Tag: caribbean court of justice

  • Denial and Banning of Dancehall and Trinibad Artists across CARICOM : Compatible or Incompatible with Regional Integration Law

    Denial and Banning of Dancehall and Trinibad Artists across CARICOM : Compatible or Incompatible with Regional Integration Law

    Rahym R. Augustin-Joseph (Mr.) (Guest contributor)

    Overtime, there has been a discernible increase in the denial of entry or even banning of certain dancehall and Trinibad artists, who were scheduled to perform in Caribbean countries in 2024 such as K-Mann 6IXX in Antigua and Barbuda and DJ Punz in St. Kitts and Nevis.    

    Earlier, in 2022, Skeng was denied future permits for any show he was scheduled to have in Guyana, after the Baderation event he had, was disrupted by gunfire and bottles turned missiles. In response, the Guyanese Government therefore noted that they would no longer issue permits to skeng or other artists whose lyrics included violence and public disorder to perform in Guyana. In 2024 however, it appears that this position was reversed as Skeng performed in Guyana.

    But these refusals and banning of artists from other Caribbean countries is not a new phenomenon, as in 2014 Jamaican artiste Tommy Lee Sparta, or Cabral Douglas was denied entry into Dominica, where he was supposed to perform, but it raised concerns for public safety. In 2010, Vybz Kartel was issued a performance ban in Saint Lucia and Barbados, citing his lewd lyrics and raunchy performances, and in 2009, Bounty Killer was also denied entry into Trinidad and Tobago, allegedly without reasons, while Vybz Kartel his reputed rival was allowed to enter and perform. There are many more examples of the denial of entry and banning of artists in the Caribbean.

    On the one hand, a wide cross section of the Caribbean peoples listen and engage with the music of these artists, and see it is a citadel of modern Caribbean culture. However, political leaders and technocrats have noted that these artists and their music are in the main, vulgar, misogynistic, crude, and have a major influence in the increased crime and violence in our society. It is their view that this music is contributing towards the increase in gang recruitment and violence, as people continue to be influenced by the lyrical component and call to action elicited by this music. Young people are therefore not seeing this music for its ‘creative expression’ but instead seeing this music for its literal meaning.

    One only has to listen to the words uttered by Dr. Mohamed Irfaan Ali of Guyana, when he noted during the 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of CARICOM. He urged leaders to prevent the proliferation of violent music in their respective nations. “We do not need lyrics that promote violence in this region, We have the ability to promote positive lyrics that inspire people to think, act, and behave positively. As leaders, we must take this matter seriously and ensure that the region’s lyrics reflect the positivity embodied by Bob Marley and encourage positive living and change.”

    This debate however is to be had at another time, and within our respective countries, wherein one can examine properly whether the music which portrays violence has been having an effect on the perpetrators of violence within the Caribbean, such that if it is reduced, curtailed or banned across various mediums, that it would reduce violence significantly. This is a task for researchers across the region, which political leaders must take their cues from if they are to sustain such an argument.

    But, beyond just the consumption of the music by nationals in the respective Caribbean countries, it is also being packaged and sold through concerts and other mediums across the Caribbean. As such, the banning and denial of entry of the artists has effects on trade in services, and also possibly implicates regional integration law of which will be discussed briefly here.

    So, how is the banning and denial of entry of artists to ply their trade within the Caribbean a regional integration law problem?

    As you may be aware, every CARICOM national has an automatic right of entry and stay within another CARICOM country for a maximum of 6 months pursuant to the 2007 Conference Decision of the CARICOM Heads of Government, Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, and the seminal case of Shanique Myrie v. The State of Barbados. This automatic right must also be hassle free, or without harassment or the imposition of impediments. Beyond just the mere right of entry, cases such as Tamika Gilbert v. The State of Barbados also notes that the right extends to being able to move freely within the particular country without any harassment and impediments.

    In restricting such right however, the offending state can only do so on two strict and narrowly applied grounds i.e., if the individual is an undesirable or a charge on public funds. Under the first prong, the offending state must show that the individual presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to national security and safety, public morals, and national health of the member state affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society. So, individuals who actually pose or can reasonably be expected to pose such a threat. It is interesting however, that the cases from the European Court of Justice also suggest that one cannot refuse an individual of another state to one’s territory by reason of or of the threat of conduct which when attributable to their own nationals, do not give rise to repressive measures or other genuine and effective measures intended to combat such conduct. One must show essentially that their own nationals who engage in the behaviour which is refused are prosecuted regularly or otherwise subjected to some legal action.  This begs the question of whether the states which have denied entry and banned artists altogether, have similarly banned local artists which share similar lyrical content in their songs?

    In the latter, one must show that the individual does not have sufficient funds, such that they will become a charge on public funds, wherein they do not have sufficient monies for the duration of their visit, lack possession of online cash and card among other considerations. Further, when refusing an individual, there are certain procedural elements that the offending country must satisfy, which include inter alia, that they must (I) inform the individual in writing why they are being refused entry, (II) state the reasons why they are refused entry (III) provide them with the right to challenge such decision, through an effective appeal or review procedure with adequate safeguards to protect the rights of the persons denied entry and (IV) allow them the opportunity to consult with an attorney or their consular official of their country.

    The probing questions is therefore whether reasons have been given to these artists justifying their performance ban, how long are these measures in effect and is there is a review mechanism for these artists to allow them to appeal against the performance ban and what do these review mechanisms look like. These are according to Dr. Waite, “serious legal and policy questions that have implications for our regional integration movement, cultural exchange, vibrancy of socio-political commentary and our community rights. In order to answer them, a probing review is necessary, not a knee-jerk emotional and moral response.”

    However, the right which the refused artists will be captured under is the Article 46 right, which is where community nationals who are skilled nationals are able to travel freely across the region to ply their skills upon attainment and presentation of their CARICOM Skills Certificate. As such, the artists or musicians should be able to travel to any CARICOM state, hassle- free, without any impediments or harassment for a period of 6 months.

    Should the abovementioned artists have their CSME Certificate, which is attained by artists after they provide, (I) copies of their portfolio work which include pictures, videos, news, reports, examples of their work, (II) letters from their previous employers which state the period of employment and a job description- which is a bit problematic of a criteria, recognising the entrepreneurial nature of most of our artists and their engagement in the gig economy, (III) letters of reference from previous individuals attesting to work previously and (IV) five invoices dated within the last six months. However, the artists can only enjoy such right of freedom of movement with the acquisition of the CSME Certificate which would validate their status as a skilled national.  As such, on a prima facie level, the banning of artists and the denial of entry into certain countries within the Caribbean already has affected and infringed on their community rights as a CARICOM citizen, wherein they can receive redress before the Caribbean Court of Justice in its original jurisdiction.

    Of course, any state, which has banned the artists who had upcoming and scheduled performances and shows in their respective countries if challenged would argue that these artists can be classified as ‘undesirables.’ As such they would argue that these artists represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to their national security, safety, and public morals, and they affect one of the fundamental interests of society. Their argument would possibly be that these artists by virtue of their lyrical component of their music could or have elicited violence in their respective countries, especially with increasing crime and violence statistics and as such is a threat to the national security. Further, they may argue that the lyrics of the artists may also be against public morals, particularly violent music which encourage gun violence. Recognising that there has been no cases within the region which have touched and concerned the exceptions, with regards to the nexus of violence and national security and public morals, one has to look towards the European Court of Justice jurisprudence, which the CCJ would look to.

    Within the ECJ, Catherine Barnard in her text, The Substantive Law of the European Union, Four Freedoms has noted that, the court grants member states a certain latitude and margin of discretion to determine what constitutes national security or public security in light of the national circumstances. It would therefore vary from one member state to another as noted in Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974]. Moreover, the courts provide the relevant national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed by the treaty, particularly as it does not provide a uniform set of values related to conduct which may be considered contrary to the national security interests of a country. However, the court still maintains its overarching view that there must be a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting the fundamental interests of the society.

    However, the court has noted in Shanique Myrie, which is a slight departure from the abovementioned, when they noted that public policy cannot be used as a justification for derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement and hassle-free travel of community nationals wholly or unilaterally be determined by each member state without being subject to control by the major community organs, in particular the conference and ultimately by the court as the guardian of the RTC.

    The unfortunate or fortunate thing about the law and the decision by the court is that it forces a ‘culture of justification’ as coined by the South African public law scholar Etienne Mureinik, albeit post-law and decision making, wherein our officials must justify their decisions utilising evidence, logical reasoning as the court does not provide a carte blanche to the decision maker, which is critical for policy making and decision making. While members of the public may see it as being heavy handed, Article 211 of the RTC, provides the CCJ with this exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction to interpret and apply the RTC.

    As such, questions which have been posed by Dr. Neto Waite, on this subject are instructive and worthy of repetition here, when he asked whether it is right to argue that salacious lyrics undermine public morality and national security, is it true that lyrics about violence and rebellion against government harm public order? Has it ever posed a serious and sufficient risk and if so what does such intelligence tell us? Is the performance ban the best mechanism to deal with it, is it not too draconian and shouldn’t adult concertgoers be left to decide for themselves what sort of lyrics they wish to enjoy? In addressing whether the concern is minors being exposed to such music, he also argues correctly, whether it would be more appropriate for the government In consultation with civil society, implement a parental rating system for concerts based on the lineup of artists which can protect minors and respect the agency of adults to determine what types of music they want to listen to.

    However, from the reports in the media, it appears that save and except for Tommy Lee Sparta or Cabral Douglas, of which the CCJ has ruled on, the artists are not being denied entry after they have attempted to enter the respective countries. Instead, they are being banned from before. This does not mean they are not captured under the abovementioned. It just means that existing domestic Immigration legislation is being utilised to preclude entry which has been addressed in Maurice Tomlinson v. The State of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago. The court has therefore noted however that the mere existence of incompatible legislation, which suggests that there are categories of individuals who may not be eligible to enter the respective country, without it being harmonised with community law is not ipso facto, incompatible. Instead, the court will assess the state practice of the particular state to decide whether the legislation is incompatible with regional integration law.

    Therefore, this denial and banning of dancehall and trinibad artists would be assessed on a country-by-country basis in order to assess whether the individual country has a history of banning of dancehall and trinibad artists, which would be determinative of the legislation and state practice being incompatible. As such, countries such as Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis among others may be found inconsistent, and the artists can make a claim even prior to entering that they will be denied entry, because of the legislation and also the application of the legislation with the banning of the artists. The artists would therefore have a claim before the CCJ in its OJ.

    However, CARICOM countries should take heed of the warning of the CCJ, who noted in Maurice Tomlinson, “that the court does not condone the indefinite retention on the statute book of a national law which in appearance seems to conflict with obligations under Community Law, and member states must ensure that national laws, subsidiary legislation and administrative practices are transparent in their support of the free movement of all CARICOM nationals and there should be harmonisation of the legislation with Community Law. If there is any permanent or indefinite discord between administrative practices and the literal reading of the legislation, then the rule of law requires clarity and certainty especially for nationals of other Member states who are to be guided by such legislation and practice.”

    Another right of the Artists, which may be affected is the right to not be discriminated on the grounds of nationality, as per Article 7 of the RTC. Essentially, in refusing entry to the artist, the offending state cannot discriminate on the artist solely on the basis of their nationality. Essentially, the artists must therefore show that similar individuals i.e., individuals who sing music similar to them have not been denied entry and that these individuals have no separate distinction other than their nationality. The unfortunate hurdle that they will face however is the high and unreasonable evidentry burden, as noted in Shanique Myrie v. Barbados, where the court noted that to show discrimination one has to show that there is statistical data which shows discrimination against the particular nationality that the individual artist has come from. It does not allow discrimination to be seen on a case-by-case basis, with the evidence being solely attributed from the particular case.

    The last right however which may affect the artist is the right to provision of services under Article 36 of the RTC, which is connected to the right to freedom of movement as noted in Shanique Myrie v. Barbados. Cabral Douglas v. The State of Dominica notes that an individual can be a service provider, if they satisfy condition precedent in Article 36 which is that (I) it must be within an approved activity in an approved sector, which music and performances are, (II) It must be supplied cross-border, which is satisfied as the artists are moving from one country to another. This would be different from Cabral Douglas, which has been critiqued, where the court held that he could not show that he was providing services because he was from Dominica attempting to provide services in Dominica and therefore the cross-border element was not satisfied. Thirdly, the element of temporary nature will be satisfied as they are travelling for a concert or some other performances which would be temporary. Finally, there must be renumeration as they are going to benefit from the payment by the patrons among other forms of income arising from the concert.

    Recognising the above, it would be advisable that these artists troubleshoot their cases in the OJ of the CCJ in order for the court to provide a definitive ruling on this matter, to guide or instruct states as to how to treat with these artists as a collective, ensuring state decisions are compatible with community law, as individual states believe they may be affecting their public morals, national security among other fundamental interests of the society.

    This is particularly opportune as there are further promises to increase freedom of movement in the region. The region cannot continue to address these matters in isolation and also ignore the trade and possible incompatibility implications of the individual countries with the RTC.

    Rahym Augustin-Joseph is the 2025 Commonwealth Caribbean Rhodes Scholar. He is a recent political science graduate from the UWI Cave Hill Campus and an aspiring attorney-at-law. He can be reached via rahymrjoseph9@ gmail.com and you can read more from him here.

    Photo credit: WordPress AI-generated image

  • Belize v Trinidad & Tobago: Caribbean Court of Justice dismisses claim for lack of evidence

    Belize v Trinidad & Tobago: Caribbean Court of Justice dismisses claim for lack of evidence

    Alicia Nicholls

    In its ruling delivered on February 1, 2022, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has dismissed the original jurisdiction claim filed by Belize against Trinidad & Trinidad over the latter’s alleged failure to apply the Common External Tariff (CET) on extra-regional imported brown sugar.

    In its claim filed on September 30, 2020, Belize contended that Trinidad & Tobago had over the period November 2018-July 2020 failed to apply the CET rate of 40% on extra-regional imported brown sugar from Honduras and Guatemala. This, Belize argued, had adversely impacted prices and sales made by Belize Sugar Industries Ltd, a State-owned entity which exports sugar to Trinidad & Tobago. In light of this alleged breach by Trinidad & Tobago of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Belize sought declarations and damages.  Inter alia, Trinidad & Tobago argued in its defense that it had not allowed for the importation of brown sugar from Guatemala and Honduras without applying the CET of 40% on that item.

    In dismissing Belize’s claim, the CCJ cited “severe shortcomings” in the evidence offered by Belize, in respect of the alleged failure of Trinidad and Tobago to apply the CET, and that these shortcomings “were not cured by reference to circumstantial evidence”.

    In its nearly fifty page judgment, the CCJ also took time to reaffirm and reiterate the importance of the obligation on Member States to impose and maintain the CET on the importation of extra-regional goods. Simply put, a CET refers to the uniform tariff rates applied by members of a customs union against imports from third countries, that is, non-parties to the customs union. Such a measure protects the exports of the members of the customs union within the union and aim to make them more competitive vis-à-vis products outside the customs union. Article 82 of the RTC requires member states to establish and maintain the CET, while Article 83 outlines the only ways in which the CET on an item may be altered or suspended.

    Citing its previous case law on the matter, the CCJ emphasized that the CET was a “fundamental pillar” in the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and its importance in encouraging and promoting the production of goods within the community.

    With regard to the specific case at hand, the CCJ noted at paragraph 122 of the judgment as follows:

    “In the present circumstances, this Court re-emphasises the importance of maintaining the CET especially in respect of a product such as brown sugar which is of demonstrable importance to Member States such as Belize which manufactures that product. No one disputes that Belize has made very significant investment in its agricultural sector in general and in sugar cultivation and production specifically. The CET does not guarantee producers of sugar in Belize an assured market, but those producers are entitled to the protection of the market that the tariff is intended to provide.”

    Additionally, the CCJ went on to urge the Community “to superintend the conclusion of the Monitoring Mechanism for Sugar as quickly as possible to ensure that the benefits intended to ensure to the regional sugar producers are not frustrated and impaired”.

    The CCJ in its original jurisdiction has compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the RTC between Member States parties and between the Member States parties and the Community.

    The full judgment may be read here.

  • CCJ First Advisory Opinion Hearing

    CCJ First Advisory Opinion Hearing

    Alicia Nicholls

    History is being made at the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) which is currently hearing oral submissions in the first ever Advisory Opinion filed in the Court pursuant to Article 212 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC).

    Article 212 of the RTC empowers the CCJ with exclusive jurisdiction to deliver advisory opinions concerning the interpretation and application of the RTC. Advisory opinions can be delivered only at the request of the Member States parties to a dispute or the Community.

    The present request, which was filed by the CARICOM Secretariat, concerns two substantive issues:

    (1) whether a Member State can, pursuant to Article 27(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, lawfully opt-out of a decision of the Conference of the Heads of Government taken under Article 46(4) concerning the expansion of classes of persons entitled to work and move freely in the Community.

    (2) whether the nationals of those Member States which opt-out of a decision under Article 27(4), can nevertheless derive the benefits of the decision.

    Day 1

    On Day 1, the Court heard, inter alia, from CARICOM’s General Counsel, Dr. Corlita Babb-Schaefer, as well as counsel from Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada. Also appearing amicus was a team from the Faculty of Law, The University of the West Indies, Cave Hill campus represented by Dean Dr. David Berry and law lecturers, Mrs. Nicole Foster and Mr. Westmin James. The live recording from Day 1 may be watched here.

    Day 2

    On Day 2 of the hearing the Court heard closing submissions. In closing, the Court promised to deliver its Advisory Opinion in a “reasonable time”. Day 2 of the hearing may be watched here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

    DISCLAIMER: All views expressed herein are her personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution or entity with which she may be affiliated from time to time.

  • CCJ Issues Ruling in Gay Rights Freedom of Movement Case

    CCJ Issues Ruling in Gay Rights Freedom of Movement Case

    Alicia Nicholls

    Test cases in law are a legal academic’s dream. They  help to map uncharted legal waters by establishing important legal principles and rights, which, as precedents, would be binding in subsequent cases whose facts are similar. The consolidated  test cases of Tomlinson v Belize, Trinidad & Tobago brought by prominent Jamaican attorney and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and/or intersex) activist, Mr Maurice Tomlinson, before the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) aimed to do just that.

    Mr. Tomlinson challenged the consistency of discriminatory provisions contained in the Immigration Acts of the defendant states, Belize and Trinidad & Tobago, which classify homosexuals among the classes of prohibited immigrants. He claimed that the mere existence of those provisions infringed his right of entry as an LGBTI Community national under Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the 2007 Heads of Government Conference Decision.

    Article XII of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction, subject to provisions of the Revised Treaty, in matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty. Freedom of movement of CARICOM nationals has been a sore point in Community relations, with some States claiming that their nationals are routinely discriminated against.  The Court rendered its landmark decision on the right of freedom of movement of CARICOM nationals in the case of Myrie v Barbados. The CCJ’s ruling in that case established definitively that CARICOM member states were bound by the 2007 Decision of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM to allow all CARICOM nationals hassle-free entry into their territories and a stay of six months upon arrival. The only exceptions for refusing entry are where  the Member State deems a person to be “undesirable person” or where  it is believed the Community national seeking entry may become a charge on public funds.

    The points of law raised in the instant case are unique as it is the first time that a CARICOM national has challenged the immigration laws of a CARICOM member state on the basis of infringing the right of entry of LGBTI community persons. Mr. Tomlinson also claimed infringement of his right under Article 7 of the Revised Treaty to not be discriminated against on the basis of nationality only and that being a UWI graduate and thus a Skilled CARICOM National, his rights under Article 46 of the Treaty would also be infringed.

    The relevant sections from the two Immigration  Acts in question are as follows:

    Belize Immigration Act (Cap 156):

    5.-(1) Subject to section 2 (3), the following persons are prohibited
    immigrants-

    (e) any prostitute or homosexual or any person who may be living
    on or receiving or may have been living on or receiving the
    proceeds of prostitution or homosexual behaviour;

    Trinidad & Tobago Immigration Act

    8. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), entry into
    Trinidad and Tobago of the persons described in this subsection,
    other than citizens and, subject to section 7(2), residents, is
    prohibited, namely—

    (e) prostitutes, homosexuals or persons living on
    the earnings of prostitutes or homosexuals, or
    persons reasonably suspected as coming to
    Trinidad and Tobago for these or any other
    immoral purposes;

    As a matter of context for readers outside of the Caribbean, LGBTI rights are still not recognised in Caribbean countries. No one needs to look further than the many archaic and discriminatory laws still found on our statute books, which though not all enforced, still discriminate against members of the LGBTI community and are incongruous to the requirement of legal certainty.

    Mr. Tomlinson argued that while he has never been himself denied entry into the defendant member states,  the mere existence of the provisions in question were inconsistent with his right of entry as to enter would amount to him being in breach of the law. As such, Mr. Tomlinson not only requested the Court to make declaratory orders declaring his right of entry to these states, but also that the provisions in question violated his right to freedom of movement and his right not to be discriminated against on the basis of nationality only. He also requested the court to order Belize and Trinidad & Tobago to remove homosexuals from the class of prohibited immigrants.

    For their part, the defendant states argued, inter alia, that the existence of the provisions in question in their Immigration Acts  has not hindered Mr. Tomlinson’s entry into their territories. They also did not deny that Mr. Tomlinson was entitled to entry and stay of up to 6 months. The defendant states also agreed that they did not see Mr. Tomlinson, a homosexual, as an “undesirable person” within the meaning given in the 2007 Conference decision.

    Judgment

    The Court agreed that homosexuals cannot be categorised as ‘undesirable persons’ and concluded that homosexual CARICOM nationals have a right to freedom of movement on the same terms as any other CARICOM national. However, in regards to the central issue on whether the mere existence of the challenged statutory provisions constituted a breach of those States’ obligations, the Court had consideration for the state practice in Belize and Trinidad & Tobago. Interestingly, the Court accepted Belize’s interpretation of section 5(1)(e) of its Immigration Act that homosexuals are only prohibited from entering the country in cases where they are engaging in prostitution or benefiting from acts of prostitution performed by others.

    Turning to Trinidad & Tobago, the Court found that unlike the Belize provision, the provision in the Trinidad & Tobago Immigration Act expressly prohibited the entry of homosexuals and not solely those seeking to engage in prostitution. The Court, however, accepted Trinidad & Tobago’s evidence of state practice that despite the existence of this discriminatory provision, it is not enforced.

    Noting the inconsistency of 8(1)(e) of Trinidad & Tobago’s Immigration Act with the Revised Treaty, the Court, however, made reference to Article 9 of the Revised Treaty which provides that “in the event of any inconsistencies between the provisions of this Act and the operation of any other law, the provisions of this Act [the Revised Treaty] shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency’. The Court also noted that the state practice of Trinidad & Tobago and Belize does not suggest any incompatibility with the Revised Treaty or the 2007 Conference Decision. The Court held, therefore, that Tomlinson had no valid reason to assume that his rights would not be respected by the States.

    However, the Court further emphasised at paragraph 59 of the Judgment that it was not condoning the retention by member states of legislation which conflicts with Community Law and stressed that “[s]tates should ensure that national laws, subsidiary legislation and administrative practices are transparent in their support of the free movement of all CARICOM nationals”. The Court also dismissed Mr. Tomlinson’s claims that his rights under Articles 7 and 46 of the Revised Treaty were infringed.

    Jurisprudential Impact

    Although the defendant lost his claim and was denied the requested remedies, this test case achieved two main things. Firstly, the Court stated definitively that “the practice or policy of admitting homosexual nationals from other CARICOM States (not falling under the two exceptions mentioned in the 2007 Conference Decision) is not a matter of discretion but is legally required based on Article 9 of the RTC as this is an appropriate measure within the meaning of that provision”. Therefore, States cannot as a matter of practice deny entry of homosexuals into their territories. It is hoped, however, that member States will move with alacrity to repeal those discriminatory sections of their Immigration Acts, and also give greater importance to bringing their laws into conformity with Community rules.

    Secondly, in so doing, the judgment has added to the Court’s growing jurisprudence, including on the contentious issue of freedom of movement.This significance was not lost on the Court. The justices stated at paragraph 65 of the judgment that the case “raised novel questions and has contributed to the clarification and development of Community law”. While litigation may be costly for member states against which claims are brought, the testing of issues of law by Community nationals helps to clarify points of Community law and ensure that member states are held accountable and uphold the rights which they agreed that Community nationals should enjoy.

    Recognising the need not to discourage parties from bringing test cases, particularly in the Court’s current stage of development, the Court in its discretion found the current circumstances were “exceptional circumstances” under Part 31.1(3) of its Original Jurisdiction Rules 2015 and so ordered both parties to bear their own costs.

    Copies of the summary, entire judgment and the video of the delivery of the judgment are available on the CCJ’s website here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.