insisting on the inclusion of certain sustainable development provisions into the agreement. An example is its recently released proposed text for the investment chapter. It would be interesting to see whether these provisions make it into the final TTIP text and that could help make it easier for CARICOM to insist on some of the same provisions in any future FTA with the US.

For my previous article on the relevance of the CBI, please click here.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. Please note that the views expressed in this article are solely hers. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in Review Part I: The Investment Chapter

Alicia Nicholls

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is the largest regional free trade deal concluded to date, creating a free trade area which encompasses 12 Pacific-rim countries and which accounts for 40% of global GDP. The TPP in its preamble speaks of the goal to establish a comprehensive regional agreement that promotes economic integration to liberalise trade and investment, bring economic growth and social benefits, among other things. However, like NAFTA over two decades ago, the TPP Agreement has been mired in controversy from its embryonic stages, with opinion sharply divided on whether it truly advances global trade or whether it sets the clock back on development issues such as labour rights and the environment. This article attempts a sober look at some of the main provisions of the investment chapter of the TPP and is the first in a series of articles which will examine some of the key aspects of the Agreement.

Framers of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) have to play a delicate balancing act between protecting the rights of investors while at the same time preserving the right of host states to regulate in the public interest and in the interest of fulfilling policy objectives.

The TPP’s investment chapter shares many striking but unsurprising similarities with the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 2012. It includes a long list of definitions followed by substantive provisions detailing investor rights and finally a separate section on procedural provisions providing for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).

Definition of “investment”

The definition of “investment”  in the TPP Agreement is broad akin to that in the US Model BIT 2012. It defines an investment as “every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk”. It outlines some of the forms which an investment for the purposes of the Agreement may take. The definition of “investor” is standard and does not merit much discussion for present purposes.

Treatment

The TPP includes national treatment and Most Favoured Nation treatment clauses, which are standard clauses in nearly all IIAs. The National treatment provision (Article 9.4) provides that parties are to accord to investors of another Party and their covered investments treatment no less favourable than that they accord in like circumstances, to their own investors and their investors’ own investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. It establishes pre-establishment rights, which is typical of US BITs and US-modelled IIAs.

In recent years the inclusion of the Most Favoured Nation clause in IIAs has been controversial as it allows for treaty shopping. Investors who are claimants in disputes have sought to rely on these clauses to benefit from more favourable treatment provided by the respondent state in treaties with third parties. In Maffezini v Spain, a precedent was established where an investor was able to benefit from more favourable dispute settlement provisions in a treaty which the respondent state had entered into with a third party state. As a result, a few IIAs have opted to omit MFN clauses.

One of the criticisms which have been levelled at the TPP is that the MFN clause potentially negates any progress made on rebalancing the rights of investors with states’ rights to regulate by allowing investors to cherry pick from provisions in older and more investor-friendly agreements.

To their credit, the drafters of the TPP have sought to build in several safeguards. Firstly, at section 9.5(3) a carve-out is made exempting procedural provisions such as those in Section B (ISDS) from applicability of the MFN clause. Secondly, it uses the qualifier term “in like circumstances”, although a broad interpretation by an arbitration tribunal may still be possible.

Minimum Standard of Treatment

The minimum standard of treatment provided for under the TPP is similar to those found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and IIAs in general. Per Article 9.6, each Party must accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.

The FET provision in many BITs has been the cause of headache for many states due to its vagueness. This has made it open to interpretation by tribunals which have tended to expand the scope of FET to encompass rights beyond customary international law standards. The proliferation of FET cases brought by investors under NAFTA’s ISDS prompted the NAFTA Commission to release an interpretative note which declared definitively that fair and equitable standard of treatment was no more than the minimum standard of treatment afforded to aliens under customary international law. This language was also included in the US and Canada model BITs.

The TPP drafters sought to mitigate this in several ways. Article 9.6(2) clearly states that the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. For greater certainty, the framers go further to define what they mean by “FET” and “full protection and security”.

The framers also go to lengths to define what does not constitute a breach. Article 9.6(3) states that determination of a breach of another Article does not establish a breach of Article 9.6. Furthermore, neither the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations nor that a subsidy or grant has not been issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or reduced, by a Party, do not constitute breaches of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.

Expropriation and Compensation

One of the most pervasive threats posed to foreign investors in a foreign country is direct or indirect expropriation of their investment by the host state without compensation being paid. Similar to standard BITs, the TPP provides that state parties may take measures which directly or indirectly expropriate a covered investment but only in the circumstances outlined under Article 9.7(1) and with compensation.

Performance Requirements

In its preamble, the framers of the TPP talk about recognising the differences in the levels of development and diversity of economies of member states. However, how has this been borne out in the provisions? Performance requirements have been typically used by countries to ensure that investors add value to the local economy. These include requirements on the investor to buy local goods and services, set levels of exports of goods and services, technology transfer and domestic content requirements. The TRIMS Agreement prohibits trade-related performance requirements. However, it has been common practice for US-based FTAs to include prohibitions against all performance requirements. The TPP follows this approach. Four of the twelve parties to the TPP are developing countries.  This therefore will have an effect on those developing countries members of the Agreement as their ability to ensure investors make a contribution to their economies through the use of non-trade related performance requirements will be compromised.

Free Transfer

One of the basic assurances investors look for is the ability to move their assets, such as repatriated profits, freely and without delay into and out of the host country. A standard provision in BITs, Article 9.8 of the TPP protects this right and is subject to the exceptions in 9.8(4). Of concern is that no exception is included for where the host state is encountering exceptional economic or financial challenges, such as currency and balance of payments difficulties. The omission of an exception for financial and economic difficulties is typical of US treaty practice but some treaties such as some UK BITs allow a carve-out for this. Such a provision would be particularly useful for developing countries which are generally more vulnerable to balance of payments difficulties.

Special Formalities and Information Requirements

Article 9.13 of the TPP provides carve-outs from National Treatment and MFN for special formalities and information requirements. It includes a carve-out from the National Treatment provision, allowing a Party to adopt and maintain measures which prescribes special formalities in connection with a covered investment, such as residency requirements for registration and requirements that a covered investment be legally constituted under the laws or regulations of the Party, provided that these formalities do not materially impair the protections afforded by the Party to investors of another Party and covered investments under the Chapter.

It also makes a carve-out from the National Treatment and MFN provisions allowing a Party to require an investor of another Party or its covered investment to provide information concerning that investment solely for informational or statistical purposes. However, such information is to be kept confidential from any disclosure which would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or the covered investment.

Carve-outs for Regulatory Objectives

Investment Agreements are a balancing act between the rights of investors and the rights of host states to regulate in the public interest and in the interest of fulfilling policy objectives. Article 9.15 attempts to make a carve-out by providing that nothing in the Agreement should be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives. However, what happens if the measure in question is not consistent with this Chapter. The inclusion of the phrase “otherwise consistent with this Chapter” is a loophole which potentially negates the efficacy of this carve-out.

Corporate Social Responsibility

The provision on CSR in Article 9.16 is rather weak; it is drafted in best endeavour language and is not enforceable. It simply reaffirms the importance of each Party to encourage enterprises operating in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognised CSR principles into their internal policies. A stronger CSR provision would have been ideal here, particularly a requirement that investors comply with all applicable laws in the host State, comply with international labour standards and adopt environmentally sustainable practices.

ISDS

The most disdain for the TPP’s investment chapter has been targeted at the ISDS provisions. ISDS systems allow an investor to bring a claim directly against the host state. A feature of investment law, they are an innovation in public international law as there is no requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies and the investor can bring the claim directly without having to go through its state of nationality.

Critics argue that ISDS provisions only serve to give investors the ability to sue host States for introducing public policy legislation deemed to hurt their investment. The truth is that the majority of BITs have ISDS provisions. In this regard the TPP is neither unique nor more onerous. ISDS systems are more efficient, while the use of an arbitration tribunal instead of the local courts ensures that decisions are rendered fairly and free of political bias.

That withstanding, the ISDS has many well-documented flaws. ISDS cases are a costly exercise and have been a painful experience for those States which have found themselves on the wrong end of an arbitral award. However, UNCTAD data shows that of the 356 known cases concluded, 37 percent were won by the State, 25% by the investor and 28% were settled. Therefore, it is not an automatic case that the investor wins.

The TPP provides several options of arbitral forum and includes several provisions which attempt to address some of the criticisms made about the ISDS. There is the requirement that the parties to the dispute attempt to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation. Claims cannot be made after more than three years and six months have elapsed from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach alleged.

Lack of transparency has been one of the biggest criticisms leveled at the ISDS system as many arbitral proceedings and awards are not made public. Article 9.23 which deals with transparency in arbitral proceedings, provides that certain documents are to be made public “promptly”. What constitutes “prompt” is not defined and will likely depend on the circumstances. The tribunal is to conduct hearings in public, a marked departure from what is provided in most IIAs. However, Article 9.23(3) makes exceptions for protected information and information that may be withheld under the articles on security exceptions and disclosure of information. The TPP’s ISDS allows for the consolidation of claims arising out of the same set of events or circumstances.

In determining whether to make an award to the prevailing disputing party of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection.is warranted, the TPP provides that the tribunal is to consider whether either the claimant’s claim or the respondent’s objection was frivolous, and is to provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to comment. If the tribunal determines such claims to be frivolous, the tribunal may award to the respondent reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.

My verdict on the Investment Chapter

The investment provisions in the TPP are generally no more generous to investors than those found in most standard BITs, including the US Model BIT 2012. Indeed, in several cases the TPP’s framers have attempted to close some of the loopholes which have been so troublesome in older BITs, such as with the FET clause. There are some weaknesses and grey areas in the Agreement. The biggest concern is the MFN clause which if a liberal interpretation by an arbitral tribunal is given may ultimately undo a lot of the improvements made in the TPP by allowing investors to rely on more favourable provisions in other agreements concluded by the host state. While there are some exceptions and additions, the influence of the US model BIT 2012 on the language and content of the TPP’s Investment Chapter is quite strong. The TPP also falls into the same trap many IIAs do in that strong investor protections are not matched by strong obligations on the investor to adhere to local laws, follow environmentally sustainable practices or labour standards. Perhaps the framers missed a chance here to advance investment treaty practice on this. While the TPP is not as development-friendly as one would wish, its investor protections are generally no more generous than most traditional BITs. However, the real test will be in the Treaty’s operation once it comes into force.

More articles in this TPP article series are available here.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

Economic Citizenship Programmes in the Eastern Caribbean: A Brief Look

Alicia Nicholls

In a world of eroded preferences for traditional Caribbean exports, the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean have had to find non-traditional ways to bolster their small open economies. There is growing global demand for alternative and second citizenship by mobile High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), a phenomenon on which an increasing number of states have sought to capitalise. At the Global Citizen Forum 2015 in Monaco last week, Prime Minister of St. Lucia, the Hon. Dr. Kenny Anthony announced his country’s intention to become the latest Caribbean state to offer economic citizenship. St. Lucia will join four other Caribbean countries: St. Kitts & Nevis, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica and Grenada which operate direct citizenship by investment programmes. This article explores the current programmes in the Eastern Caribbean and whether the offering of economic citizenship is worth the risks involved.

The concept of citizenship, that is, the status of holding the nationality of a State, is imbued with a whole package of legal, political and other rights and duties. All states of the English speaking Caribbean have citizenship on a jus soli basis, that is, the right to citizenship by virtue of being born in the territory, as well as citizenship through descent and naturalisation. Those states which offer economic citizenship stretch the notion of citizenship to give qualifying investors the right to full legal citizenship and the right to hold a passport for themselves and their families through making a qualifying investment into the local economy.

Many of these mobile HNWIs are from China, the Middle East and Russia, seeking economic and political security, a more favourable tax climate, and the benefits of hassle free travel a good second passport could bring. According to The Wealth Report 2015, “it is estimated that 76,200 Chinese millionaires emigrated or acquired alternative citizenship over the 10 years to 2013”. Additionally, the US’ system of nationality based taxation and the onerous reporting requirements under FATCA have caused many Americans living abroad to renounce their American citizenship in record numbers (1,335 in the first quarter of 2015 according to this article).

Economic citizenship and residency programmes are not unique to the Caribbean. Several countries such as Malta and Cyprus operate direct Citizenship by Investment programmes. Some countries offer Immigrant Investor Programmes which use the prospect of citizenship or permanent residence to attract highly skilled HNWIs. The US’ EB-5 visa is a prime example. Similar programmes are also offered by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Outside of this, there is a whole wealth and tax planning industry which has built up around advising HNW clients and their families on how and where they can get the best passport for their buck.

As countries known for their high standards of living, democratic principles, political stability, respect for the rule of law and healthy reputations internationally, it is little wonder several Eastern Caribbean countries have sought to leverage these pull factors and seek to get their share out of the second passport pie. The expected benefits to the host economy include foreign direct investment through purchasing real estate, funding for infrastructure development and the other economic benefits to be derived from HNWIs and their families spending in the economy.

The investor must meet the application requirements and go through stringent application procedures and invest in one of the options available which differs by country. In return, investors which take advantage of economic citizenship offered by one of those Eastern Caribbean states gets visa free travel to over 100 countries, a second passport, no requirement for residency, as well as second citizenship for themselves and their spouse and dependents. They also can take advantage of the tax benefits offered by a low tax jurisdiction, including no capital gains, wealth or inheritance taxes.

Below is a brief description of each programme:

St Kitts & Nevis – It is the oldest continuously operating citizenship by investment programme and has been in existence since 1984. Two options for investment: (1) making a non-refundable donation to the Sugar Industry Diversification Programme of a minimum of US$250,000 plus processing fees or (2) by investing in an approved real estate project worth at least US$400,000 plus registration and other costs.  While the investment in real estate is recoverable, the investor must hold the property for a minimum of 5 years. The next buyer also qualifies for citizenship. For further info: http://stkitts-citizenship.com/

Antigua & Barbuda – Three methods of investment: (1) Investment of at least US$400,000 in  an approved real estate project to be held for a period of no less than five years, (2) contribution of at least US$200,000 in the National Development Fund, (3) An investment of a minimum of US$1,500,000 directly into an eligible business as a sole investor or a joint investment involving at least 2 persons in an eligible business totalling at least US$5,000,000 and each of those persons individually invests at least US$400,000. For further info: http://cip.gov.ag/citizenship/

Dominica – Dominica’s programme requires the smallest minimum investment. Citizenship can be obtained through investment either in the Government Fund or the Real Estate Option. According to the website of the CBIU, the generated funds are utilised for public and private sector projects where a need is identified. To qualify for citizenship under the Government fund there are four investment categories with different contribution amounts, based on the number of dependents included in the application. For a single applicant, there is a non-refundable contribution of US$100,000 required. The contribution required increases where a spouse and dependents are involved. To qualify for citizenship of Dominica under the Real Estate Option under the Citizenship by Investment Program, an applicant must purchase authorized real estate to the minimum value of US$200,000 plus government fees which dependent on whether a spouse is included and number of dependents. For further info: http://cbiu.gov.dm/

Grenada – After a thirteen year hiatus, Grenada restarted its Citizenship by Investment programme in 2014. Application is by invitation only. Citizenship can be obtained by investment of a minimum of US$ 350,000 in an Approved Real Estate project plus fees and costs. The investment is subject to a minimum holding period of four (4) years. The second option is a non-refundable donation to the Island Transformation Fund which is not yet open. For further info: http://www.citizenship.gd/ 

St Lucia – St Lucia has indicated its programme will begin from January 2016 and details about the programme are not yet available.  It has stated that they expect significant economic benefits from the programme.

There is little data publicly available on the success of Caribbean CbI programmes. It would be interesting to know the number of applications received and approved on a yearly basis, the countries from which most applicants have come, and what have been the tangible benefits to the host countries. However, the IMF Staff Report  on St Kitts & Nevis noted the citizenship by investment programme in St. Kitts & Nevis, the region’s most successful CbI programme, is bearing fruit. It notes as follows:

Continued rapid inflows under the Citizenship-By Investment (CBI) program have led to a surge in construction activity, and supported a large increase in government and Sugar Industry Diversification Fund (SIDF) investments and spending, including on the People Employment Program (PEP). These factors, together with the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals fueled rapid GDP growth of about 6 percent in 2013 and 2014.

Entangled in the notion of economic citizenship are a whole set of moral and legal issues. For one, the definition of ‘spouse’ in the legislation of these Caribbean countries still means either of a man or woman who are married to each other. In light of competition from other CbI programmes, will this definition eventually be amended to allow gay HNWIs and their spouses to take advantage of these programmes?

There are also regulatory and national security implications, including concerns about the potential use of second passports to facilitate money laundering, organised crime and terrorist activity. Of course, there are stringent screening methods, including requirements of police certificates of character. After all, all countries prefer to attract investors of good character who are self-sufficient, and willing to make a significant economic investment to the country in which they are seeking citizenship. Under the Antigua & Barbuda programme for example, a person can be deprived of citizenship in several instances e.g: fraud, conviction or failure to spend at least 35 days in Antigua & Barbuda during the period of five calendar years after his registration. There is the potential for attracting ‘undesirables’, even with a rigorous programme.

A few countries worldwide have found that the potential investment inflows were not worth the risk or they could not cope with the volume of applications. Canada cancelled its Immigrant by Investor Programme, while Hong Kong has suspended its CIES programme. Barbados has clearly stated that for policy reasons it will not go the route of economic citizenship. It currently offers the Special Entry and Reside Programme (SERP) for qualifying HNWIs and their spouses/dependants. In order to qualify as an HNWI in Barbados, the investor must have assets of at less than US$ 5 million. In spite of this, Eastern Caribbean CbI programmes not only have to compete amongst themselves but also face increased competition globally from potentially more attractive CbI and residency programmes worldwide.

Moreover, countries which offer economic citizenship programmes do open themselves to reputational risks, especially if other States have doubts about the rigor of their screening procedures. The US Treasury has accused persons obtaining St Kitts & Nevis passports for financial crime  and Canada imposed visa requirements on St. Kitts & Nevis nationals on November 22, 2014. The merits of these actions are debatable. However, these are the kinds of risks which countries operating these programmes face. Moreover, they may result in holders of those passports, including natural born citizens, being blacklisted or subject to more scrutiny by foreign jurisdictions, which may redound to more harm than good for that State and undermine the very programme itself.

In light of the foregoing, any Caribbean state considering a Citizenship by Investment programme must not only consider the possible investment inflows but weigh them carefully against the potential reputational, security and other risks, as well as the sustainability of such a programme.

Disclaimer: This article is NOT intended to provide investment advice and the Author is not accountable to anyone who relies on the information in this article. The information was taken from sources deemed to be accurate and correct at the time of publication. For further information on the respective CbI programmes stated above, please contact the relevant authorities in the respective countries.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, public international law and trade.