Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Tag: EU

  • The need for a CARICOM Trade and Development Strategy

    The need for a CARICOM Trade and Development Strategy

    Alicia Nicholls

    Last week the European Union (EU), one of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)’s largest and key trading partners, released a communication outlining what would be the elements of the EU’s new trade strategy over the medium term.

    This article discusses the elements of the new EU trade strategy, but does so as a backdrop to explain why a similar exercise by CARICOM, as well as a comprehensive review of CARICOM’s existing trade agreements, is long overdue.

    The elements of the new EU trade strategy

    The EU has indicated that in light of new internal and external challenges, which include its more sustainable growth model, it will be formulating a new trade policy. According to the Commission’s communication, the EU needs a new trade policy strategy which “will support achieving its domestic and external policy objectives and promote greater sustainability in line with its commitment of fully implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals”.

    The new ‘open, sustainable and assertive’ trade policy would be based on what the Commission has termed ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’. This concept is defined in the EU communication as follows: “Open strategic autonomy emphasises the EU’s ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement, reflecting its strategic interests and values”.

    The communication outlines the core objectives of what will be the EU’s new trade policy for the medium term. These are (1) supporting the recovery and fundamental transformation of the EU economy in line with its green and digital objectives; (2) shaping global rules for a more sustainable and fairer globalization and (3) increasing the EU’s capacity to pursue its interests and enforce its rights, including autonomously where needed.

    While the document notes that multilateralism and open trade remain central tenets of the EU’s trade strategy, it strongly hints at the possibility of the EU taking unilateral action on enforcing its rights against what it terms ‘unfair trade practices’. It is likely this assertive tone is aimed at China and the US, in particular.

    To deliver on the objectives of its new trade strategy, the Commission has indicated that it would focus on several deliverables, including “reinforcing the EU’s focus on implementing and enforcing trade agreements, and ensuring a level playing field for EU businesses”.

    Considering the EU’s recognition that the majority of global growth is expected to take place outside of the EU in the coming years, it is not surprising that another deliverable for its new trade policy outlined in the communication is “deepening the EU’s partnerships with neighbouring, enlargement countries and Africa”. The Caribbean is not among the regions prioritized. While it could be argued that this is because of the longstanding relationship between the EU and CARIFORUM under the EU-ACP relationship, many African countries are part of the long-standing EU-ACP relationship as well.

    One of the things the African region has over the Caribbean and why so many countries, including China and now those in the Caribbean, are making greater overtures towards the African continent, is that Africa is clearly one of the new hotspots for global growth. Some African countries, like Rwanda for example, are becoming shining examples of post-conflict growth and development. Moreover, Africa’s growth prospects will be boosted with the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) which came into effect January 1, 2021 and is currently being operationalized. Meanwhile in the Caribbean, with the exception of Guyana which has benefited from its new oil exporter status, growth among our countries remains lacklustre, beset by several shocks, with the COVID-19 pandemic being one of the latest.

    The need for a CARICOM trade and development strategy

    The EU’s announcement of its new trade strategy made me wonder, and not for the first time, does CARICOM have a trade and development strategy? After several inquiries, I am none the wiser as I am yet to see any public document which outlines a comprehensive CARICOM trade and development strategy.

    Some individual CARICOM Member States, for example Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, have clearly outlined and documented trade policy/strategy documents which can be easily found with a simple Google search. But there is a need for a comprehensive and clearly articulated region-wide strategy for trade and development. Why? Quite simply, we are stronger when we are unified. Among the objectives of the Community outlined under Article 6 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas is the enhanced coordination of Member States’ foreign and foreign economic policies. Enhanced coordination does not mean a requirement to consolidate, but it stems from a recognition that the region is stronger on any given matter of a foreign policy or foreign economic policy nature when our approach is unified. In much the same way, a unified approach on a regional trade and development strategy would be beneficial to the region.

    There was a CARICOM Strategic Plan for the period 2015-2019, which was the first of its kind and which outlines a strategy for repositioning CARICOM, including its trade and investment relations. However, there is no publicly available information, as far as I am aware, on whether the goals under this plan have been achieved or whether its operation was even assessed. Will there be another five year strategic plan? One is certainly needed given the changing realities our countries confront.These are questions that should be easily answered by being able to look on CARICOM’s website.

    A comprehensive CARICOM trade and development strategy is especially important now that it is pellucidly clear that the overreliance on a single sector for economic activity, employment and foreign exchange, which is tourism for most of us, remains a perilous development strategy. It has long been recognised that there is a need to not only diversify our trade through higher value-added goods and services, but expand links with non-traditional partners, such as China, African countries, India and countries of the Middle East. How can our existing trade agreements with current major partners be leveraged to support our goals of export diversification and expansion? Do we need trade agreements with some of our newer partners? How can we better utilise economic diplomacy and our diasporas as part of our trade strategy?

    Any CARICOM trade strategy must be clearly undergirded by the region’s strategic development objectives, and logically linked to an industrial policy. It must complement and not be divorced from strategies to promote MSME growth and internationalization or diaspora engagement. Of course, formulating such a strategy would be an involved process and should involve extensive consultations with key stakeholders both at the regional and national levels, including the private sector, civil society and ordinary citizens. Much could be learned from the process of how the EU does its consultations.

    This brings me to another critique, the lack of transparency which remains a problem in our region. It is not good enough that those of us who follow trade know more about what goes on in other regions, especially the EU through its excellent website and other communications infrastructure, than what happens in CARICOM.

    Although CARICOM has introduced some commendable outputs like its use of social media, weekly video summary of what is happening in the Community and its summary of business news across the region, it would also be helpful to see more substantive information on what is discussed in COTED and COFCOR meetings. The issues discussed in these meetings have an impact on the ordinary CARICOM citizen and it is regrettable that often there are no communiques released after these meetings or where there are, the information usually appears generic with little substance.

    Need for review of CARICOM’s trade agreements

    Lastly, there is also the need for a comprehensive evaluation of the region’s trade agreements in much the same way as I called for a review of our existing bilateral investment treaties in a previous article. CARICOM has partial scope agreements with Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba. It has free trade agreements (FTAs) with the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica.  The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement is CARICOM’s first FTA with a developed country partner, and the CARIFORUM-UK EPA rolls over the provisions of this agreement to cover CARIFORUM-UK trade now that the UK has exited the EU. Most CARICOM countries also benefit from non-reciprocal preferential market access for their goods to the Canadian market through CARIBCAN and to the United States (US) through the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Individual CARICOM countries also have partial scope agreements, often with neighbouring countries in South or Central America.

    Unfortunately, most of the data on the utilization of these agreements are via reports published by our partners, and not through our own publicly available independent studies. In the case of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, we have to rely on the biennial reports published by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) for data on the operation of that programme.

    In the case of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, it is through the review reports commissioned by the European Commission . The most recent European Commission report on the monitoring of the EPA, though noting some progress with implementation, highlights several remaining implementation deficits. It also shows that the Agreement remains underutilized and that in some cases, there is limited awareness by firms of the existence of the Agreement and the opportunities thereunder. This is despite the many sensitization workshops, seminars and literature conducted and disseminated on the EPA. Why is this? And how can it be fixed?

    An excellent study by McClean and Khadan of 2014, which was published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), found that the situation of under-utilisation is endemic with all of the region’s trade agreements. A key paragraph from the study is deserving of particular attention:

    In spite of the various trade agreements negotiated, CARICOM export performance has not
    improved significantly and there has been little movement up the value chain, particularly since
    subregional economies have been unable to transform their production systems in order to take
    advantage of the market access opportunities provided by these trade arrangements. In addition,
    production and exports of Caribbean goods are extremely specialized and along with its services sectors
    have been declining in competitiveness. (McClean & Khadan 2014)

    Is it not time that CARICOM conduct its own public review of the operation of its trade agreements to empirically ascertain the reasons for the poor utilisation by regional firms of its trade agreements, but also whether these agreements are making any contribution to regional development? Larger countries and regions, like the EU and US, do periodic review of their agreements. I see no reason why we should not be doing the same. Moreover, any report from such a review should be made publicly available.

    In summary, the EU’s recognition of the need to rethink its trade strategy in light of changing economic and geopolitical developments and its more sustainable growth model reiterates why a similar exercise is long overdue in CARICOM.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. All views herein expressed are her personal views and should not be attributed to any institution with which she may from time to time be affiliated. You can read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • What’s Happened in Trade since December 2020?

    What’s Happened in Trade since December 2020?

    Alicia Nicholls

    Happy New Year to all of our readers! Since our last Caribbean Trade & Development News Digest was published near the end of December 2020, some major trade developments have occurred. If you missed any of these developments, we will bring you up to speed with the top ones in this article!

    UK-EU begin trading under new trade arrangements

    The United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) received the Christmas present they both wanted. On Christmas Eve (December 24) 2020, political agreement was reached on their future trading terms before the Brexit transition period deadline of December 31, 2020. The deal averts the no-deal scenario, that is, trading on World Trade Organization (WTO) Most Favoured Nation (MFN) terms. Such a scenario would have caused, among other things, the reintroduction of tariffs. This would have been disastrous for both parties, and is a circumstance both sides sought to avoid at all costs, even as contingency plans were put in place in case of the worst case scenario.

    The new EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement covers not just trade and investment, but also deals with issues such as competition policy, fisheries, State aid, tax transparency, among other areas of mutual interest. January 31, 2021 marked the start of the EU-UK’s new trading arrangement. Of course, implementation of the new arrangements have not been without their kinks, including border delays due to the reintroduction of customs checks.  

    The UK-CARIFORUM EPA, which rolls over the provisions of the EU-CARIFORUM, now governs trade between the UK and CARIFORUM countries. The EU-CARIFORUM EPA, of course, remains in effect as between CARIFORUM countries and the remaining EU-27. It remains to be seen what practical impact the new EU-UK trading arrangement may have on CARIFORUM’s trade with the EU and UK respectively, including on supply chains.

    Trading under AfCFTA begins

    Originally slated for July 1, 2020, but delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, trading under the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) has officially started from January 1, 2021. A special ceremony marking the Start of Trading was held to mark this historic occasion and the recording may be viewed here.

    The AfCFTA is a landmark trade agreement comprising 54 African countries, with an integrated population of 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of US 3.4 trillion. It is second only to the WTO as the world’s largest trade agreement. While full implementation of the AfCFTA is not expected for some time, it is expected to help boost economic development on the continent.

    A recent PWC report highlights the ways the AfCFTA could assist African countries in their COVID-19 economic recovery. These include providing the opportunity to reconfigure supply chains, allowing for greater intra-regional sourcing of goods, such as pharmaceuticals, thereby reducing dependence on third countries.

    CARICOM-Africa relations continue to develop and it was announced that the African Union (AU) has offered CARICOM access to approved COVID-19 vaccines from a shipment the AU recently secured.

    EU-China reach agreement in principle on Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)

    On December 30, 2020, it was announced that the EU and China had reached agreement in principle on the text of a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). While the text does not appear to be public as yet, the agreement is said to cover market access for EU and Chinese investors respectively, sustainability commitments and provision for State-to-State resolution of disputes arising under the agreement. The EU and China also commit to try to complete negotiations on investment protection and investment dispute settlement within two years of the agreement’s signature.

    US Section 301 investigations on Vietnam currency valuation and on DSTs

    In December, the US Department of the Treasury designated Vietnam as a currency manipulator. According to the USTR, Vietnam currently enjoys a $55 billion dollar merchandise trade surplus with the US, but a $1.2 billion services trade deficit. In the report on its Section 301 investigation of Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices related to currency valuation, the USTR concluded that in their totality, they were “unreasonable and burden or restrict US commerce”, but stopped sort of recommending punitive tariffs.

    On the digital services tax front, the USTR has suspended retaliatory duties on French luxury goods, until further notice, which were scheduled to have taken effect on January 6, 2021. On another note, the USTR’s section 301 investigations on digital services taxes adopted by several other countries, including Italy, India and Turkey, found that these countries had placed “unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce” but did not recommend any retaliatory action as yet.

    A new direction for US trade policy?

    On January 20, Joseph R. Biden will be sworn in as the 46th president of the US, and it is widely anticipated that this will herald a change from the outgoing administration’s often chaotic trade policy.

    In a key note speech delivered last week, Katherine Tai, the nominee for United States Trade Representative (USTR), provided some idea of the incoming Biden administration’s trade policy priorities, of which China and the USMCA remain foremost. Notable was that there was no mention in Ms. Tai’s speech of the WTO, including the current impasse on the appointment of a Director-General or the Appellate Body crisis. However, further information on the Biden administration’s trade policy priorities and disposition will be gleaned when the USTR releases its report on the President’s trade agenda, expected sometime in February.

    Without doubt, domestic issues, such as COVID-19 vaccine roll-out and economic recovery, are expected to absorb much of the administration’s policy agenda within the first 100 days. Biden has proposed a $1.9 trillion-dollar stimulus package to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fall-out. Climate change is also one of the policy priorities and Biden has indicated that the US will rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement.

    Despite the outgoing Trump administration’s limited cooperation with the President-elect’s transition team, fate appears to have dealt Biden some fortune on the legislative front. With both Houses of Congress controlled by Democrats (albeit a slim majority in the case of the Senate), Biden should have some breathing space to get his policy agenda enacted, at least for the first two years of his administration.

    US redesignates Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism

    The outgoing Trump administration’s State Department has redesignated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism (SST) for allegedly “repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists”. Cuba had been delisted in 2015 under the Obama Administration as part of that administration’s attempts to normalize US-Cuba relations. However, the US’ illegal and unwarranted economic, commercial and financial embargo on Cuba, which requires Congressional action to remove, remains.

    The redesignation of Cuba as a SST is just the latest of several actions taken over the course of the Trump administration, which has seen a hardening of the US’ policies against the island nation. This included, for example, ending the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. With regard to the trade implications of Cuba’s redesignation, which is extraterritorial in application, it penalises persons and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba, bans defense exports and sales, and imposes certain controls on exports of dual use items.

    In a strong statement condemning this unilateral action taken by the administration, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) argued that “Cuba’s international conduct does not in any way warrant that designation.” CARICOM also unequivocally condemned it as a “further attack on the country adversely affects its international standing and its social, human and economic development”.

    US President-elect Joe Biden, who had been the VP under the Obama administration and part of the efforts at rapprochement, has been critical of the Trump Administration’s handling of Cuba affairs. It remains to be seen what will be his administration’s approach to Cuba policy.

    Post-Cotonou Agreement Text faces opposition by some EU Member States

    Towards the end of last year, the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) announced political agreement on the text of a deal to succeed the Cotonou Agreement which was meant to have expired in December 2020. The post-Cotonou agreement is not a trade deal; trade between the EU and the OACPS is covered by the various Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). It is, however, the overarching framework for EU-OACPS relations and, therefore, covers EU-OACP cooperation on a variety of political and social issues.

    A Devex exclusive report released last week revealed that some EU states, particularly Poland and Hungary, expressed reservations with the proposed text, especially on the treatment of issues such as sexual education issues and migration and mobility.

    WTO Developments

    According to Bloomberg WTO reporting, in its final General Council meeting for the year held December 16-17, 2020, WTO members approved the WTO’s budget for 2021 and also decided that a Special General Council meeting will be held earlier this year to determine where and when the next Ministerial Council will be held. However, the US maintained its veto on the selection of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the new Director-General. It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration will maintain the US’ current objection.

    The African Union, Cuba and African Union’s proposal on strengthening the WTO for promoting development and inclusivity was also one of the agenda items. At the meeting, WTO Members were unable to agree on the proposal advanced by several developing country members on amending the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to facilitate developing countries’ access to COVID-19 vaccines. This week, the countries proposing the amendment released their responses to WTO Members’ questions on their proposal.

    In other developments, India was the first WTO Member to have its Trade Policy Review for 2021. Costa Rica has requested WTO dispute consultations with Panama regarding measures affecting strawberries, dairy products, meat products, pineapples and bananas.

    Caribbean Community (CARICOM) developments

    From January 1, 2021, Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago, the Hon Dr. Keith Rowley, has assumed chairmanship of CARICOM under its six-month rotating chairmanship. He took over from then outgoing chairman, the Hon. Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, Prime Minister of St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Dr. Rowley’s statement as incoming Chair may be viewed here.

    CARICOM has already had a busy start to the year. According to a press release from the Community, the Heads of Government last week held their 13th Special Emergency Meeting of the Conference and under Prime Minister Rowley’s chairmanship. Among other things, they received an update on the Caribbean Economic Recovery and Transformation (CERT) Plan.  

    CARICOM IMPACS and the Small Arms Survey signed a Memorandum of Understanding to Reduce Gun Violence in the Caribbean, including support efforts to improve CARICOM Member States’ to prevent the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons.

    The CARICOM Committee of Ambassadors also met later last week and among other things, reviewed plans for the Thirty-Second Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government slated for 23-24 February 2021. The Community Council of Ministers also convened to, inter alia, advance preparations for the Intersessional Meeting and to approve the CARICOM Secretariat’s Budget for the financial year 2021-22.

    The Secretariat has since the start of the year already released separate statements condemning the US’ designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and repudiating any Venezuelan aggression in the escalating Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. The latter statement was in response to a statement released by the Maduro Government on January 7, announcing the creation of a so-called “Territory for the development of the Atlantic Façade” in the disputed Essequibo region of Guyana over which Venezuela has repeatedly claimed as part of its territory. An interesting development is that the Brazilian Government has expressed support for Guyana in the matter.

    In its statement demanding greater equality in COVID-19 vaccine dissemination, CARICOM has called for a global summit in the context of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) ACT-A Facilitation Council to discuss equitable access and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines.

    Now you are all caught up! We look forward to continuing to follow these developments and more throughout the course of what promises to be a critical year for trade.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. All views herein expressed are her personal views and should not be attributed to any institution with which she may from time to time be affiliated. You can read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • EU Blacklist among issues discussed by OACPS Ministers at meeting

    EU Blacklist among issues discussed by OACPS Ministers at meeting

    Alicia Nicholls

    A resolution on the European Union (EU)’s List of High Risk Jurisdictions for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) was among the outcomes agreed to by Ministers of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) at their 111th Council of Ministers session held virtually on 14, 15 and 17 December 2020.

    The EU’s updated List of High Risk Jurisdictions for AML/CFT purposes in force from October 1, 2020 includes several ACP states. Note that this list is different from the EU’s list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions.

    Expressing concern about the list, the Council condemned the “unilateral, non-transparent and discriminatory approach” adopted by the EU in publishing the list especially in light of the socio-economic challenges wrought on the listed countries by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Council therefore “recommends a programme of action to effect a reasonable comprise in response to the situation”. It is assumed that details of this programme of action will be worked out at a later date.

    The meeting was chaired by H.E. Prof. Palamagamba John Aidan Mwaluko Kabudi, Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Co-operation, United Republic of Tanzania, and President-in-Office of the OACPS Council of Ministers.

    The full paragraph on the EU blacklist from the OACPS press release is reproduced below:

    The inclusion of Member States of the OACPS on the EU’s List of Third Countries at High Risk for Anti-Money Laundering and the Financing of Counter Terrorism (AML/CFT) continues to be a contentious issue for the OACPS despite the exchange of letters between the OACPS and the relevant EU institutions. In light of the existing situation, and recognizing that the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism is an immense global challenge and of equal concern to the OACPS as it is to the EU, the Council expressed its deep concern for the unilateral, non-transparent and discriminatory approach adopted by the EU in publishing the list of “small developing countries”, especially with respect to the additional socio-economic challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and recommends a programme of action to effect a reasonable compromise in response to the situation.

    The Council of Ministers also endorsed the Political Agreement of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement concluded on December 3, 2020. The new partnership agreement, which replaces the Cotonou Agreement, will be signed in Apia, Samoa in January 2021. They also approved decisions for restructuring the OACPS, as well as a resolution in support of action on fisheries subsidies.

    According to the press release, the signed list of decisions and resolutions will be posted on the OACPS’ website at a later date.

    Read the full OACPS statement here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. All views herein expressed are her personal views and should not be attributed to any institution with which she may from time to time be affiliated. You can read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

  • Theresa May’s Resignation: What are the implications?

    Theresa May’s Resignation: What are the implications?

    Renaldo Weekes, Guest Contributor

    In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held the now famous ‘The United Kingdom European Union (EU) Membership referendum’ in which it voted to leave the EU. Due to then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s resignation over the result of the referendum, Theresa May became the Conservative party leader and concomitantly, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. What followed was a tumultuous few years as Mrs. May tried to negotiate a deal that would satiate the country and the House of Commons.

    As she came to realise, however, this was no easy task. Disagreements over whether there should be a clean break from the EU with no deal, trading on World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, or a deal that would tie the UK to the EU in some form ensued. When a deal was finally crafted, Members of Parliament (MPs) from all across the Commons, including those in May’s own Conservative party, showed their displeasure for it as they rejected it three times. Though she tried to secure some changes, the EU effectively ruled that out. Fed up with the situation, many of her cabinet members began to resign and many MPs started calling for her own resignation as well.

    Amidst of all this, Theresa May argued that her deal was the best deal they could get and that she would not resign. That, however, did not last long. In an effort to persuade the Commons to support her deal, she promised she would resign if they voted for it. That was not enough, however, and now she has finally announced on Friday, May 25, 2019, that she will resign as Conservative party leader on June 7 and subsequently, Prime Minister of the UK. All problems do not end with Theresa May, however. In fact, some new ones now arise. One must ask what Theresa May’s resignation means for the Brexit withdrawal deal and the United Kingdom’s trade policy with other countries.

    A New Prime Minister and a new deal?

    Theresa May’s resignation has sparked a competition for leadership of the Conservative party and the UK as a whole. This means that all conservative MPs who were dissatisfied with May’s handling of Brexit now have the chance to correct all of her wrongs. At first, it may seem as though the party may choose one of the many vocal, hardline Brexiteers who wish to see a no-deal scenario, such as former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, to become the next Prime Minister since those hardliners are often credited as obstructing the passing of May’s deal. However, we must not forget that the Conservative Tory party is also made up of persons who wish to have a close relationship with the EU or even to remain in the Union. Those varying stances have all played a part in why May’s deal has been rejected. They all agreed on what they didn’t want but must now agree on what they want. Some Tory MPs have publicly said that will oppose the selection of someone like Mr. Johnson as his plans for a no-deal Brexit are too reckless.

    Let us consider a scenario where a no-deal supporter became the Prime Minister. Presumably, he may just rip up the deal and choose to exit the EU on WTO terms. This is next to impossible, however, as the House of Commons has already rejected a no-deal scenario under Theresa May. It is far less likely that those opposed to a no-deal withdrawal will change their minds just because of a new face. Especially if that new face is acting more ideological than pragmatic. If a no-deal scenario were to succeed, it would create massive disruption to operations and supply of goods as many businesses have deep ties within the EU that help them to survive. There will be an eventual recovery but how long will that recovery take? Would it really be wise to risk financial stability for the sake of satisfying an ideological point?

    What about a deal-supporting Conservative? There are many MPs who want to leave the EU with a deal but they differ on what they want in the deal. Some want an arm’s length relationship in the deal while others want to be as close as possible to the Union with a customs union or what has been dubbed as the common market 2.0. Though those scenarios would be more preferable than a no-deal, the House has also rejected those through the series of indicative votes that it held in late March and early April. On the face of it, no matter what the new Prime Minister brings, it may suffer the same fate as May’s deal. Of note though, is the margin by which each indicative vote failed. In the second round of indicative votes, the customs union vote tabled by ‘europhile’ Tory Kenneth Clarke, lost by only 3 votes; the lowest margin. The new Prime Minister who knows how to play politics better than Theresa May may able to swing people to the customs union provided that it is his or her preferred option.

    Forgetting Brexit entirely?

    Other options such as holding a second referendum and revoking article 50 are also desired by some but that may not be the wisest thing to consider at this time. The public will perceive that the Government is holding a new referendum simply because the first one produced an undesired result. Revoking article 50 goes directly against what the people voted for. Avoiding Brexit may be the desired outcome for some, but the public upheaval that may arise through the methods of trying to stop it may not be worth it. Implementing these options with support from the House and the public will be quite laborious. 

    The EU’s role in the deal

    Amidst of all this, no matter what the new Prime Minister puts forward, he or she still has to deal with the EU. The EU has made clear that they will not change the current deal. There is no more room for tweaks or changes, especially relating to the contentious Irish backstop that seeks to prevent a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. If a new Prime Minster believes that he or she can sway the EU to remove the backstop or any other restrictive conditions then he or she is sorely mistaken. It will be especially difficult to renegotiate the deal so late into the timeline with someone who may be hostile toward the EU. By all means, however, the EU will welcome anyone willing to build its current relationship with the UK. It will be easier to renegotiate the deal in that regard. The EU will also still be wary of crafting any kind of deal considering that the House has effectively ruled out all options on the table.

    The United Kingdom’s Trade policy with other Countries

    It is quite clear that Brexit will shape who becomes the next Conservative leader and the next Prime Minister but there are other trade policy issues that exist beyond Brexit. With a change in leadership and subsequent change in team, other world leaders must now adapt to what could be a change in trade policy approach. There could be a new Prime Minister who is more of a hardliner as it relates to overall trade policy or someone who has a softer approach. This will be of special interest to leaders like United States (US) President Donald Trump who wishes to renegotiate the US’ trade deals with other world leaders that he considers as conciliatory parties. This may not be much of a big concern, however, as a change in leadership is normal as this happens whenever there is a general election.

    Additionally, a Conservative is a Conservative. There may be no real major policy changes for the country as a whole. The relationship between the UK and the EU is also one that is unlike other relationships the UK has and issues surrounding Brexit will be far more complex than normal trade relationships. Others may claim that the EU is being a bully as it is merely concerned for its own sustainability.

    Conclusion

    Considering that all surrounding factors remain the same, those being Parliament’s and the EU’s stubbornness, and the fact that practically speaking, there are no changes that can be made unless they seek to bring the UK and the EU closer together, the new Prime Minister has to be one that looks at the situation in a pragmatic way rather than ideological. He or she must also be able to play politics. Though the legal relationship is what really matters, people must be sold on the idea that this is the best possible deal rather than simply being told it is the best. Whoever the new Prime Minister is, one can only hope they can achieve these things and solve the current Brexit problem rather than exacerbate it or even create new ones. The Conservatives must realize that Britain’s future, Brexit and beyond, is in their hands.

    Renaldo Weekes is a holder of a BSc. (Sociology and Law) who observes international affairs from his humble, small island home. He has keen interest in how countries try to maneuver across the international political and legal stage. Read his other postings here.