Caribbean Trade Law and Development

Tag: United States

  • US House of Representatives passes GSP Renewal Bill; on to Senate

    US House of Representatives passes GSP Renewal Bill; on to Senate

    Alicia Nicholls

    The first hurdle in the renewal of the United States’ Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) was overcome last week Tuesday when the US House of Representatives passed  H.R.4979 – To extend the Generalized System of Preferences and to make technical changes to the competitive need limitations provision of the program. This is welcomed news for the 120 countries and territories which benefit under the GSP, but just the first step towards the programme’s renewal.

    The US GSP lapsed on December 31, 2017. This Bill provides a three year extension through to December 31, 2020. H.R. 4979 requires there be an annual report on the enforcement of eligibility criteria to ensure that countries designated as beneficiary developing countries are meeting the eligibility criteria.

    Exporters would also be refunded for the duties collected during the lapse period. This is not the first time the GSP has expired, a fact which has created some uncertainty for exporters from GSP beneficiary countries seeking to make use of the programme. Other sources of uncertainty are that the President may graduate any country, remove products from GSP eligibility and remove products for an individual country which has exceeded competitive need limitations (CNLs). There are also a number of criteria for GSP eligibility which reflect the geopolitical  and other objectives underpinning the programme, for example, the ineligibility of communist countries.

    The US GSP was instituted by the Trade Act of 1974 and it is one of several US government trade preference programmes which allow designated goods from certain disadvantaged countries to enter the US market at preferential rates of duty. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) fact sheet on the GSP, some 5,057 8‐digit U.S. tariff lines are eligible for duty‐free entry under the GSP, of which 1,519 are eligible for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) only.

    The fact sheet further notes that in 2016, total US imports under the GSP was $18.7 billion, with the top five GSP beneficiary countries being 1. India ($4.7 billion), 2. Thailand ($3.9 billion), 3. Brazil ($2.2 billion), 4. Indonesia ($1.8 billion) and 5. Philippines ($1.5 billion).

    As of March 2017, the GSP-eligible countries in the Caribbean include: Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, while the following non-independent Caribbean territories are eligible: Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Montserrat.

    Caribbean countries do not feature among top US GSP countries and there is a good reason for this. Most Caribbean countries are beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), while Haiti is a beneficiary of the HOPE Acts. As such, according to the 2015 Report on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), in 2014, US imports under the GSP from CBI beneficiaries were just 0.02% of the total imports from those countries. As such, CBI countries’ exports under the GSP are quite small, though some countries like Belize, Jamaica and Dominica make more use of the GSP than others.

    The GSP renewal Bill received bipartisan support in the House and is now before the Senate. For HR 4979 to become law, the identical bill would have to be passed in the US Senate. Failing this, there must be reconciliation of the bills passed in both houses before being signed into law by President Trump.

    The text of the House Bill may be viewed here.

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

     

     

  • Linking Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis to the US and the WTO

    Namit Bafna & Shamy Ravishankar (Guest Contributors)

    Puerto Rico, an island the US acquired in 1898 after the Spanish-American War, has lived in legal ambiguity with respect to its relationship with America and its statehood. It was recently declared bankrupt and has demanded that the US bail it out. This article explores if such a demand is well–founded, both in logic and in law.

    A general reading of Puerto Rico’s history makes such a demand appear to be a prudent call. However, would this be desirable from the WTO law making perspective? Are bailouts allowed under WTO rules? We explore Puerto Rico’s dilemma through international relations and WTO law.

    Understanding Puerto Rico’s Debt

    Puerto Rico’s debt is a complex one with multiple types of debts; making it harder to negotiate agreements with various investors. Michael Williams, the Attorney who was handling Puerto Rico’s case states that its $123 billion debt is a consequence of years of economic stagnation and bad policy according to writers like Thomas Heath of the Washington Post. There is a serious need for debt restructuring, with investments needed for upgrading the island’s infrastructure (water works, waste management, and electric supply) as well as in boosting the economy.

    Investors bought bonds from one of the eighteen authorised Governmental Agencies under the belief that the mainland Government would do everything necessary to prevent such an awful bailout situation from happening. However, the authorised agencies missed payments to the investors. Its cumulative bond debt is $74 billion. Even with an Oversight Board and PROMESA (Puerto Rico Oversight & Economic Sustainability Act of 2015-2016), it remains unclear how a wholescale economic turnaround can be initiated, with not only settling claims with investors (who will undoubtedly require fees for the Government’s defaulting on payments), but also improving the economy. Puerto Rico also requires funding for its pension commitments ($40 billion debt) and for MEDICAID, so that its social security obligations can also be carried out.

    The Island has had a terrible recession since 2006, which has only been worsened by questionable policies of its previous Governments by borrowing more and thereby putting the island into greater debt. In addition to this, the current Government’s negotiation attempts with the aforementioned investors have not helped the situation by producing any concessions in the repayment of money owed to these creditors.

    At this juncture, it is unfortunate to note that Puerto Rico has been knocking on Washington’s doors for over two years now, requesting more involvement from the mainland. It has been involved in Congressional Committee hearings and submissions before the United States Supreme Court. This invites the question: If any, what is the extent of Washington’s obligations to Puerto Rico, and in particular to this debt crisis? To ascertain this, we must go back in time and establish the exact nature of their relationship.

    The US & Puerto Rico’s Relationship

    The United States of America (US) has several categories of land holdings that it acquired over time, none of which are considered “Federal States”. These categories include territories (Guam, American Samoa, and US Virgin Islands), Possessions (which includes Baker, Howland, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Jarvis and Johnston, that are all islands), and finally land holdings that are a Commonwealth (Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico). It is to be noted that the Commonwealth category of land holdings are “insular political communities” that have affiliations with the mainland Government of the US. They are above territories in prestige and status but below the level of states. The Possessions and Territories have low levels of political and legal power on account of their fluctuating populations and not desiring self-determination. An another interesting nuance is the fact that the Commonwealth category of nations works with the US Congress and has an established political system that works for both the Congress and the Commonwealth land holding. However where the territories are concerned, the US Congress as more power to impose measures and in effect rule over the populations on the given territory. Citizens of the territories also cannot vote for the members of the Congress.

    Over time the offshore territory policy of the US has varied and has even come before the US Supreme Court. In one case (Puerto Rico v. Sanchez) which went into the question of whether or not double jeopardy was applicable to Puerto Rico, the Judges of the Supreme Court had some interesting ideas of what Puerto Rico really was. If it was considered a Federal State then double jeopardy would not apply because federal proceedings could not disallow a state government to try a person for the same crime. If it wasn’t a Federal State then double jeopardy would disallow the person from being tried twice for the same crime (once by the US and once by Puerto Rico). This is because double jeopardy in the US does not apply where the person is being tried by “separate sovereigns” which in this case would be the State Court and the Federal Court. The counsellor for Puerto Rico suggested that it be given “Semi-sovereign status” so as to avoid the political implications of calling it a sovereign and thereby the 51st Federal State of the US, while also ensuring that Puerto Rico would also be able to prosecute Sanchez. Justice Kennedy then sought clarification on whether this would be an “interim sovereignty”? In the end, however, the Supreme Court held that the sources of power for itself and for the Court in Puerto Rico were the US Constitution because Puerto Rico was not a State and therefore the double jeopardy principle did not apply. This meant that the Court in Puerto Rico could not also prosecute Sanchez.

    This reasoning is the strongest for the US Congress to allow the bailing out of Puerto Rico. It has had many occasions to either grant freedom to Puerto Rico or to make it the 51st federal state, as the US Constitution empowers the Congress to deal with matters of allowing a new state to be a part of the federation [Article IV. Section 3. Clause 1]. Given the fact that the US has both promised the United Nations to respect Puerto Rico’s sovereignty in 1953 (after allowing Puerto Rico’s Constitution to come into force in 1952), but also never fully allowed it to be a free independent nation, it would suggest that the US wants continued association with Puerto Rico. The fact that on several occasions, the US Government has rejected even the commonwealth status of Puerto Rico, deeming it as merely a territory, also points towards the same conclusion. The US wants these “land holdings” because it clearly benefits from the culture, natural resources and of course the population, who have served in the US military forces. That being said, the US Government does not want to give it full power that a State has. Regarding the bankruptcy bailout, the current US Administration has said it would not extend a helping hand, to what is undoubtedly (based on facts and legal precedent), a US problem.

    The US policy on its offshore holdings seems to be one of granting those populations a “second class citizenship” status. It must be noted that when the US conceived the idea of a commonwealth, it was used to mean that the path to self-determination was automatic. This, however, has not taken place for Puerto Rico. Could this be a new twist to an already floundering and ever changing US policy on its offshore land holdings? Could this be the impetus necessary for the Puerto Ricans to demand freedom over their own affairs and formation of a new country that is divorced from the US?

    The WTO perspective!

    May be yes! But an underlying problem with bailouts would be that it may not be allowed under the WTO norms. Though bailouts are not anything new and the 2008 financial crisis triggered a few bailouts, every forthcoming bankruptcy should push for a clearer stance of the WTO on whether such bailouts would be considered as a subsidy and thus prohibited under SCM? Is it trade distortive under GATS? Is it time to introduce special WTO rules to deal with economic crises; making state actions non-vulnerable from WTO consequences?

    The WTO has a well drafted subsidy discipline under the SCM Agreement. Any financial contribution which provides some benefits to an enterprise or an industry would result in a subsidy. Bailouts being sponsored from public money may attract provisions of GATS as they may provide benefit to the bank and its dependent (read “whole economy” of a major bank). As financing of banks would ultimately assist manufacturers, exporters and other players; they may affect other trading partners by creating artificial competitive processes.

    However, as banks provide services, a bigger case forms under the GATS; for affecting competition in banking & financial services and making market competitive artificially. This may violate GATS’ obligation of National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation and Anti–Competitive provisions.

    Despite its widespread use as a tool for economic reconstruction, no member state of the WTO has challenged bailouts at the WTO. But even if one appears in future, would it be desirable? As financial crises are unavoidable and it is practically impossible to pin down fault to any one entity, group of entities or even a state – bailouts are inevitable. They are required not just to save the bank but the whole economy. Thus, desirability of an “economic crisis exception” in the SCM and/or GATS should be put on table for member states and WTO expert committees before we witness another Puerto Rico-like situation in some other part of the world.

    Conclusion

    It is unfortunate that today, much after colonialism and colonialist tendencies have lost international relevance, that Puerto Rico’s relationship with the US is still not well-defined in law. However, for the purpose of alleviating this crisis, this article firmly backs considering Puerto Rico to be an integral part of the US; although it may not be necessary to use the terminology of “federal state”. Puerto Rico must be treated for all intents and purposes as a federal state, that entitles them to federal support and involvement, as was granted when Detroit required an $18 million debt restructuring in 2013. This is because, the US still claims Puerto Rico as a land holding, and the US Congress is still empowered under the US Constitution to manage the same. It may have given Puerto Rico some degree of sovereignty but the fact is that the US still has not granted it independence. By the very fact of this lack of independence from US policies and control, Puerto Rico has a right to seek and get aid from the Federal government.

    Even if Bankruptcy is declared and the Federal Government pumps money into the Commonwealth, the question of its legality from WTO perspective still remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the bigger question is would bailouts even be challenged at the WTO? As bailouts are used by every member state to safeguard its economy from financial crisis, it is unlikely that it they will be challenged at the WTO, much like the fossil fuel subsidies.

    Namit Bafna is a Corporate Lawyer working in Bangalore. His area of interest includes derivatives & trade law. 

    Shamy Ravishankar is a 2015 Felix Scholar, now working as a Human Rights Lawyer. Her areas of interest include environmental law, public international law and of course Human Rights Law. Follow her on twitter: @shamy27 or on her blog: https://theworldweknowsite.wordpress.com/

    References:

    1. Mark Joseph Stern, Second-Class Sovereignty, Slate (14 Jan., 2016), available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/01/the_supreme_court_considers_puerto_rico_s_sovereignty_in_sanchez_valle.html
    2. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-108
    3. Puerto Rico Report, The Relationship Between Puerto Rico and the U.S. (27 Feb 2016), available at: http://www.puertoricoreport.com/relationship-puerto-rico-u-s/#.WSAl_uuGPcd
    4. Thomas Heath & Tory Newmyer, Puerto Rico, with $73 billion in debt, forced toward bankruptcy, The Washington Post (3 May 2017), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/puerto-rico-with-73-billion-in-debt-forced-toward-bankruptcy/2017/05/03/92e39d76-3020-11e7-9534
    5. Jaemin Lee, Beneath the Tip of the Iceberg – Global Financial Crisis, Bank Bailouts and the SCM Agreement, 10 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy (2015)
  • Will US Financial Deregulation help mitigate the de-risking phenomenon?

    Will US Financial Deregulation help mitigate the de-risking phenomenon?

    Alicia Nicholls

    The exigencies of complying with a complex and often confusing maze of overlapping regulations, coupled with steep fines for compliance breaches, have been identified as principle drivers for United States-based global banks’ restriction and termination of correspondent banking relationships with respondent banks in other jurisdictions. As part of his promise to “Make America Great Again”, US President Donald Trump has pledged to cut the regulatory noose argued to be strangling US enterprise and growth. Will this deregulatory push have the unintended spin-off of mitigating the de-risking phenomenon facing several countries around the world, including Caribbean States?

    President Trump has been adamant that ‘burdensome’ regulations passed during the Obama administration to avert a repeat of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis of 2008, have been fetters on US business activity and prosperity. While most available data point to the contrary, the Trump Administration and Corporate America posit that Obama-era regulations like the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) have reduced bank profitability and risk appetite, culminating in dampened bank lending to consumers and businesses.

    President Trump has so far signed two executive actions on financial deregulation. The latter, an executive order dated February 3, 2017, sets out seven core principles for regulating the US Financial System. It mandates Treasury Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, to consult with the heads of the member agencies of the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) and to submit to the President within 120 days a review of “laws, treaties, regulations, guidance” inter alia, which among other things inhibit regulation in sync with the Core Principles. There has been reportedly a shift towards more ‘pro-business’ regulators. Perhaps most telling, in contrast to his anti-Wall Street rhetoric during the campaign, President Trump has picked several former bankers (notably Goldman Sachs) for key cabinet and administration positions, including for Treasury Secretary.

    Stringent compliance burdens and costs, as well as uncertainty about the interpretation of the regulations, are major drivers for banks’ avoiding, rather than managing risks. Will an unintended consequence of financial deregulation in the US be a mitigation of the de-risking phenomenon? While at first blush this conclusion may appear tempting, I respectfully submit that this may be an overly optimistic view, at least at this early stage, for the reasons which I outline below.

    Firstly, the Trump Administration has set its cross-hairs firmly on the Dodd Frank Act which President Trump termed a “disaster”. This Act, which is hundreds of pages long, was passed in the aftermath of the Great Recession. It includes, for instance, rules against predatory lending, sets measures to deal with banks which become “too big to fail”, prohibits proprietary trading by banks for their own profit (Volcker Rule), inter alia. While Dodd Frank is not perfect and has been blamed for contributing to de-risking, repealing it would not only create an environment for a resumption of the pre-crisis risky behaviours by banks and other financial institutions. It would set the stage for a repeat of 2008, in much the same way that deregulation during the 1990s to early 2000s, including changes to the (now repealed) Glass-Steagall Act, laid the groundwork for the Great Recession, almost a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s.

    Secondly, Dodd-Frank is just one aspect of the de-risking problem. There appears to be no indication that the Trump Administration intends to tackle the constellation of other regulations, including international anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), tax and banking regulations (Basel III), with which banks, including in the US, must comply.

    In the World Bank’s seminal 2015 global survey on the Withdrawal from Correspondent Banking, some 95% of large banks had cited “concerns about money-laundering/terrorism financing risks” as a driver for withdrawing from correspondent banking relationships. However, it is unlikely that the Trump Administration will try to rollback AML/CFT rules. President Trump’s ‘America First’ ethos has a strong national security undertone. Weakening the US’ AML/CFT rules would likely make him appear ‘soft’ on money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. International pressure is also a factor as the US’ last Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation Report (2016) highlighted some AML/CFT weaknesses, including gaps in timely access to beneficial ownership information.

    Thirdly, replacing existing regulators with so-called pro-business regulators does not necessarily mean that there will be a more lenient approach to fines imposed on banks for compliance breaches. Unlike popular belief, most of the large banks which have been made to pay record fines had indeed knowingly committed serious AML/CFT breaches.

    Fourthly, even if financial deregulation in the US eases the regulatory pressure on US global banks, it does not affect two core problems which appear to be driving the de-risking of regional banks, namely the perceived unprofitability of providing correspondent banking services to indigenous Caribbean banks, and the Caribbean region’s unjustified characterisation as a ‘high risk’ region for conducting financial services. In the previously mentioned World Bank 2015 Survey, some 80% of large banks cited “lack of profitability of certain foreign CBR services/products” as a driver of exiting correspondent banking relationships.

    Further to the latter point, Caribbean countries, particularly international financial centres (IFCs) are consistently and unjustifiably placed on US government lists deeming them as money laundering threats, despite the fact that no Caribbean IFC is currently on any CFATF list of ‘high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’. The most notorious example of this unfair practice is the US’ annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the latest edition of which listed 21 Caribbean jurisdictions without providing (as usual) any evidence to support the conclusions drawn.

    Caribbean countries are consistently branded as tax havens in spite of the fact that all Caribbean countries have signed intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with the US Government pursuant to the extra-territorially applied US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) passed in 2010. Most Caribbean governments have already passed implementing legislation to bring their IGAs into force. In addition, while the US has opted not to be a part of the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard, several Caribbean countries have elected to be early adopters!

    Added to this is that compliance officers in overseas banks usually view the Caribbean as a “collective” and not as individual countries; any perceived risks in one country are transposed to the Region as a whole.

    Granted, it is still early days of the Trump Administration and the findings of the Treasury Secretary’s report on which regulations may possibly be earmarked for axing would not be known for some time. What does help, however, is where there is clarification of the rules through clearer guidance. For instance, for a long time it was unclear how far banks’ due diligence requirements were to go. In addition to knowing their customer (KYC), there appeared to be a growing consensus that banks were also supposed to know their customer’s customers (KYCC).  Definitive guidance through the FATF Guidance in October 2016 showed that KYCC was not required. Turning to the US, that same month the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released guidance to assist banks in the periodic risk reevaluation of foreign correspondent banking relationships.

    However, the Region would be well-advised not to expect any serious mitigation of the de-risking phenomenon stemming from US financial deregulation. Despite being a ‘pro-business’ administration, it should be remembered that the overriding goal of the Trump Administration’s regulatory rollback is to “Make America Great Again”, point blank. Any spill-over positive benefits to the Caribbean from Trumpian financial deregulation would be welcomed but unintended, and it is more likely that the regulatory rollback may perhaps be more harmful than helpful to the region.

    There is no panacea for the de-risking phenomenon as it is caused by a multiplicity of factors. Regional governments and private sector stakeholders should continue their lobbying and advocacy efforts, including engagement with key US administration officials, regulators and the banking sector. Given the Trump Administration’s ‘America First’ disposition, lobbying efforts which emphasises the implications that possible derisking-related economic and social destabilisation in the Caribbean may have on the US’ homeland security would be more impactful than pure moral suasion.

    These advocacy efforts should also highlight to US officials and to US correspondent banks Caribbean countries’ own efforts at continuously improving their AML/CFT frameworks and the compliance efforts of Caribbean banks. Regional banking stakeholders should also continue to explore the possibility of investing in technologies such as Know Your Customer (KYC) utilities and legal entity identifiers (LEIs) to assist in customer due diligence (CDD) information sharing between themselves and their US correspondents.

    These were part of the remarks I gave as a panellist at the Barbados International Business Association (BIBA) International Business Forum 2017. 

    Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.