Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Tag: Climate Change

  • Caribbean Citizenship by Investment Programmes and Climate Resilience

    Caribbean Citizenship by Investment Programmes and Climate Resilience

    Alicia Nicholls

    Citizenship by investment programmes (CIPs) are currently operated by five countries in the Caribbean. These are St. Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, Grenada, Antigua & Barbuda and St. Lucia. Caribbean CIPs face increasing threats stemming from reputational risks, increased regional and international competition and heightened international scrutiny. Despite these challenges, some Caribbean CIP-operating countries are utilising CBI revenues to finance climate change adaptation/mitigation initiatives in order to build climate resilience.

    The Climate Change Challenge

    June 1st of each year marks the official start of the Atlantic Hurricane Season. It is exemplified in the rhyme many Caribbean school children learn: “June – too soon, July – standby, August – you must prepare, September – remember, and October – it’s all over”.

    Rhymes aside, Caribbean countries are no strangers to the human, economic, financial and social devastation inflicted by weather systems around this time of the year. 2017 was an unforgetable year as Hurricanes Maria and Irma caused significant damage to a number of Caribbean islands, most notably Dominica, the island of Barbuda (part of Antigua & Barbuda) and the US territories of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

    In a 2016 International Monetary Fund (IMF) study, Acevedo wrote that in the Caribbean, “storms cause on average 1.6 percent of GDP in damages every year, but that figure could be 1.6 to 3.6 times larger due to underreporting of disaster and damages.” One of the many adverse impacts of climate change is more intense weather systems. As such, the level of damage from hurricanes and tropical storms is expected to rise.

    Whereas climate change mitigation focuses primarily on emissions reduction, adaptation recognizes the irreversibility of some climate change impacts and emphasizes resilience building through targeted programmes, initiatives, policies and projects. Caribbean countries’ domestic financing constraints necessitate their disproportionate reliance on international financing and support for their climate change adaptation efforts. High debt overhangs mean they often lack the fiscal space to respond quickly and adequately to climatic shocks. Rebuilding requires significant capital, which can be burdensome for small countries beset by narrow tax bases and limited ability to attract the large inflows of FDI required. In some cases,  high gross national income (GNI) per capita restrict their access to most official development assistance and concessional funding from multilateral agencies.

    Role of CBI Revenues

    In light of these constraints, revenues from CIPs are increasingly attractive sources of inflows for funding development programmes and initiatives. In its Staff Concluding Statement of the 2019 Article IV Mission for Grenada published in May 2019, the IMF noted that “robust FDI flows, including from the citizenship-by-investment (CBI) program, are financing the external deficit while supporting economic growth.” It further noted that these inflows “have helped channel sizable resources to the contingency fund that could be used for mitigating the effects of natural disasters”.

    In September 2017, St Kitts & Nevis introduced a temporary third investment option, the Hurricane Relief Fund, to prepare for future hurricanes, repair property damage and support Caribbean neighbours in need. The minimum contribution is US$150,000. The Fund was controversial because it was criticised as further evidence of a “race to the bottom” among Caribbean CIPs. Nonetheless, it was reported that over 900 persons benefited from the Hurricane Relief Fund. A reported 1200 applications were received under the Fund, but it is unclear how many were successful.

    CBI assisting Dominica’s recovery

    In September 2017, category five Hurricane Maria caused Dominica pervasive human, social and economic damage equivalent to 226% of its GDP (Post Disaster Needs Assessment 2017), resulting in 31 confirmed deaths and 34 missing. According to the Government of Dominica, CBI inflows have been pivotal in financing Dominica’s recovery. In its Article IV Report on Dominica, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that “fiscal performance deteriorated sharply due to the fall in tax revenue after the hurricane, but was partially offset by a surge in grants and buoyant Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) sales revenues.”

    Following Hurricane Maria, Dominica has sought to become “the world’s first climate-resilient nation”. The island nation has emphasized resilience-focused rebuilding with the help of international donor funding coordinated through its Climate Resilience Executing Agency for Dominica (CREAD). This includes building climate-resilience structures.

    In a recent article, the Dominica Citizenship by Investment Unit (CBIU) noted as follows:

    After Hurricane Maria last year, Dominica’s CBI Programme was responsible for funding housing and hotel developments, as well as tourism and agriculture projects that cumulatively helped the island recover. The collected financial resources also enabled the Dominican authorities to make payments to affected home owners in the region of £26 million, whilst a government scheme to build 5,000 new homes is financed entirely by CBI income, according to Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit.

    Moreover, it was announced that the Housing Revolution, which is providing climate resilient low income housing is “completely funded by Dominica’s Citizenship by Investment (CBI) Programme”. 

    Conclusion

    CIPs have significant risks, but can also be tools for promoting sustainable development. The revenue inflows can assist cash-strapped governments in financing climate climate adaptation and mitigation programmes.

    This is not to suggest, however, that CIP revenues are a panacea for financing resilience. Firstly, heavy dependence on these revenues is a real risk which must be guarded against due to the potential volatility of CBI revenue inflows. Fiscal discipline, including prudent management of these inflows, is important to ensure these countries have the fiscal space to respond to any shocks. Fiscal responsibility frameworks such as that adopted by Grenada are important.

    Secondly, due diligence standards of CIPs must be maintained and should not be lowered or compromised just to attract greater inflows.   

    Thirdly, any special climate/disaster relief funds financed by CBI revenues should be situated within a coherent national policy framework for catalyzing and making optimum use of these and other resources for building climate resilience.

    Fourthly, transparency is also important. This also includes timely data on the number of applications received under special funds, timely audits of the funds and reporting of the audits of these special funds. It also requires sensitizing the general public about the use to which the funds are being put.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

    DISCLAIMER: All views expressed herein are her personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution or entity with which she may be affiliated from time to time.

  • COP 24: Paris Agreement Rule Book Agreed But Is It Enough?

    COP 24: Paris Agreement Rule Book Agreed But Is It Enough?

    Alicia Nicholls

    On December 15th, 2018, nearly 200 countries signed off on the rules required for translating the Paris Agreement from mere aspirational words on paper to an operable agreement. Agreement on the Paris Agreement ‘rule book’ came late on Saturday night, one day after the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP24) talks were scheduled to conclude.

    While there is understandable international relief and jubilation that an agreement for operationalising the Paris Agreement has been reached after two weeks of at times tension-filled negotiations, climate-vulnerable countries like Small Island Developing States (SIDS) would be justified in opining that the global political response to the climate change crisis still remains well below what is needed to stop irreversible global warming which threatens their very existence, and the future of the planet.

    Background

    Over 20,000 delegates from 196 nations converged in the small Polish town of Katowice from December 3-14, 2018 with one primary objective in mind – formulating the guidelines and institutional mechanisms for giving life to the landmark Paris Agreement adopted at COP21 in 2015 in Paris, France.

    While far from perfect, the Paris Agreement represents a commitment by the parties to hold the global average temperature increase to levels below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius, to increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience, to make available finance flows for climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible.

    The Paris Agreement rule book includes the modalities, procedures and guidelines for making this happen. A deadline of December 2018 was set for the rule book’s completion, which meant that negotiators were in a double race against time.

    Given the need to balance the national interests of almost 200 countries, the many technical issues to be negotiated, the threat to multilateral diplomacy posed by growing nationalism and populism, and the current climate-skeptic rhetoric by the world’s second largest anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter (the US), the success of the talks was hoped for, but not assured. Negotiators were walking a thin rope and the negotiated outcome reflects many areas of compromise, including on areas where climate-vulnerable countries, like SIDS, would have wished more robust language to reflect the urgency of the political action needed.

    What was agreed?

    The majority of the rule book has been completed. The parties have decided on the rules for reporting on their mitigation, adaptation and financing efforts in a universal and transparent manner.

    As opposed to a bifurcated system (separate rules for poor and rich countries), the rule book establishes a single set of rules for transparent reporting. This was one of the lines drawn in the sand by the US and the European Union (EU) to ensure, in particular, that large developing countries like China abide by the same transparency rules as they.

    The rules for the enhanced transparency framework provide flexibility for “developing country parties that need it in the light of their capacities” in the implementation of the transparency provisions of the Paris Agreement. This will be on the basis of self-determination, and developing countries seeking to avail themselves of these flexibilities must clearly indicate the provision to which flexibility is applied, concisely clarify capacity constraints, and provide self-determined estimated time frames for improvements in relation to those capacity constraints.

    A further flexibility comes with respect to reporting support. The rule book uses the legally binding language of “shall” for developed country parties with respect to providing information on support given, while for other parties, it uses less forceful language in the form of “should”.

    Under the Paris Agreement, each party committed to progressively ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which reflect their pledges to climate action and are to reflect their highest possible ambition. Of note is that the interim public registry developed by the UNFCCC Secretariat will serve as the public registry for parties’ NDCs. The registry will be accessible for use by the parties, stakeholders and the public. From 2031 onward, parties are to apply common time frames to their NDCs. The exact time frame is to be determined later.

    One of the issues at COP24 was scaling up parties’ ambitions by 2020 because when calculated, the current ambition level in countries’ existing NDCs puts global average temperature increases on track for more than 3 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This was noted in a Special Report on Global Warming at 1.5 Degrees Celsius released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This temperature increase would be well-above the Paris Agreement goal and towards levels that would lead to even more irreversible global warming, and would put some low-lying SIDS under water, literally.

    The IPCC further warned that restricting temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels would limit some of the more severe climate change impacts, than at 2 degrees, confirming what SIDS were arguing under their “1.5 to stay alive” campaign in the lead up to COP21 when the Paris Agreement was signed.

    How these scientific findings in the IPCC report were to be treated was a major sticking point in the COP24 negotiations. In a blow to climate activists and SIDS, fervent objection by the US and the major oil-exporting nations of Russia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait led to a weak statement which merely welcomes the “timely completion” of the Report, but is silent on its dire findings.

    Financing for developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation efforts is critically important, especially for SIDS whose climate vulnerability far exceeds their ability to self-finance their mitigation and adaptation efforts. It was agreed that the Adaptation Fund, which was established under the Kyoto Protocol, will serve the Paris Agreement. Some countries have also made additional pledges to the Green Climate Fund, another multilateral fund. Another nugget of good news is that parties have agreed to increase the collective climate finance goal post 2020 beyond the current goal of 100 billion USD per year. However, it is not yet decided by how much.

    While the parties recognise the importance of capacity-building, they put off adoption of a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity building to COP25.

    Loss and damage due to climate change’s irreversible and adverse impacts remains a sensitive issue for developed countries, but one on which climate-vulnerable countries, such as SIDS, are particularly concerned. Indeed, climate change impacts have cost some SIDS like Dominica after Hurricane Maria in 2017 the equivalent of 226% of GDP, at a time when that country was still recovering from the devastation of Tropical Storm Erika in 2015.

    SIDS fought hard for the inclusion of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement, and although ‘loss and damage’ is also included throughout the rule book, the language is less robust than desired. The transparency rules provide that countries “may, as appropriate” report on loss and damage, and the global stocktake rules “may take into account, as appropriate..efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage”.

    Another example of compromise is in the weak compliance mechanism provided for. Under the Paris Agreement, this mechanism is “to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement”. The rule book makes clear that the committee is to “neither function as an enforcement or dispute settlement mechanism, nor impose penalties or sanctions, and shall respect national sovereignty”. This mechanism, therefore, will have to rely on moral suasion for ensuring compliance.

    The compliance mechanism will consist of an elected 12-member committee which is to function in a manner that is “transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive”. In a nod to developing countries, the committee membership is to have “2 members each from the five regional groups of the United Nations and 1 member each from the small island developing States and the least developed countries, taking into account the goal of gender balance”. It “shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.”

    A critical area which remains incomplete is that of voluntary market mechanisms. Agreement on this was held up as Brazil objected strongly to rules preventing double counting. This issue has been deferred to COP25 which will be held in Chile.

    What next?

    The rule book is a welcomed achievement given the swirling headwinds it had to face leading up to its negotiation. But the reality of balancing varying political interests meant that the text features many areas of compromise, with the net result that the political response and ambition do not adequately reflect the urgency needed to confront the magnitude of the climate crisis.

    The Global Carbon Project released a report noting that global carbon emissions are to reach an all-time high in 2018. While SIDS are undoubtedly at the frontlines of the climate change battle, natural disasters, such as the impact of Hurricane Harvey (2017) and Hurricane Katrina (2005) in the US, show that large countries are by no means immune to climate change’s most disastrous effects. Climate action is, therefore, in all countries’ interests.

    Political headwinds, however, still threaten the global climate response as powerful fossil fuel interests now have climate deniers in the highest positions of political power. Brazil has withdrawn its offer to host next year’s COP25. Its incoming President Jair Bolsonaro, a climate change denier, has already signalled his support for increased agricultural production in the Amazon – the world’s largest green lung. The Trump Administration has re-emphasised a commitment to so-called ‘clean’ coal, rolled back many Obama-era emissions-cutting initiatives and has indicated earlier this year that the US is withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Under the Agreement, the US cannot withdraw until 2020 and its delegation played an active role in the COP24 negotiations, especially on the issue of transparency. However, should President Trump be re-elected in 2020 and the US make good on its threat to withdraw, this will have implications for the Agreement and on global climate action more widely.

    The next few years will be critical for climate action. At COP25 in Chile next year, the parties will seek to finalise the final details of the rule book. However, before this, a special climate summit will be convened in September 2019 to mobilise ambition. The deadline for current emissions commitments is 2020 and new targets will have to be set. Failure to scale up ambitions puts SIDS and future generations at risk of climate disaster. More ambitious political action will be needed to ensure a transition to a low carbon and climate resilient world which ensures that the most deleterious climate change impacts are averted.

    The informal text may be found here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • Human Rights in the context of the International Climate Change Agenda

    Stefan Newton, Guest Contributor

    snewton
    Stefan Newton

    In her address to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Prime Minister of Barbados, the Hon. Mia Mottley, abandoned a scripted speech and made a passionate appeal to United Nations (UN) Member states to make good on their commitments to climate change under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC). She urged States to accelerate mobilizing the necessary funding for climate adaptation and mitigation under The Green Climate Fund.

    In thinly veiled remarks, she criticized the current position of the United States of America (USA) by refusing to acknowledge the reality of climate change, noting “For us it is about saving lives. For others it is about saving profits”. It is well known by now that the USA has regrettably withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement: which builds upon the UNFCCC and for the first time brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so.

    Moreover, the Prime Minister pointed to the need for UN Member States to recognize that “mighty or small we must protect each other in this world”. In closing her speech, she appealed to the international community to exercise empathy and care for those States and their citizens who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. I humbly submit that this is perhaps the most significant speech given by a Barbadian leader to the United Nations, as it impinges on Barbados’ very survival as a nation State. Indeed, if climate change ambitions are not met, Barbados and its citizens will face very certain demise due to the effects of climate change.

    Climate Change is a Human Rights Problem

    While climate change is most often viewed as an environmental problem, it is also very much a human rights problem. Mary Robinson, the former president of Ireland and former High Commissioner for Human Rights, has described climate change as “probably the greatest human rights challenge of the 21st century”.

    Explicit mention of human rights is now being made in international climate agreements. The Preamble to the Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC calls for all States, when acting to address climate change, to “respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights”. The World Bank Report on Human Rights and Climate Change highlights the relevancy of international human rights law to climate change by linking particular social and human impacts of climate change to special human rights standards under international human rights treaties, thereby confirming human rights impacts. For example, the right to life is the most fundamental human right and well enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

    A number of observed and projected effects of climate change will pose direct and indirect threats to the human right to life. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects with high confidence an increase in people suffering from death, disease and injury from heat waves, floods, storms etc. Equally, climate change will affect the right to life through an increase in malnutrition, cardio- respiratory morbidity and mortality related climate change effects.

    Despite the clear human rights implications of failure to act to combat climate change, the international community is not “grasping the baton firmly” enough through decisive policy actions to reach the ambitions of the climate change agenda. The USA- Trump led administration seems to be a lost cause with its view that climate change is a fiction. Heeding Prime Minister Mottley’s call to climate action will most likely be viewed by them as a mere courtesy, not an obligation. However, it can be soundly argued that Prime Minister Mottley’s urging of States to protect each other from the effects of climate change, are not merely aspirational or appeals to international consciousness, but are linked to and grounded in legally binding international human rights principles.

    Legal Link between Human Rights and Climate Change

    The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has set out the essentials of the legal dimensions link between Human Rights and Climate Change. International Human Rights principles to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of all people without discrimination gives rise to a wide range of duties for State in acting on climate change. I will touch on three.

    First, under these principles is the duty to mitigate climate change and to prevent its negative human rights impacts. Failure to take affirmative action to prevent human rights harms caused by climate change, including foreseeable long-term harms, breaches this obligation. Second is the duty to ensure that all persons have the necessary capacity to adapt to climate change. Falling under this duty States must ensure that appropriate adaptation measures are taken to protect and fulfil the rights of all persons, particularly those most endangered by the negative impacts of climate change e.g. small islands, riparian and low-lying coastal zones. Third, under core human rights treaties, States acting individually or collectively are obliged to mobilize and allocate the maximum available resources for the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the advancement of civil and political rights and the right to development. The failure to adopt reasonable measures to mobilize available resources to prevent foreseeable climate change harm breaches this obligation.

    Incorporating Human Rights into Climate Change Policy Discussions

    Besides recognizing the legal implications of international human rights law as it pertains to climate change, Caribbean policy makers should also recognize the value added of incorporating human rights into discussions around climate change policy.

    Among other things, a focus on human rights law may serve to locate policy within the framework of internationally agreed obligations and acceptance of certain goods, interests or goals as rights. This has the effect of establishing a hierarchy of importance among policy goals, helping to ensure that human rights are not traded off among interests lacking that status. Simply put, human rights place people before profits. This is critical as more firms and investors enter the Caribbean market whose activities may have climate and environmental impacts.

    Additionally, human rights offer a normative and institutional framework for strengthened accountability and international co-operation for those responsible for adverse impacts of climate change. It may be argued that states should be encouraged to take climate action on this basis and do more in their capacity to assist and contribute to the financing of climate adaptation programs. This might be a useful bargaining chip in the realm of international relations and negotiations. For small developing states, such accountability can be used as a tool of moral suasion against large carbon emitting States like the USA which have retreated from global actions on climate change, or to spur States who are already implementing climate action targets to redouble their efforts.

    Diagonal Environmental Rights

    Further to policy, human rights law has an incredible potential to fill in a missing legal gap present in the international legal framework addressing climate change. The carbon emissions from large industrial States have a disproportionate impact on small lesser emitting States. Citizens of small developing States are thus marginalized and face aggravated vulnerability to human rights impacts from climate change. Yet currently there exists no formal legal mechanism for citizens to claim climate justice against large states responsible for impacting on and violating their human rights. This is referred to a Diagonal Environmental Rights; a term coined by John Knox the United Nations Independent on Human Rights relating to a safe, healthy and sustainable environment. Without going into the theory of a State’s extra-territorial human rights obligations, and proving causation, I submit that the ability to claim climate justice is well founded in the principles of international law.

    As previously stated, no formal international diagonal environmental rights legal mechanism exists. Given the state of geo- political madness that has taken hold of multilateralism, I also do not see one being created and implemented by UN Member States. As the experience of the Paris Agreement has shown, it is a challenge just to get a critical mass of countries- let alone all countries- to participate in an international environmental agreement.

    Therefore, the greatest hope is that existing international human rights mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR), and domestic courts are flexible enough to accommodate climate change litigation. There has been jurisprudence emerging from domestic courts that successfully incorporates rights-based arguments to climate change e.g. Pakistan in the case of Leghari v Federation of Pakistan.

    Albeit these claims were made in the context of litigation by citizens against their own State for failing to respond to climate change. Nevertheless, such cases do much to add shape and contour to this emerging body of climate justice jurisprudence. They set precedents on which international, and broader litigation may find success.

    Stefan Newton is a graduate of the University of the West Indies Faculty of Law.  The views reflected here are entirely his own.

  • IMO Member Countries adopt pathway to reduce shipping carbon footprint

    IMO Member Countries adopt pathway to reduce shipping carbon footprint

    Alicia Nicholls

    Member countries of the United Nations specialised agency charged with regulating the shipping industry, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), adopted the first greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction framework for the shipping industry. This decision came at the 72nd session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) held in London from April 9-13.

    The Initial Strategy adopted by IMO member countries has set a target of halving greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships by 2050 vis-a-vis emissions levels in 2008. This move brings the shipping industry closer in line with the goals of the Paris Climate Change Agreement signed by over 190 countries in 2015, but to which the shipping industry (like the aviation industry) is not bound.

    Some 80% of the volume of global trade is carried by ships. The phenomenon of mega-ships has seen a doubling in container ship capacity, and improvements in engine efficiency have increased the ability to travel longer distances in shorter time. However, the industry is estimated to account for 2-3% of global GHG emissions, including carbon dioxide and sulphur. A study entitled “Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global Shipping: 2013-2015” found that CO2 and other emissions from ships were increasing, despite increases in efficiency. Aside from the very real climate impact, emissions  from ships have public health risks for persons who live on or near the coast.

    So what was decided?

    Under the Initial Strategy, IMO States agreed:

    • To reduce total annual GHG emissions from international shipping by at least 50% compared to 2008
    • The peak and decline of GHG shipping emissions completely by the end of the century
    • To reduce the carbon intensity of ships through implementation of further phases of the energy efficiency design index for new ships
    • A working group will develop a program of follow-up actions to the Initial Strategy, and will consider ways to reduce shipping GHG emissions in order to advise the committee and will report at the next session of the MEPC in October 2018
    • The Initial Strategy is to be revised by 2023.

    As noted by the IMO, achievement of these targets will require continued innovations in shipping design and technology to maximise energy efficiency and decarbonisation through use of alternative and renewable energy sources.

    Agreement on the Initial Strategy did not come easy and reflects a compromise. Small Island Developing States, China and the European Union for example, had advocated for a more ambitious emissions reduction target of at least 70%, which scientists argue would put the sector more on track to meeting the Paris Agreement goal to limit global temperature increases to well-below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.  Others like the US, Saudi Arabia and Brazil had argued for lower targets.

    Some environmental groups have posited that the compromise target of 50% is not enough to bring shipping emissions in line with the target set out by the Paris Agreement.

    Nonetheless, the Initial Strategy is an important milestone as, after years of delay, it represents the first pathway forward for reducing the shipping industry’s carbon footprint. In March this year, a  mandatory data collection system for fuel oil consumption of ships also came into force.

    The full IMO press release may be viewed here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.