Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Category: US China Trade War

  • US Tariff Wars: What possible impact for the Caribbean?

    US Tariff Wars: What possible impact for the Caribbean?

    Alicia Nicholls

    What a time to be an international trade analyst! That was my first thought after reading the latest memorandum dated February 1, 2025, announcing sweeping tariffs on America’s three biggest trading partners—Canada, Mexico, and China. Well-known for using tariffs as a tool for geopolitical ends, President Donald J. Trump is justifying these latest measures as part of a national emergency he declared against illegal immigration and drug trafficking under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This Act, signed in 1977, allows the President broad powers to regulate commerce after declaring a national emergency.

    These aggressive trade moves, the latest in Trump’s America First Trade Policy 2.0, are in fulfillment of promises he made on the campaign trail and expand on his first-term tariffs on China (which President Biden largely maintained). In his first term he had also announced 25% tariffs on steel imports and 10% on aluminum imports from the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico. Canada and Mexico are not just the US’ largest trading partners, but are its treaty partners under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the agreement that replaced the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) during Trump’s first term and which is due for review in July 2026 under its review clause.

    What do these new tariffs involve?

    Yesterday, President Trump announced a 25% additional tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico and a 10% additional tariff on imports from China, and has also vowed to increase these tariffs should these countries retaliate.

    This move will of course hurt those countries, affecting manufacturers and also jobs. But Trade 101 is that tariffs also mainly hurt consumers in the country imposing them – the US in this case! Billions of dollars in trade occurs among USMCA countries each year, with tightly interwoven supply chains, especially in the automobile, agriculture, textiles and other industries. Indeed, U.S. goods and services trade with USMCA totaled an estimated $1.8 trillion in 2022, according to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). This means that many of the goods on American shelves come from these countries or were made with inputs sourced from these countries. Therefore, American manufacturers will pay higher costs for raw materials and intermediate goods sourced from these countries and higher business costs which they will likely pass on to consumers. The end result is that American shoppers and businesses will pay higher prices for everyday goods, an ironic state of affairs given that reducing these costs was said to be one of the reasons the American public voted for President Trump.

    For their part, both Canada and Mexico have announced retaliatory measures of their own yesterday. Outgoing Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, announced in a press conference last evening a 25% tariff on 155 billion (Canadian dollars) of US goods, while Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum indicated that Mexico will be implementing retaliatory measures as well.

    Trump has also again threatened to hit the EU with tariffs, and Colombia following a row over Colombia’s insistence that its deportees be returned with dignity. Trade wars among the world’s major powers threaten global economic stability, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned in October last year, even before Donald Trump was re-elected but in the amidst of tariff threats he made on the campaign trail.

    They’ll Hit Caribbean Consumers too

    Caribbean manufacturers, which depend on US inputs, will likely face higher prices and business costs, while we end consumers might spend more for American-made food, cars, electronics and the like. However, there are ways in which we could seek to combat this to the best that we can. Caribbean manufacturers should, to the extent possible, continue to explore alternative suppliers to mitigate against these possible price hikes. This state of affairs also makes the case for more intra-Caribbean sourcing. After all, instead of sourcing so much of our fresh fruit from Florida, we could be sourcing these from within the region more.

    Final Thoughts

    Trump’s tariffs may be aimed at Canada, Mexico, and China, but the ripple effects will be felt far beyond in the possible form of higher prices and business costs, supply chain disruptions and economic uncertainty. Our jobs as trade analysts have never been more important as we help the Caribbean businesses and governments we advise to stay informed, and ready to adapt in an increasingly unpredictable global trade landscape.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is an international trade specialist and the founder of the Caribbean Trade Law Blog. Learn more about her work at http://www.caribbeantradelaw.com.

  • 10 Trade Policy Developments to watch in 2020

    10 Trade Policy Developments to watch in 2020

    Alicia Nicholls

    Happy New Year! It is both a new year and a new decade, but several stories we were following in 2019 have spilled over into 2020. 2019 started off as a year of uncertainty and volatility with increased trade restrictive measures and slowing global merchandise trade growth and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.

    Towards the end of 2019 some positive developments occurred and so 2020 does present some potential bright spots, such as the likely ratification of the US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Agreement, a now definitive date for Brexit and what appears to be an initial US/China deal.

    There are many things which are likely to impact global trade in 2020, including geopolitical developments, technological advancements, data privacy rules, climate change and the growing demand for more environmentally-friendly goods and services. All of these have the potential to either positively or negatively impact, inter alia, freight rates, supply chains and firms’ import, export and investment decisions, and on a wider scale, the global economy.

    While this is not meant to be an exhaustive list, here are the top ten trade developments we will be watching in 2020:

    1. WTO Reform

    The WTO is celebrating its 25th year of existence, but is also facing several challenges which threaten to undermine some seventy years of a rules-based multilateral trading system. Key this year to watch will be whether there will be a solution to the now defunct Appellate Body, and whether there will finally be a conclusion to the fisheries subsidies negotiations which again failed to yield an agreement last year. The US also continues to argue for a revamping of the current system of eligibility for Special & Differential Treatment. The 12th WTO Ministerial Conference will be held in Nur-Sultan, Kazahstan in June 2020, and will therefore be one of the organisation’s most important ministerial meetings to watch.

    2. Brexit

    After several missed deadlines for leaving the European Union (EU), the decisive victory handed to the Conservatives in the December 12, 2019 snap United Kingdom (UK) election meant that Prime Minister Boris Johnson was able to get parliamentary approval of his deal with the EU. The UK is now on track to leave the current 28-member grouping on January 31, 2020. Some political and economic uncertainty remains, however, especially with the stronger electoral performance of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Will the Scottish opposition to leaving the EU undermine the unity of the UK and will there be yet another Scottish independence referendum? What kind of post-Brexit trade agreement will the UK and EU eventually negotiate?  

    3. Trade Wars: US/China and Japan/South Korea

    After a year of continued touch and go negotiations and escalating tensions between the US and China, a ‘Phase One’ trade deal, which was announced in December 2019, will be signed January 15, 2020. The text of the Agreement has not yet been released, but it reportedly contains chapters on intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, unfair currency practices, trade expansion and dispute resolution. Under the agreement, China has agreed to increase imports from the US, and the US has deferred implementing the List 4B Section 301 tariffs which were to have come into effect on December 15, 2019 and decreased some of the List 4A tariffs.

    Receiving much less attention is the Japan-South Korea trade tensions which escalated in summer 2019 with fears that it could have harmed the global economy. The two Asian economic behemoths have had a challenging political history, but tensions flared up in July 2019 when Japan restricted the export of three chemicals (fluorinated polyamides, photoresists, and hydrogen fluoride) to South Korea. Japan is the major exporter of these chemicals which are needed in the production of semi-conductors and display screens – top export products for South Korea. Senior-level negotiations between the two countries were held in December and there appears to be some de-escalation in tensions.

    4. US Presidential Election

    Without doubt, the inauguration of President Donald Trump in 2017 saw a radical shift in the US’ trade and foreign policy. At this stage, it is unclear who the democratic nominee will be. However, trade policy is likely to be a major issue in the US election campaign, and even among the current democratic contenders there are some differences in their approaches to trade policy.

    What is certain, however, is that a Trump re-election in November 2020 would entail four more years of economic nationalism, a continued retreat from multilateralism, undermining of the rules-based multilateral trading system, and climate change denial.

    4. Regional Trade Agreements: USMCA, RCEP and AfCFTA

    After much uncertainty about the fate of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – the agreement which seeks to update and replace the NAFTA – a revised agreement was eventually signed in December 2019. It will need to be ratified by each of three parties in order to enter into force.

    Another agreement to watch will be the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) whose negotiations began in 2012. At the Bangkok Summit in November 2019, it was announced that the text has been agreed. Although India pulled out of the RCEP negotiations, it appears that the remaining fifteen parties are on track to sign the Agreement in 2020.

    Phase II negotiations on the operationalisation of the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) will begin in 2020 and will focus on investment, competition policy and intellectual property.

    5. IMO shipping fuel standards

    The United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Low Sulphur Regulation comes into effect January 1, 2020. From this date, the IMO requires all shipping companies to reduce their sulphur emissions by 85%. The sulphur in fuel oil must be reduced to 0,50 from 3,50% for all sea-going vessels. This is an important move for reducing shipping emissions, although concerns have been raised about the possible freight rate increases.

    6. ACP-EU Post-Cotonou Negotiations

    The Cotonou Agreement – the partnership agreement which sets the framework for cooperation between the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and the countries of the ACP (renamed to the Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (OACPS) – is due to expire in 2020. The Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 and revised in 2010. Negotiations on a successor agreement will continue into 2020.

    7. Second Review of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA

    2020 would make it twelve years since the EU-CARIFORUM EPA has been provisionally applied between the EU and CARIFORUM countries. The second review on the implementation and impact of the EPA is currently on-going and consultations were held in 2019. The first EPA review in 2014 found that the EPA had not led to a significant increase in CARIFORUM exports to the EU, and there was still implementation work to be still done on both ends. The results of the second review will be important to gauging what additional progress has been made.

    8. Pending CCJ Advisory Opinion on freedom of movement

    The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) will this year deliver its first advisory opinion pursuant to Article 212 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) on the circumstances under which it is lawful for CARICOM Member States to “opt-out” of CARICOM Heads of Government decisions that involve fundamental objectives of the Community. Last year the Court held a two-day hearing where it heard oral submissions. The ruling will be critical to clarifying Community law on opt-outs.

    9. UNCTAD XV – October 2020

    All eyes will be on Barbados and the United Arab Emirates in October 2020 when the two nations will co-host the UNCTAD XV quadrennial. This will be a good opportunity for Barbados to help influence the trade and development agenda for the next four years, highlighting issues such as climate change and small States issues.

    10. COP26 Climate Talks

    2020 is a ‘make or break’ year for climate action. By most measures, the UNFCCC COP25 was a disappointment despite being the longest UN climate talks on record. Agreement on Paris Agreement Article 6 (carbon markets) and common timeframes, for instance, remains elusive and has been pushed back again to COP26. It should be noted that 2020 is the year when parties are expected to undertake their first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement and ratchet up their climate ambition by submitting more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Climate change both impacts and is impacted by trade. As such, these talks will be key to follow.

    As usual, we at the CTLD Blog will be monitoring these developments. We welcome you to follow them with us by reading our weekly Caribbean Trade & Development News Digests. You can subscribe here to receive the mailings directly to your inbox:

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

    DISCLAIMER: All views expressed herein are her personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution or entity with which she may be affiliated from time to time.

  • Has Canada become Collateral Damage in the US-China Trade War?

    Has Canada become Collateral Damage in the US-China Trade War?

    Renaldo Weekes, Guest Contributor 

    The trade tensions between the United States (US) and China have subsided for a while as each side has promised not to introduce new tariffs during a 90 day period starting from December 1, 2018, when US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping had a dinner at the G-20 summit in Argentina. Negotiations resume on January 7, 2019 and, so far, it seems that not much has changed as both have committed to their previous stances on the matter. However, the overall context of the negotiations has changed. Canada has arrested Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou at the US’ request. Shortly thereafter, China arrested two Canadian citizens, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. Many see China’s actions as a tit-for-tat response to Meng’s arrest and wonder if Canada will now become collateral damage in a trade war between the US and China.

    Why were Meng and the Canadian duo arrested?

    Meng has been accused by the US of allegedly violating its sanctions on Iran by defrauding multiple US banks. On a layover in Canada, she was arrested by Canadian authorities on request from the US. She has since posted bail and is required to wear an ankle monitor and stay in her residence from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. Kovrig and Spavor were arrested on suspicion of engaging in activities that were considered as breaching national security. The pair reportedly is subjected to three interrogations a day, must sleep with the lights, does not have access to legal representation and can only have consular visits once a month. Both Canada and China have denied that the arrests of the Canadian pair are related in any way to the arrest of Meng Wanzhou but Canada has said that the arrests were unfounded.

    Did Meng’s arrest influence Kovrig and Spavor’s arrests?

    Some may see it as a coincidence that Kovrig and Spavor, both Canadians, were arrested in China shortly after Meng, a Chinese heavy-weight, was arrested in Canada. As mentioned earlier, both countries have denied that the arrests are related. However, some persons, including former diplomats, are quite sure that the opposite is true. Reportedly, Chinese officials are concerned about Meng’s arrest. A Canadian parliamentary delegation, currently in China, has engaged in talks with Chinese officials about the pair of Canadians they arrested.  The officials demanded to know why Canada arrested Meng. It is public knowledge that Canada has detained Meng for bank fraud on the US’ request but it seems as though the Chinese believe there is more to the arrest than meets the eye. Fearing the worst, they may have retaliated by detaining two Canadians in order to keep Canada in check. It seems probable that Meng’s arrest had an impact China’s decision to arrest the Canadians.

    Do the arrests have an effect on the trade war?

    The trade war between the US and China has been quite contentious as each side continually laid tariffs on the other party’s goods until recently. When dealing with any high stakes negotiation such as this one, persons may wonder if external issues would impact the talks. This is especially the case in the current situation as the US has pointed out many problems it wants China to fix such as alleged forced transfer of intellectual property from foreign companies and restricted market access. There is also the issue of the disputed South China Sea where, as recently as today (Monday, January 7, 2018), China claimed that the US violated its domestic and international law by performing acts interpreted as provocation near the sea.

    As it relates to the arrests, China’s actions may be ostensibly seen as its modus operandi whenever one of its citizens is arrested overseas, and not related to the trade war. In a previous tit-for-tat situation in 2014, Canadian aid workers Kevin and Julia Garratt were detained for the same national security reasons as the pair of Michaels shortly after Canada arrested Su Bin, a Chinese man wanted for industrial espionage in the US. Mrs. Garratt was released on bail while Mr. Garratt remained detained for more than two years until his eventual deportation, which occurred after Su Bin was extradited to the US and sentenced.

    However, as mentioned earlier, Chinese officials seem to believe that Meng’s arrest was political. One may infer that the Chinese may not want the US to receive Meng as this may give additional leverage to the US in the trade talks. China’s paranoia may have been bolstered by comments President Trump made which insinuated that Meng’s arrest may assist in securing the “the largest trade deal ever made.” China may, therefore, seek to create its own leverage by punishing Canada, a US ally, in whatever way it can. China may refrain from committing any additional acts that directly affect the US but still continue current acts with which the US is concerned.

    Canada’s situation

    Canada is in a sticky situation. China will continue to punish Canada until it secures Meng’s release. Though it is a US ally, Canada’s citizens are the ones being used as pawns in China’s game so it will have to navigate this situation mostly on its own merit. This situation can be, theoretically, immediately remedied by Canada releasing Meng, rejecting the US’ extradition request. China may likely release the Canadians in return and refocus its attention solely on the US. However, this decision cannot be made lightly. Should Canada disregard all credible evidence of Meng’s crimes in order to appease China or will it repeat its 2014 decision of extradition? When weighing this decision against the well-being of your own citizens, it is not an easy decision to make. Canada must keep in mind that this is not a simple tit-for-tat situation for China as is usually the case but a piece on the battlefield. China cannot allow the US to gain what it sees as additional leverage. This ostensibly personal spat is being fought against the backdrop of the US-China trade war.

    If Canada arrested Meng outside of the context of a trade war between the US and China, the situation probably would have been the same. The US would have still made the request to Canada as Meng’s arrest was predicated on her committing bank fraud with the intent of violating the US’ sanctions on Iran. China would have still arrested the two Canadians in retaliation since this is its established modus operandi. The weighing of Meng’s crimes versus its citizens’ well-being would still be an issue. As mentioned earlier, the US has a number of issues with China’s actions. Therefore, if not the trade war, Canada may have been collateral damage in some other dispute. It is safe to conclude that Canada is indeed collateral damage in the US-China trade war. However, the trade war is just the biggest of many disputes that have the potential to create more collateral damage.

    Renaldo Weekes is a holder of a BSc. (Sociology and Law) who observes international affairs from his humble, small island home. He has keen interest in how countries try to maneuver across the international political and legal stage.

  • Global Trade Policy in 2019: What to Watch?

    Global Trade Policy in 2019: What to Watch?

    This article has been updated.

    Alicia Nicholls

    Happy New Year to all! 2018 was without doubt a nail-biting year for global trade policy developments. In our first blog for the year, we take a look back at some of the key trade policy developments in 2018 and five developments to watch for 2019!

    1. US-China Trade Tensions and Truce?

    Starting with the scary; 2018 saw an escalation in global trade tensions among major trading powers. Without doubt, the election of President Donald Trump in the US in 2016 has led to a more nationalistic, protectionist and unilateral turn in US trade and foreign policy. Under his ‘America First’ ideology, President Trump issued proclamations hiking tariffs on imported steel and aluminum under the guise of national security, with only a small handful of countries being spared.

    Tensions between the US and its other key trading partners, such as Canada and the EU, were inflamed, but China was the main target of US trade action. According to the BBC, the US has imposed tariffs on over $250 billion dollars of Chinese goods and had threatened an additional $260 billion, while China has imposed tariffs on $50 billion dollars of US goods and threatened tariffs on an additional $60 billion. Both countries agreed to a truce in December to suspend any further tariff impositions for a 90-day period while talks resume.

    Trade talks held between the US and China this week have been hailed as positive by both sides, but the two economic behemoths are still a long way from resolving long-simmering tensions. US President Donald Trump appears confident that China will acquiesce to the US’ demands given the current slowdown in the Chinese economy. However, the US has not escaped the trade tensions unharmed as, for example,  soybean farmers have been affected by the reduced Chinese demand for their produce.

    The WTO has warned that the uncertainty around the escalating trade tensions was beginning to adversely impact business and investment confidence, with potential implications for continued global trade growth. Moreover, in its Global Economic Prospects – January 2019 report, ominously titled ‘Darkening Skies’, the World Bank has warned of darkening clouds over the global economy and softening global trade and investment flows.

    2. WTO Reform

    On the multilateral scene, the crisis in the WTO’s Appellate Body due to the US’ blockage of appointments appears to have given new political will and urgency to the need to reform the WTO, which is facing its greatest existential crisis since its founding in 1995.

    The US’ continued blockage of appointments/re-appointments to the organisation’s seven-member Appellate Body has now resulted in only three sitting Appellate Body members – the minimum for the Body to function.

    Several WTO members have tabled proposals for reforms on discrete issues, such as transparency/notification, while the European Union (EU) and Canada have both placed more comprehensive reform proposals on the table, including reform of the dispute settlement system.

    However, WTO members are still a long way from deciding on how deep and wide-ranging the reform agenda should be. The US, which has for a long time expressed grave reservations about the Appellate Body, has so far not been convinced by any of the proposals tabled.

    This year will be critical for deciding on the way forward for WTO reform, especially since the loss of yet another Appellate Body member will result in the Appellate Body being unable to operate, with grave implications for the prompt settlement of disputes and the rules-based multilateral trading system, on a whole.

    3. Regional Trade Agreements – AfCTA, USMCA, CPTPP, EU-Japan 

    On the regional trade agreement scene, there were several positive and major developments in 2018. One of the most exciting was in March, 2018 when forty-four African states signed the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCTA) in Kigali, Rwanda. Since then, five other States have signed the agreement. Thirteen African States have ratified the agreement thus far and further ratifications will be needed before it comes into effect.

    President Donald Trump made good on one of his major trade policy promises – the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico to make it ‘fit for purpose’ for the 21st century. In November 2018, the three countries announced they had agreed an agreement under a new name – the United States, Mexico and Canada (USMCA) Agreement. Some of the major changes include more stringent rules of origin (RoO), extension of terms of copyright protection, a sunset clause and provision for a 6-year review.  The Agreement is awaiting ratification in the three countries.

    After the US’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Trump, the remaining eleven TPP parties signed a successor agreement termed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in March 2018. The Agreement came into effect on December 30, 2018, and its parties account for an estimated 14% of global GDP.

    Five years after negotiations began in 2013, the EU and Japan signed the Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement. The Agreement, which is on track to come in effect in February 2019, is the first free trade agreement to make explicit reference to the Paris Climate Change Agreement which was signed in 2015.

    4. Bolsonaro’s Brazil

    South America’s largest country, Brazil, elected Jair Bolsonaro who took office as president at the beginning of 2019. Riding the wave of right-wing populism, Mr. Bolsonaro has expressed support for the unilateral foreign policy espoused by his US counterpart and has expressed apathy about Mercosur. Brazil is one of the most influential emerging economies, both hemispherically and internationally. The implications of the South American nation’s shifting foreign and trade policy will, therefore, be key to watch.

    5. Brexit Uncertainty

    Of course, one of the biggest trade policy developments to watch in 2019 will be the UK’s impending withdrawal from the EU – Brexit – which, as it stands, is to take place on March 29, 2019.

    After nearly two years of intense negotiations, the EU-27 and the UK finally arrived at a Draft Agreement on the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU and a Political Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship between the EU and the UK in November 2018. The EU-27 leaders endorsed the two texts at a special emergency meeting of the European Council.

    However, in the face of strong opposition to the deal, particularly the ‘backstop’ provisions regarding the Northern Ireland/Ireland Border, UK Prime Minister Theresa May cancelled a crucial House of Commons vote on the deal which she likely would have lost. Mrs. May has sought to obtain further binding concessions from the EU, but without success thus far.

    This week, the British House of Commons MPs voted in favour of an amendment requiring the Prime Minister to present to Parliament a Brexit Plan B within three days, in the event that MPs reject the current Draft Withdrawal Agreement in their vote rescheduled for next week Tuesday. Meanwhile, Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn is calling for a general election to break the Brexit deadlock.

    The Brexit deadline looms, but the May Government has ruled out requesting an extension under Article 50. With the timeline for the UK’s withdrawal ticking and the real threat of a potentially economically disastrous ‘no-deal’ exit, this will be one of the major trade policy issues to watch in 2019.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.