Tag: Politics

  • Deeper CARICOM integration key to navigating fractured global trade order – CARICOM ASG

    Deeper CARICOM integration key to navigating fractured global trade order – CARICOM ASG

    CARICOM Secretariat | Turkeyen, Greater Georgetown, Guyana | Thursday, 29 January 2026:     A senior Caribbean Community (CARICOM) official has positioned deeper regional integration as a strategic response to an increasingly fragmented and uncertain global trade environment, as global rules-based systems weaken and economic nationalism intensifies.

    Ambassador Wayne McCook, Assistant Secretary-General, CARICOM Single Market and Trade, was a panelist discussing Prospects for International Trade in 2026 in the Context of the Changing Global Geopolitical and Economic Landscape – Impact on Trade and the Challenges and Opportunities for the Caribbean and Latin America. The discussion was held on Wednesday, 28 January, at the World Trade Centre in Georgetown, Guyana.

    Contextualising the Region’s position, Amb. McCook said: “For our Region, the scars of the immediate past are visible. The devastating passage of Hurricane Melissa encapsulated the dual challenge we face: the existential threat of climate change and the inherent economic vulnerabilities of our CARICOM Member States. Simultaneously, we have navigated dramatic shifts in global trade, driven largely by an intensified “America First” trade policy that has significantly impacted our exports, value chains and supply chains through a suite of unprecedented tariff measures.”

    Against the background of what he described as “a truly tumultuous 2025” for international and regional trade, Amb. McCook highlighted CARICOM’s “oneness” and its resilience to navigate the “choppy waters” of the 21st century.

    Amb. McCook warned that the erosion of multilateral trade norms is no longer theoretical, but already affecting investment, supply chains, and growth prospects worldwide.

    According to UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global foreign direct investment fell by 11 per cent in 2024, marking a second consecutive year of decline, with further weakness expected in 2026. Global trade growth has slowed dramatically, falling below one per cent in 2025, even as uncertainty and geopolitical rivalry reshape supply chains.

    Despite these headwinds, CARICOM’s trade performance has shown resilience. Between 2023 and 2024, CARICOM exports grew by 32 per cent to US$34.7B, with exports to the United States increasing by 86 per cent. However, recent data reveals uneven impacts across Member States.

    The Assistant Secretary-General pointed to the recent steps toward full free movement of people by Barbados, Belize, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines as tangible progress toward a more integrated Community.

    “Fundamentally, CARICOM integration should be seen as a strategic response to a shifting global order,” he emphasised.

    Addressing prospects for international trade in 2026, he advanced a multi-pronged strategy focused on strengthening intra-regional trade, strengthening existing relationships while diversifying global partnerships beyond traditional allies, and deepening economic integration. Central to this approach is the CARICOM Industrial Policy and Strategy (CIPS), and the 25×25+5 food security agenda aimed at reducing food import dependence and boosting regional production.
    Read his presentation here: https://caricom.org/deeper-caricom-integration-key-to-navigating-fractured-global-trade-order-amb-wayne-mccook/

  • US ‘Liberation Day’ Tariffs: What impact for the Caribbean?

    US ‘Liberation Day’ Tariffs: What impact for the Caribbean?

    Alicia Nicholls

    On April 2, 2025, United States (US) President, Donald J. Trump, announced additional ad valorem tariffs of 10% on goods imports from all countries, including Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries, under his new ‘Reciprocal Tariff Policy’. In addition, some countries like Guyana, which have a merchandise trade surplus with the US, will face even steeper additional tariffs. This article discusses these ‘Liberation Day’ developments and what they might mean for CARICOM countries.

    The Reciprocal Tariff Policy

    Earlier this year, on January 20, 2025, President Trump signed a presidential memorandum outlining the broad contours of his America First Trade Policy 2.0, initiating an investigation into the root causes of the country’s “large and persistent” merchandise trade deficit. This was followed by a second executive order, the Presidential Memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs issued on February 13, 2025, which ordered a review of non-reciprocal trade practices and their contribution to the U.S. trade imbalance. On April 1, 2025, the President received the results of these investigations.

    The executive order of April 2, 2025 entitled “Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that contribute to large and persistent annual US goods trade deficits” introduces the so-called Reciprocal Tariff Policy as a response to the national emergency supposedly caused by foreign trade and economic practices.

    Using presidential authority pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), this policy applies an additional ad valorem duty starting at 10% on imports from all of the US’ trading partners, effective April 5, 2025 at 12:01 am (EDT). For countries in Annex I, these tariffs will increase to the country-specific rates outlined in that annex effective April 9, 2025 (EDT). For Guyana, the only Caribbean Community (CARICOM) country on Annex I, its goods exports to the US will be hit with additional ad valorem tariffs of 38%.

    These tariffs are to remain in place indefinitely, until the President determines that the conditions warranting them have been “satisfied, resolved, or mitigated”. Additionally, the President has the authority to increase the tariffs if the countries retaliate. A narrow range of goods listed in Annex II of the Memorandum is exempt from the ad valorem tariffs.

    These new ‘reciprocal’ tariffs aim to address what the Trump Administration perceives as chronic non-reciprocity in the US’ trade relationships, hampering U.S. manufacturers’ ability to compete in foreign markets and thereby threatening American jobs, manufacturing capacity, and competitiveness. However, the methodology used to determine these tariffs has faced criticism. If it is to be a so-called ‘reciprocal’ tariff, the initial thinking by many of us in the trade policy community was that the US would match the tariffs charged by these countries on US imports. Rather, according to financial journalist James Surowiecki in a post on X and later confirmed by economists and the administration, the formula for calculating the additional tariffs appears to involve simply dividing a country’s trade balance with the U.S. by the value of its exports to the US multiplied by ½ to arrive at the tariff rate. This has led to some of the poorest countries in the world being hit with disproportionately high tariffs based on this dubious formula. Moreover, tariffs have even been imposed on small uninhabited territories like the Heard and McDonald Islands, reiterating doubts about the logic behind the policy and on the more humorous side, giving rise to a raft of penguin memes on social media.

    Possible implications for Caribbean economies and firms

    However, this is no laughing matter as all goods exported from CARICOM countries to the U.S. will now face the additional 10% tariff, except for Guyana which faces a country-specific 38% tariff. This makes the costs of Caribbean products more expensive in the US, although there is the argument that they will also be competing with goods from other countries which might be subjected to even higher country-specific rates.

    The US has a large trade surplus with the region on a whole, and with most Caribbean countries, with the exceptions of the commodity-exporting countries of Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago. Indeed, the US remains a key market for several important Caribbean exports, including energy products like oil, ammonia and methanol, as well as rum, textiles and other manufactured and agricultural products. Since the 1980s most CARICOM countries’ goods exports to the US are eligible to enter duty-free due to the Caribbean Basin Initiative and its constituent Acts. This is not a negotiated trade agreement, but a unilateral preferences programme which has enjoyed bipartisan US support because it benefits US manufacturing as the biennial US International Trade Commission (USITC) reports on the operation of the CBERA have consistently shown.

    In her latest article, noted Caribbean economist Dr. Kari Grenade outlined a variety of ways in which these developments could impact Caribbean economies, including inflation as since the Caribbean imports a significant volume of US goods, including essential foodstuffs, this could lead to rising prices on our supermarket shelves. Analysis by Tax Foundation shows that the Trump tariffs amount to an average tax increase of more than $2,100 US per US household in 2025. What does this mean for the Caribbean diaspora in the US? What does this mean for Americans’ travel to the region if US consumers will be paying more for everyday goods and will have less disposable income ? What does this mean for those countries in the Caribbean which depend on the US as a major tourism source market?

    What next? Firm and regional responses

    The tariffs have not yet come into effect, and it is likely that they could be halted at the last minute given the backlash and stock market volatility the announcement has caused. Nonetheless, it is imperative for firms and Caribbean countries to plan for them. For Caribbean exporters which rely on the CBI concessions, this may necessitate rethinking export strategies, possibly by shifting to non-trade market entry strategies to maintain access to the U.S. market, or by diversifying into new export destinations. For those Caribbean companies which rely on inputs imported from the US, they could face higher costs as US manufacturers pass on their increased costs to intermediate and end consumers. This means they will have to continue to diversify their sourcing. Some firms are already doing this.

    Retaliation is not a feasible option for CARICOM countries as we import much of what we consume from the US and already have high tariffs on imported goods. Where feasible, Caribbean countries could lower their applied rates on imported goods to help offset some of the pain consumers would feel.  Our other main options are diplomatic, preferably as a grouping. Caribbean governments have been engaging in diplomatic outreach to urge the US to reconsider the policy or at least provide carve-outs for small countries. In a recent article, Antigua & Barbuda’s highly respected Ambassador to the US, Sir Ronald Sanders, has called on the US to revisit these tariffs as they are against the spirit of the CBI and US-Caribbean relations, have human and economic costs and also imperil US strategic interests. Indeed, this policy will make the price of US goods more expensive and further incentivise importers in the region to source more regionally or internationally. Moreover, many Caribbean nationals have customarily gone to the US, especially cities like Miami and New York, to vacation and shop, contributing to the economies of those cities. Caribbean nationals will increasingly go to cheaper destinations like Panama.

    The ‘America First Trade Policy 2.0’ reinforces the need for us in CARICOM to accelerate efforts to expand our intra-regional trade and continue our trade diversification efforts. This is nothing novel and it is something we have long recognised. I listened to the speech of EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen earlier this week and found it noteworthy that the EU, a market of some 450 million people and with the economic heft to implement meaningful retaliatory measures also saw the salience of deeper integration and economic diversification to helping build its resilience and navigate this period of uncertainty. If deeper integration and diversification are important for the EU, they are doubly vital for us in CARICOM. After all, it is not just these tariffs we must contend with, but also the mooted fees to be placed on vessels which are Chinese made or are part of fleets which have a large number of Chinese-made vessels, which could impact many Caribbean countries.

    A broader concern is the pall this beggar thy neighbour trade policy by US as the world’s largest economy casts over the rules-based multilateral trading system and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which it was critical in establishing. While the multilateral trading rules are far from perfect, they have provided a predictable and rules-based framework where, inter alia, countries agreed to bind their tariffs for tariff lines at specific levels, which ensures some predictability for exporters. However, what the Trump administration is doing is contrary to the spirit of the multilateral trading system and will set off a global trade war as major economic powers react with their own retaliatory measures. As history shows, this will possibly have deleterious implications for the global economy, and just a mere five years after the world was hit by the worst pandemic in 100 years.  This latest move heralds a more unpredictable, uncertain, unstable and unilateral era in global trade relations, one in which strategic diplomacy, regional cooperation and diversification will be key for CARICOM countries to navigate.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is an international trade specialist and the founder of the Caribbean Trade Law and Development Blog: www.caribbeantradelaw.com.

  • Caribbean-African Trade: The Unfinished Bridge

    Caribbean-African Trade: The Unfinished Bridge

    Ashley Williams, Guest Contributor

    The Premise

    History left a fracture where a bridge should have been. The Caribbean and Africa—two regions tethered by blood, yet disconnected by trade.
    For centuries, we have exchanged culture, music, and resilience, but not commerce at scale. That was by design.

    Today, we are positioned to correct that. Not as an afterthought, not as a side conversation, but as a deliberate economic force.
    The Caribbean and Africa are two sides of the same coin—one rich in resources, the other rich in financial infrastructure and global access.

    The question is not if this bridge will be built. The question is who will control its foundation.

    The Case for Reconnection

    For decades, Caribbean nations have been locked into trade cycles dictated by former colonial powers.  Our largest exports still head to North America and Europe.
    Our tourism models remain dependent on Western economies. Even our food supply is largely imported from outside the region.

    Africa, too, has been locked into extractive economic relationships—its vast resources flowing outward, while financial control remains offshore.
    China, the EU, and the U.S. have embedded themselves as dominant players in African trade. Yet, the Caribbean is absent. Why?

    Because we have not yet moved as a collective force. But when we do, the system changes.


    Strategic Synergies: What We Bring, What They Bring

    Caribbean economies are small but agile. We are financial architects. We design offshore structures, manage global wealth, and maneuver regulatory frameworks like second nature.
    Africa, on the other hand, is  a sleeping giant—a landmass of opportunity, with raw materials, energy potential, and scale.

    The synergy is undeniable. The Caribbean is the financial brain, Africa is the industrial body.


    1. Financial Infrastructure & Alternative Investment 


    The Bahamas is a financial powerhouse—one of the world’s most recognized offshore banking hubs. Africa is experiencing a fintech revolution, leapfrogging traditional banking systems.

    – Caribbean Strength: We control regulatory frameworks, offshore finance, and structured investment models. 
    – African Strength: Digital banking, mobile finance, and large-scale investment needs. 
    – Opportunity: A Caribbean-African sovereign wealth fund that structures investments in real estate, energy, and infrastructure across both regions. 

    2. Renewable Energy & Power Independence
    Both regions suffer from high energy costs and dependency on fossil fuels. Africa has solar farms the size of cities, untapped hydroelectric power, and access to rare minerals needed for battery storage. 

    – Caribbean Strength: Expertise in solar-powered desalination, grid management, and sustainable energy policies. 
    – African Strength: Raw materials, large-scale renewable energy projects, and battery storage potential. 
    – Opportunity: Co-owned energy companies** that provide off-grid power solutions for both regions—drastically reducing reliance on external energy suppliers. 

    3. Food Security & Agricultural Trade 
    The Caribbean imports **80% of its food.  That is a liability. Africa has the land and the output to close this gap. 

    – Caribbean Strength: Trade logistics, duty-free zones, and financial structuring. 
    – African Strength: Large-scale agricultural production, natural farming conditions. 
    – Opportunity: A direct agricultural pipeline, moving fresh, organic African produce into the Caribbean food supply chain. 

    4. Real Estate & Infrastructure Development 
    Both regions have a real estate boom, but capital access remains a challenge. The Bahamas understands luxury development and foreign direct investment. Africa needs urban expansion and commercial real estate projects. 

    – Caribbean Strength: Investment-friendly real estate laws, residency incentives, and luxury market expertise. 
    – African Strength: High demand for commercial and residential expansion. 
    – Opportunity: A Caribbean-African Real Estate Fund that funnels investment capital from both regions into large-scale developments.


    Breaking the Barriers: The Playbook 

    This is not a matter of potential, but of execution. The barriers are not structural; they are psychological and logistical.

    1. Trade Agreements & Economic Alignment 
    The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) exists. CARICOM exists. The link between the two is missing. 
    Bilateral agreements must eliminate tariffs, streamline import/export regulations, and incentivize direct Caribbean-African trade flows.

    2. Direct Shipping & Air Cargo Routes 
    Right now, Caribbean-Africa trade requires detours through Europe or the U.S. That is not sustainable. We need dedicated trade hubs in The Bahamas, Barbados, and Jamaica to serve as logistical entry points for African goods. 

    3. Digital Trade & Blockchain Integration 
    Africa leads in mobile banking. The Bahamas leads in blockchain-friendly regulation. Smart contracts, blockchain-based supply chain verification, and digital trade platforms can bypass traditional barriers and create frictionless commerce. 

    The Bahamas as the Financial Bridge 

    The Bahamas is uniquely positioned to be the Caribbean-African trade epicenter. It is one of the world’s most respected financial jurisdictions, a tax-neutral hub, and a global player in wealth management and fintech.

    What must happen next? A formalized Caribbean-African Investment Forum. A platform that: 

    – Connects investors with African-Caribbean projects.
    – Structures investment vehicles for real estate, energy, and agriculture. 
    – Expands digital banking solutions to enable smooth financial transactions. 

    The Bahamas can lead this movement. Not by asking permission, but by building the infrastructure.

    Conclusion: The Shift is Inevitable 

    This is not just about trade. This is about rewiring the economic power flow. 
    For too long, both regions have been extraction zones—raw materials, cheap labor, offshore finance—flowing outward, never cycling back. 

    The cycle ends here.

    This is about control. Control of capital, control of supply chains, control of our economic future. 

    Africa is rising. The Caribbean is evolving. And when these two forces align, the game resets. 

    The only question that remains is: Who moves first?

    Ashley Williams is an attorney, strategic visionary, and key figure in the rise of The Bahamas and the founder of WilliamsAdvise.

  • Grenada leads the way by abolishing criminal libel – We all should follow suit

    Alicia Nicholls 

    The big legal news rippling across the Caribbean Sea this week is the revelation that the Tillman Thomas government in Grenada has made history by being the first Commonwealth Caribbean territory to abolish criminal defamation and thus bring its libel laws, at least on this front, in conformity with the exigencies of a twenty-first century democracy.

    According to the International Press Institute (IPI), Grenada’s Criminal Code (Amendment) Act of 2012 abolished sections 252 and 253 of the Grenada Criminal Code which imposed criminal sanctions for libel. The repeal was a big victory for the International Press Institute which has been ardently campaigning for the abolition of criminal defamation in all Commonwealth Caribbean States, advocating instead the reliance on civil actions exclusively. Seditious libel however still remains on the books as a criminal offence under s 357 of the Criminal Code. For a full background on the work of the IPI on this front, see here.

    Freedom of the press is held to be one of the central tenets of a functioning liberal democracy. The rationale behind press freedom is that a robust and independent press keeps public officials in check by informing the populace of their actions, calling them out on their shortcomings, while also providing information which would allow the public to make informed decisions in their own interest. However, the existence of antiquated defamation laws on the statute books of Commonwealth Caribbean countries has led many to criticize these vestiges of the colonial era as fetters on the efficacy of the fourth estate in scrutinizing our public officials, and thereby serving as a barrier to true democratic governance.

    The zeal with which Commonwealth Caribbean territories have tended to cling to our pre-independence laws has been heavily criticized, but in the case of our libel laws, the situation becomes even more perplexing. While it is accepted that a delicate balance must be maintained between the much deserved need to protect a person’s reputation and the equally deserved right of the public to access information, the harshness of Commonwealth Caribbean countries’ libel laws can be contrasted with the iniquitously broad freedom of expression privileges granted to parliamentarians on the floor of parliament under the convention of parliamentary privilege.  Is the freedom of speech of parliamentarians therefore more valuable than that of those whose role is to serve as the watch dogs of our post-independence democracies?

    Defamation legislation throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean ranges in vintage from semi-modern to archaic acts dating back to the mid-nineteenth century.  With sluggish statutory change, if any, it has been up to the common law to adapt the laws of defamation to the needs of modern twenty-first century democracies. The defence of qualified privilege is one which has not generally found much success in case law before the landmark House of Lords decision in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Limited [2001] which recognized the duty of the press to communicate to the world at large and also recognised a public interest defence which commentators have called the “Reynolds defence”. In Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead further clarified the Reynolds defence by giving some guidance on the factors to be taken into consideration when deciding whether the defence of qualified privilege applies.

    Criminal libel prosecutions remain alive and well in the Caribbean, although their frequency varies according to territory. In the recent Grenadian case of George Worme and Grenada Today v Commissioner of Police of Grenada (2004) which had been referred to the Privy Council, Lord Rodger importantly rejected submissions by counsel that then section 258 was too narrowly drafted to allow for the raising of the Reynolds defence. However, the court also regrettably held that criminal libel  was “a justifiable part of the law of the democratic society in Grenada”. Rulings such as this reinforce the cloud of fear hanging over regional journalists in execution of their ‘watch dog’ function.

    Penalties for criminal libel vary across the region. Before its abolition, section 252 of the Grenada Civil Code provided that the penalty of conviction for negligent libel was imprisonment for six months, while two year imprisonment existed in the case of intentional libel. The Barbados Defamation Act (Cap 199) of 1997, one of the more ‘modern’ acts,  is a bit more lenient at Article 34(3) as it gives the Court the discretion to impose a fine of up to $2,000, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both.Despite the talks and promises of libel reform decades after many of us have achieved independence, our journalists still have the risk of criminal prosecution as an ‘occupational hazard’ of their profession. It is little wonder therefore that self censorship by media houses is endemic in several Commonwealth Caribbean states, including Barbados. It is a practice which, though done to shield these entities from prosecution, is contrary to the public interest.

    Moreover, stringent libel laws have tended to make the constitutional guarantee of right to access to information virtually nugatory, particularly where freedom of information acts do not exist. In Barbados, the proposed Freedom of Information Act which was supposed to buttress the constitutional guarantee of right to access to information under section 20 of the Constitution of Barbados by, inter alia, providing greater public access to information held by government bodies, has not yet been passed and neither have the proposed defamation reforms. On the contrary, the UK, from whom our defamation laws were inherited, abolished criminal libel and sedition per section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and is currently in the process of passing a new Defamation Act (currently HL Bill 41) which is aimed at modernizing that country’s defamation laws.

    In countries which pride ourselves as democratic states, it is high time that we purge our statute books of these archaic and anti-democratic laws. As seen in Grenada, this is not a move most politicians would make without strong lobbying by local, regional and international civil society.  Despite this, Grenada’s big step towards the complete removal of criminal defamation should be applauded and one can only hope that other post-independence Commonwealth territories, including Barbados, would follow suit in the interest of greater democracy.

    Alicia Nicholls is a trade policy specialist and law student at the University of the West Indies – Cave Hill. You can contact her here or follow her on Twitter at@LicyLaw.