Tag Archives: CBI

In defence of Caribbean Citizenship by Investment (CBI) Programmes

Alicia Nicholls

A  60 Minutes Special aired by American network, CBS, on January 1, 2017 has added fuel to the fiery debate on the legitimacy of Caribbean countries’ economic citizenship programmes. Whether intended or not, the segment entitled “Passports for Sale” cast a shadow of iniquity on the programmes which certain Caribbean countries, and to which an increasing number of countries are turning in order to stimulate their economies and attract much needed foreign investment.

Last year, St. Lucia joined four other Eastern Caribbean countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Kitts & Nevis by offering a direct citizenship programme. Economic investor programmes fall into two broad types: residency programmes (which only offer investors the right to reside) and citizenship programmes (which confer citizenship, either directly or after a period of residency).

Caribbean CBI programmes fall into the category of direct economic citizenship programmes which entitle qualifying investors and their qualifying spouse and/or dependents (e.g: children or elderly parents) to citizenship of the host country upon making a qualifying investment under that particular programme. Depending on the programme, a qualifying investment could be a monetary contribution of at least a certain amount to a special fund, the purchase of real estate of a minimum value or the purchase of government bonds in some cases. Investors and their co-applicants must also pass stringent due diligence procedures and pay the prescribed fees.

The reporting on the Caribbean CBI programmes was reduced to simply the “sale of passports” without taking into account the rationale behind the operation of these programmes. CBI programmes are not only about raising revenue through foreign investment for cash-starved Caribbean countries, but have wider development goals. These include helping to improve infrastructure, creating jobs and  attracting investors who are the “best of the best”, that is, persons with know-how and skills and networks which could redound to the benefit of the host economy. It is for this reason that an increasing number of countries, including Western countries, have either implemented economic investor programmes or are thinking of doing so.

CBI programmes not limited to small states

Indeed, missing from the CBS segment was that economic investor programmes are not unique to small countries like those in the Caribbean or the EU small state of Malta whose programme has a one-year residency requirement. Economic investor programmes are offered by a growing number of countries around the world. For example, the United States has its EB-5 Immigrant-Investor Programme where eligible investors may obtain a green card once they “make the necessary investment in a commercial enterprise in the United States; and plan to create or preserve 10 permanent full-time jobs for qualified U.S. workers”. Several European countries offer Golden Visa programmes, while a number of Canadian provinces offer Provincial Entrepreneur Programs whereby qualifying investors can attain permanent residence once a qualifying investment is made.

As I argued in a recent article I wrote for Henley Partners’ Global Residence and Citizenship Review Q3 2016, once carefully managed, CBI programmes can be tools of development. A prime example is St. Kitts & Nevis, which at one point had been among the world’s most indebted countries, and has seen its economic fortunes turned around.

Focuses on missteps and not changes

The 60 Minutes Special focused almost exclusively on the missteps made under some of the CBI programmes, while comparatively little was said of the changes made to the programmes to increase the robustness of the due diligence processes. For instance, St. Kitts & Nevis undertook a revamp of its programme amidst concerns raised by the US and Canada.

The CBS 60 Minutes Special also harped on the fact that some unsavoury characters had managed to obtain passports through CBI programmes. This is regrettable, no doubt, but “shady”characters have managed to earn residency in western countries which have much greater due diligence capability than do small states. The CBS Special did not mention, for instance, that Caribbean CBI countries maintain a list of restricted nationalities. Nationals from Afghanistan, Iran and Syria are not eligible under St. Kitts & Nevis’ programme, as an illustration.

Moreover, when oligarchs from Russia and the Middle East set up homes in western countries, no one (and rightfully so) questions their intention. Yet, why is a nefarious light cast on a Russian or Middle Easterner who obtains citizenship via a Caribbean CBI programme? Why the double standard? Or better yet, why are Caribbean countries constantly being held to a higher standard? Or is it because Caribbean CBI programmes, just like our much maligned offshore financial services sectors, are one area in which Caribbean countries can actually go toe to toe with developed countries?

Growing demand for secondary passports

One of the biggest falsehoods about CBI programmes is that secondary passports are sought primarily by persons with nefarious intent or as the CBS Special put it “scoundrels, fugitives, tax cheats, and possibly much worse”. This is far from the case. The growing class of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), which includes a growing number of persons from emerging economies, increasingly see second passports as an “insurance policy” against instability or economic uncertainty in their home countries. Moreover, simple things like travelling for business or taking one’s family on vacation can be burdensome if one comes from a country with limited visa-free access to other countries. A good quality passport, therefore, brings mobility benefits.

However, it is not only HNWIs from emerging economies which have sought secondary passports. Many, particularly those living abroad, are renouncing their American citizenship not because they necessarily want to dodge their tax duty, but because of the onerous and costly reporting requirements and the fact that American citizens may be liable to pay tax on income earned abroad to the Federal Government even if they have been resident in another country for years. Added to this, ever since the passage of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010 which requires foreign financial institutions to report to the US Inland Revenue Service on assets owned by US citizens, Americans have been renouncing their citizenship in record numbers.

The demand indicators for secondary citizenship are all trending in the right direction, which is yet another reason why countries are turning to economic investor programmes. The election of President-elect Donald Trump in the US led the Canadian Immigration Department’s website to crash on election night as Americans increased online enquiries about moving to Canada, while the UK’s impending withdrawal has spurred demand by UK nationals for second EU passports.

Additionally, investors who acquire citizenship under Caribbean CBI programmes do not only come from “questionable countries”. The St. Lucia Times reported in December that among the 38 citizenships which were granted in St. Lucia, “there were seven applicants from the Middle East, three from Russia, two from Asia, two from North Africa, two from South Africa, one from North America and one from Europe.”

Attractiveness of Caribbean passports

There is also the erroneous belief that Caribbean CBI programmes’ popularity stems from their  purported corruption or because of the perceived negligible due diligence.  Caribbean passports are attractive for a multiplicity of reasons. Holders of Caribbean passports enjoy visa-free access to a growing number of countries, which tick off the mobility box for investors. The high standard of living and political stability in the Caribbean appeals to those investors in search of a lifestyle change.

CBI Caribbean countries’ citizenship laws  recognise both citizenship by birth (jus soli) and citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) meaning that investors can pass on their citizenship to their children (born after the investor’s acquisition of citizenship) whether they are born in the host country or not.Moreover, Caribbean countries allow for dual citizenship so they do not have to renounce their current nationality.

Another factor is that the lack of residency requirement reduces the time it takes to acquire citizenship than through naturalisation. There are other factors such as Caribbean countries’ access to international business hubs through frequent flights to international gateways, their tax-friendly climates and their network of tax treaties and investment treaties with third states.

Conclusion

For the above reasons I found the CBS 60 Minutes Special’s “Passports for Sale” segment to be extremely unbalanced. I also question why except for a nominal reference to Malta at the beginning, Caribbean CBI programmes were singled out and why so much attention was devoted to some of the mishaps but little was said of the steps taken to prevent a recurrence. An online petition by One people, One Caribbean has sought to set the record straight and also calls for the retraction of the segment.

That being said, I do believe that robust and honest debate on the functioning of Caribbean countries’ CBI programmes is an important exercise once it is objective and not skewed. For example, the lack of transparency on the number of citizenship approvals granted under CBI programmes and to whom is a problem I have mentioned before. Although some countries have started to release some of their statistics, more data should be released and in a more timely manner.

What is needed as well is greater cooperation among Caribbean CBI countries. Some critics of CBI programmes raise the legitimate fears that increased competition both among Caribbean CBI programmes and with extra-Caribbean CBI programmes may lead to a race to the bottom in order to remain competitive. Perhaps what needs to be done is harmonisation of Caribbean countries’ CBI due diligence requirements so that an investor who fails the due diligence requirements of one Caribbean programme cannot gain access to another’s. Another option could be to harmonise CBI countries’ restricted countries’ lists. I am under no illusion that this would be an easy task but it is perhaps worth considering.

There is some support for greater OECS collaboration on this issue. The Prime Minister of St. Lucia, Allen Chastanet, has called for an OECS approach to CBI programmes through an OECS initiative based at the OECS Secretariat. However, it should be noted that a pan-OECS initiative may be problematic as not all OECS countries are supportive of such programmes. Additionally, CBI programmes must be free of political influence and interference.

Cooperation with the wider Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is also needed. Non-CBI CARICOM countries have raised concerns about reputational and security implications for their own countries. Under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the broad definition of “Community National” means that an individual who attains citizenship of a CARICOM country would qualify as a community national and be entitled to those benefits.

As I argued before, CBI programmes are not a panacea. Continued monitoring and upgrading of the programmes is needed to ensure that they meet their objectives of contributing to national development, while also ensuring the strictest of due diligence standards.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

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Are Citizenship by Investment programmes sustainable?

Alicia Nicholls

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its end of mission press release following its recently concluded Article IV Consultation mission in St. Kitts & Nevis highlighted that strong construction activity, driven in part by large real estate projects funded under the island’s Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programme, had contributed significantly to the island’s five percent economic growth in 2015. Although the Article IV report itself has not been made available, the end of mission press release noted as follows:

“The outlook for 2016 is positive, but remains dominated by developments in CBI inflows. Growth is expected to moderate to 3.5 percent in 2016 and 3 percent, on average, over the medium term, reflecting a tapering of construction activity associated with a potential slowdown in the pace of new CBI applications, given the increased competition from new CBI programs [emphases are this Author’s].”

Two main things are clear from this paragraph and indeed from the entire press release. Firstly, St. Kitts & Nevis’ CBI programme, which has been in existence since 1984 and was the first of its kind, has contributed significantly to the island’s recent macroeconomic performance at a time when some Caribbean countries are still seeing sluggish GDP growth. Secondly, the IMF has concerns about the sustainability of this  CBI-led growth. This is reflected in the lower GDP growth rate projected for 2016 and for the medium term. It raises the question of how sustainable a role can CBI programmes play in fostering growth and development in the host country.

Citizenship by investment programmes or jus pecuniae (economic citizenship) remain a controversial topic in the Caribbean. Despite this,  given the high level of indebtedness of many Caribbean countries, the need for economic diversification, the fickle nature of foreign direct investment inflows and limited access to concessional borrowing, Caribbean countries are increasingly considering their attractiveness. In January this year, St. Lucia recently joined four other Caribbean countries (Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Kitts & Nevis) as the fifth Caribbean state currently operating a CBI programme. Each of these programmes differs in terms of fees, types of qualifying investment and admission and other qualification criteria.

If managed well, CBI programmes can be an important source of targeted foreign direct investment and other foreign exchange inflows. They can also be alternative means of financing infrastructure projects which might be otherwise unattractive to most private investors. As an example, the Government of Dominica recently announced that its West Bridge project under the Roseau Enhancement Project will be financed through its CBI programme. Without private sector-led involvement, such projects would require use of government’s tax coffers, borrowing or public-private partnerships. Construction activity pursuant to these projects, where provided for, contributes to economic activity and generates employment. High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) and their families  also bring with them expertise, contacts and know-how to the businesses which they establish. CBI programmes can to some extent contribute to poverty reduction by creating employment and creating infrastructure in rural communities.

Growing global demand for Second Passports

There is also no disputing that global demand for second passports is increasing. Contrary to popular belief, this demand is not fuelled in the main by nefarious purposes but by HNWIs either fleeing political or economic instability in their home countries or seeking the greater mobility a less restrictive passport could bring. Caribbean passports, for example, rank among some of the least restrictive passports outside those of metropolitan countries.

A growing and increasingly mobile Chinese, Russian, Middle Eastern and African HNW class, and continued instability in the Middle East, are two of the major developments to watch. Turning to this hemisphere, Fortune reports  that 2015 was the third straight year in which a record number of US citizens renounced their US citizenship. Besides the onerous reporting requirements under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), the main factor is that under US law,  American citizens or resident aliens living or travelling outside the  US are mandated to file taxes in the US in the same way as those resident in the US. Moreover, if media reports are to be believed, that number may jump depending on the outcome of the presidential election this fall! It is therefore no surprise that citizenship planning is a multibillion dollar global industry.

Sustainability issues

While it is unlikely that global demand for second passports will abate anytime soon, there are concerns about the sustainability of these programmes not just because of the inherent reputational risks to the host countries if applicants are not thoroughly vetted, the implications for loss of visa-free access with third states, but also the security implications in the context of the free movement of persons as envisioned under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. For example, St. Kitts & Nevis had to revamp its programme after the US and Canada raised concerns. The latter revoked visa-free access  to Kittitian nationals. I have touched on these issues in previous articles so my main focus here is on issues of economic development.

Like all inflows, CBI  revenue inflows are not guaranteed and could leave a country in the lurch if there is a sudden drop in inflows due to competition from other CBI programmes globally. It is a concern that the IMF rightly raised  in its Article IV end of mission press release in regards to St. Kitts & Nevis. Even so, market and size constraints mean there is only so much real estate and tourism construction activity which can take place in a small country at once, and concerns have been raised that increased demand for luxury real estate could drive up the general price of real estate, making it unaffordable to ordinary persons.

The CBI programmes in the Caribbean are direct citizenship programmes, which means that once all fees are paid and due diligence requirements met, a qualifying investor is granted citizenship on the basis of a one-time qualifying investment and is not required to be resident in the country for any period of time prior to applying for citizenship or afterwards. A slight exception is that under Antigua & Barbuda’s CBI programme  an investor may lose citizenship if he fails to spend at least 5 days in Antigua & Barbuda during the period of five calendar years after having obtained citizenship. Five days out of a possible 1,826 days is hardly any time and only applies after citizenship is obtained.

This may be contrasted with residence-to-citizenship programmes, such as the US’ EB-5 programme, which require a period of residency before an investor may apply for citizenship. The lack of a residency requirement means there is no incentive for the investor to reside in the new country of citizenship or contribute through expenditure, tax paying or otherwise once he receives citizenship.

Some countries seek to address this by establishing a relationship with their new citizens. In this article on the Government of Dominica’s website, the Prime Minister of Dominica is reported to have visited and addressed several new citizens of Dominica in Europe, Asia, Dubai and the Arab Emirates and “impressed upon them the importance of their contributions for the development and modernization of [their] country.”

Another option could be to do like Malta did and introduce a one-year residency requirement. A drawback is that this would increase the waiting time for the potential investor, making such a programme less competitive.  While one could argue that this has not hurt Malta which is currently  ranked as the top global residency and citizenship programme on Henley & Partners’ Global Residence and Citizenship Programs 2016 report, I believe that its  visa-free access to 168 countries, including EU citizenship, offsets any negative fall-out from having a residency requirement.

Conclusion

To go to the heart of the question posed in this article,  CBI programmes have their benefits. The revenue  inflows and the economic activity generated make the macroeconomic fundamentals of a country look good. However, they should not be relied on exclusively as an engine of inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Careful planning is needed to ensure that investment under CBI programmes is steered towards targeted growth areas and sectors which can boost economic diversification and growth. To some extent we are already seeing this being done. CBI-funded projects in St. Kitts & Nevis are adding to the appeal of the island’s tourism product. St. Lucia is using its programme in order to develop its luxury tourism and real estate sectors. However, this should be done in a sustainable way in order to boost development and at the same time having a minimal adverse human and environmental impact.

The IMF has also made a very interesting suggestion in its above-mentioned press release that the categories for qualifying investments under the Citizenship by Investment regulations be broadened to include renewable energy, education and health. This merits consideration by policy makers. However, promoting investment in these sectors would require more marketing as their profitability for investors may not be immediately apparent.

The IMF also recommended the need for a prudent framework that “would help build resilience to a sudden stop in CBI inflows, and facilitate the accumulation of fiscal buffers necessary to address natural disaster shocks and absorb unforeseen financing needs if tax performance disappoints after a slowdown in CBI inflows”. The Fund also emphasised that a Growth and Resilience Fund using savings from the CBI programme should be established which could be used as a contingency buffer in the case of natural disasters.

Besides these very timely suggestions, it would be useful if Caribbean countries released more data about the operation of their programmes. For example, periodic impact assessments should be done on the operation of the programmes and made publicly available, highlighting their contributions, challenges and whether they have met their targets. Such an exercise would not only assist policy makers in their policy planning but also show the public that CBI programmes are not a cloak used by unsavoury characters to conceal their illegal activity but are a policy tool to assist in development. I would also add that countries should continuously evaluate and monitor, and where necessary, revise their due diligence frameworks, to ensure the integrity of their programmes.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

The rights of Citizenship by Investment beneficiaries as Community Nationals: What Implications for CARICOM Member States?

Alicia Nicholls

Citizenship by Investment (CbI) programmes are utilised as a development strategy by five out of the fifteen countries comprising the Caribbean Community. This article explores the rights which CbI beneficiaries are entitled to as nationals of the Community under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and considers the implications these rights  have for CARICOM member states. Particularly, it explores the tension between the right of CbI operating member states to determine their own citizenship policy versus the right of non-CbI member states to control the entry of perceived “undesirable persons” to their borders, particularly in light of the Caribbean Court of Justice’s ruling in Shanique Myrie v Barbados.

Citizenship by Investment (CbI)

CbI programmes offer qualifying investors (as well as their spouse and dependents once they meet certain criteria) citizenship in exchange for an investment in a qualifying activity, for instance, in real estate, a special fund or government bonds.  The programmes are aimed at high net worth individuals (HNWIs) with the expectation that they would lead to targeted foreign direct investment inflows to sectors considered to be of national importance (e.g: hospitality and luxury real estate), job creation and the sharing of expertise and skills. In a previous article I discussed the specifics of the programmes in each territory and the pros and cons of CbI programmes.

Although CbI programmes have existed in the Caribbean since the 1980s, CARICOM countries differ on the desirability of their usage as legitimate development strategies. At present only five of the fifteen CARICOM states currently offer CbI programmes: St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua & Barbuda and most recently, St. Lucia. The Bahamas has been discussing the prospect of a CbI programme for some time. Belize scrapped its programme a few years ago, while Grenada had suspended its programme at one point and now operates its programme by invitation only. The current policy positions of the Governments of Barbados and St. Vincent and the Grenadines is that they will not be offering CbI programmes.

While it is the right of each member state to determine its own citizenship laws, the issue of granting citizenship on a purely economic basis becomes a regional one considering that CbI beneficiaries (the term I use to refer to persons who have successfully obtained citizenship under a member state’s CbI programme) would be considered ‘Community Nationals’ for the purposes of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and would be entitled to all the rights and benefits such nationals enjoy under the Revised Treaty, including the right to travel to, live and work in another member state, subject to exceptions.

The CbI beneficiary as a ‘Community National’

In regards to a natural person, Article 32(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas defines a Community “national” as:

(a) a person shall be regarded as a national of a Member State if such person –

(i) is a citizen of that State;

(ii) has a connection with that State of a kind which entitles him to be regarded as belonging to or, if it be so expressed, as being a native or resident of the State for the purposes of the laws thereof relating to immigration; or

A literal interpretation of this clause provides that any natural person, including one who attains citizenship of a CARICOM member state pursuant to its CbI legislation and regulations, is a national of that State and henceforth considered a Community “national” for the purposes of Article 32(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Rights enjoyed by Community nationals

These rights are fundamentally economic in nature and can be divided between what I term general (non-discrimination and Most Favoured Nation) and specific rights (right of establishment, free movement of persons, services and capital). These rights are not absolute and are thus subject to exceptions.

  • Non-Discrimination and MFN: Article 7 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas prohibits member states from discriminating based only on the grounds of nationality within the scope of the application of the Revised Treaty except where provided for in the Treaty (Article 7). The Most Favoured Nation clause (Article 8) prohibits Member States from according to other Member States treatment less favourable treatment than they accord to a third Member State or third States. It should be noted that in Shanique Myrie v Barbados, the Caribbean Court of Justice noted that the right to MFN treatment “is a right that enures to Member States and, so far as applicable, to their nationals”.
  • Rights of establishment and to work – The right of establishment includes the right to engage in “non-wage earning activities” which are defined by Article 32(2) of the Revisted Treaty as “activities undertaken by self-employed persons”, as well as the right to create and manage economic enterprises as defined under the Revised Treaty. The following categories of Community nationals have the right to seek employment in the jurisdiction of another member state (a) University graduates; (b) media workers; (c) sportspersons; (d) artistes; and (e) musicians, recognised as such by the competent authorities of the receiving Member States. The Certificate of Recognition of CARICOM Skills Qualification assists in this.
  • Capital – Member states are prohibited from introducing any new restrictions on the movement of capital by businesses and individuals. However, as many CARICOM states currently operate currency controls, this still very much remains highly restrictive.
  • Freedom of services – Member States are prohibited from introducing any new restrictions on the provision of services by nationals in the Community through the four modes of services supply: cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence and via temporary presence of a natural party in the territory of a Member State.
  • Rights accruing under treaties with third states – This is not covered in the Revised Treaty. However, as Community nationals, CbI beneficiaries have the right to make use of any double taxation agreements, bilateral investment treaties and any other treaties of which their member State is a party, as well as any such agreements of which CARICOM is a party, including the EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement.

Freedom of movement is a cornerstone of the Caribbean Community and is one of the areas in which Member States have made the least progress in their implementation of reforms and commitments. It entails the right of entry, as well as the right to live and work in another member state.  It should be noted that the Bahamas has not signed on to this aspect.

Right of Entry

Community nationals enjoy the right of entry to any member state and to stay therein for a period of up to six months, subject to exceptions. This stems from a decision taken by the Heads of Government at the Twenty-Eighth Heads of Government Meeting in Barbados in July 2007 where they agreed that

-: “all Community nationals should receive a definite entry of six months upon arrival in a Member State in order to enhance their sense that they belong to, and can move in the Caribbean Community, subject to the rights of Member States to refuse undesirable persons’ entry and to prevent persons from becoming a charge on public funds.”

A key issue arises in regards to the right of CbI states to determine their own citizenship laws versus the right of other Member States to limit their risk exposure by denying entry to any such persons whom they perceive as “undesirable persons”, particularly persons from “high-risk” countries. This balancing of rights is of greater currency in light of the escalation of global terrorism threats, rising crime and concerns about money laundering.

Critics of CbI programmes argue that the non-CbI Member states are at the mercy of the robustness of the due diligence checks and vetting process of CbI states to ensure that “undesirable persons” are not granted citizenship. They also argue that the free movement of persons and capital within the Community provides fertile ground for money launderers, terrorists and organised crime participants to carry out such threatening activities across the Region, with concomitant security and reputational implications for the Community as a whole vis-a-vis third States e.g: in regards to visa waivers.

While these concerns have legitimacy and it is imperative on CbI countries to manage their programmes to the highest possible standard, security concerns apply not just under citizenship granted under a CbI programme but also to citizenship obtained under regular naturalisation laws. It also should be noted that those Community nationals believed to be fighting with ISIS are natural born Community nationals.

However, the fear of “undesirable persons” obtaining citizenship under its CbI programme and the reputational threats to its own programme are likely the motivation behind St. Kitts & Nevis’ suspension of the eligibility of Syrian nationals to benefit under its programme.

Under Community Law, to what extent can a CARICOM State deny the right of entry to a Community national based solely on his or her previous or original country of origin?

The ‘Myrie Effect’

Community law and the limits it imposes on the Member States must take precedence over national legislation, in any event at the Community level. It follows from the above that a refusal on the basis of “undesirability” may be based on national law and on Community law, with the proviso that where national law does not conform with the parameters laid down by Community law, it will be the latter that ultimately must prevail.

(paragraph 69 of the CCJ Judgment in Myrie v Barbados)

The tension between CbI programmes and the rights of States to deny entry to persons perceived to be threats is heightened in light of the CCJ’s ruling in Shanique Myrie v Barbados which interprets several points of laws relating to the right of entry and the denial of the right and which some critics have unfortunately viewed as curtailing a member state’s public policy right to deny entry to “undesirables”.

The CCJ in its original jurisdiction applies and interprets the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.In brief, the landmark Myrie case involved a claim brought by a young Jamaican woman, Miss Shanique Myrie, against Barbados after she claimed she was discriminated against by being denied entry, and being allegedly subjected to bad treatment by Barbadian immigration authorities. For all the controversy which surrounded it, it is a pivotal case in Community Law.

Firstly, the case established a precedent wherein a natural person (Miss Myrie) was granted leave to bring a claim against a member state before the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. Therefore, it is possible that a CbI beneficiary can be granted leave to bring a claim against a member state if he/she feels her rights under Community Law were violated.

Secondly, the Court gave a definitive statement on the law relating to the right of entry and under what circumstances a State may successfully invoke any of the exceptions under Articles 225 and 226. At paragraph 65 of its judgement, the Court found that by virtue of the Heads of Government decision previously referenced all Community nationals have the right to be granted definite entry for a period of six months upon arrival in a member state “without harassment or the imposition of impediments”.

Thirdly, the Court clarified the law on Articles 225 and 226 of the Revised Treaty which provide exceptions to any of the fundamental rights. The Court noted that as exceptions to a fundamental right any exception must be narrowly and strictly interpreted and the burden of proof rests on the member state that seeks to invoke the ground for refusing entry. As the Court stated at paragraph at 83 of the judgment, “Given the above characteristics of the right of entry it would only be in exceptional situations that entry into Member States will be denied to Community nationals.”

Fourthly, the Court at paragraph 70 defined “Undesirable persons” within the meaning of the 2007 Conference Decision as “those Community nationals who actually pose or can reasonably be expected to pose such a threat”. For the purposes of the case, the Court was not called on to determine or define what would constitute “a threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”. However, it held obiter that:

in the area of public morals, national security and safety, a reasonable test for assessing such a threat is that, as a starting point, it must be shown that the visitor poses a threat to do something prohibited by national law. In practice that threshold will of course be much higher as it also requires that the threat be genuine, present and sufficiently serious.

Fifthly, the Court held at paragraph 83 that a State which is refusing entry must give the reasons for refusal promptly and in writing and must inform the person denied that he or she has a right to challenge the decision and must allow the refused national the opportunity to consult an attorney or a consular official of their country or a family member. Member States are also required at the national level to provide “an effective and accessible appeal or review procedure with adequate safeguards to protect the rights of the person denied entry”.

This does not mean, however, that a State’s immigration authorities’ hands are completely tied and that if there is clear evidence or suspicion that a national is a clear threat, entry cannot denied. It however prohibits the arbitrary denial of entry to Community nationals, including on the basis of their original citizenship.

While there are fears about CbI programmes and whether they will attract “undesirable persons”, it should be noted that there has to date not been any known case of any individual who has been granted citizenship under a Caribbean CbI programme who has been involved in a major organised crime or other illicit activity.

Because of the lack of publicised data on the operation of the CbI programmes in the region, it is difficult to know for sure how the programmes are operating and which nationalities have been the most active. However, recently released data for Antigua shows that Chinese nationals, followed distantly by Syria, Libya and Italy have been the main beneficiaries. This highlights the fact that the majority of the persons who apply under these CbI programmes are HNWIs who come from countries with restricted passports and are seeking hassle-free travel for business or leisure, or are seeking to escape conflict-ridden countries. Due to confidentiality, it is unknown whether persons who have been denied approval into one member country’s programme have subsequently had their applications approved in others.

According to the data provided by the Prime Minister, many of the applicants who have been successful under the Antigua CbI programme are also from metropolitan countries like the US, Italy and Germany. CbI programmes can be complementary to regional integration by fostering intra-regional investment and tourism. It is not unusual for foreign nationals who have established a business in one member state to eventually conduct business, either directly or indirectly, in others. Additionally, HNWIs tend to be highly mobile, travelling for business and with their families for leisure, and therefore could be a target market for high end tourism and yachting.

The EU Experience and Malta

A similar tension between the right of a State to control its citizenship laws versus the Community interest played out in the European Union in relation to Malta’s introduction of its Individual Investor Programme by amending its Citizenship Act in 2013. Malta is a small island state of the EU with a population of under half a million and not dissimilar in geographic size to many of the small islands of CARICOM.

Maltese citizenship not only entitles successful CbI applicants to all the rights of natural-born Maltese but also EU rights, such as the right to reside and work in other EU states and the right to visa-free travel within the Schengen area. The EU raised opposition to Malta’s programme, including by adopting a resolution in January 2014 which argued that Malta’s programme put EU citizenship for sale. After engaging in negotiations with the EU Commission, Malta added a residency condition which provided that any applicant is required to prove that they had been residing in Malta for at least twelve months immediately preceding the issuing of the certificate of naturalisation.

Conclusion

CbI programmes have co-existed in the Caribbean Community since the 1980s. What is clear is that as community nationals, CbI nationals are entitled to the same rights as all other Community nationals, including the right of entry into other member states.

There are however potentials for conflict if there is lack of confidence by member states in the due diligence processes of CbI member states. It would appear from the Community law examined that no member state  may arbitrarily deny entry to the national of another member state, including based on his or her previous or dual citizenship, and where entry is denied, must follow the procedure laid out by the Revised Treaty for denial of entry and the denied national is entitled to appeal.

Member states must be assured of the robustness of the screening and due diligence process of CbI states. In light of increasing threats in regards to crime, terrorism and money laundering and the security and reputational risks which any lapse may cause for non-CbI states in the context of free movement of labour, CbI states have an increased duty to ensure their programmes are highly managed and regulated. In this regard, it would be useful if CbI countries would use the framework for information sharing as mentioned in the Community Stategic Plan to share data on the operation of their programmes for transparency purposes, including their approval and disapproval rates.

There are also options such as the addition of a residency requirement in order to establish a “genuine” link between the CbI beneficiary and the member state/Community and the exemption from eligibility of nationals from certain “risky” countries. Without doubt, the constant monitoring and review of due diligence and screening procedures is essential.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

 

 

St Lucia’s Citizenship by Investment programme officially opens for business

Alicia Nicholls

As of January 1st of this year, St. Lucia’s Citizenship by Investment programme is officially open and taking applications by interested investors. Late last year, Prime Minister, The Hon. Dr. Kenny Anthony formally launched the programme at the Global Citizen Forum held in Monaco. St. Lucia joins St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Antigua & Barbuda and Dominica to become the fifth Caribbean State to offer a citizenship by investment programme.

A citizenship by investment programme (CbI) offers qualifying investors (as well as their spouse and dependents once they meet certain criteria) citizenship in exchange for an investment in a qualifying activity, for instance, investment in real estate, a special fund or government bonds. In a world of dwindling access to financial resources, a growing number of States internationally are currently offering some form of citizenship by investment programme as a way to raise much needed finance, including for development objectives.

This phenomenon is not limited to developing countries. Several metropolitan countries such as the US and its EB-5 Immigrant Investor Programme, offer some form of citizenship by investment scheme. Other States offer residency by investment programmes, which grant the qualifying investor certain residency benefits. A Caribbean example is Barbados’ Special Entry and Reside Permit (SERP), while Spain’s Golden Visa is an international example.

The market for second passports is growing and is an attractive option for high net worth individuals (HNWIs), particularly business persons who come from countries  whose passports are subject to visa restrictions, making it difficult to travel to, and conduct business in major markets unimpeded. For HNWIs from those few countries like the US where personal income tax is levied based on nationality as opposed to residency,  renouncing one’s citizenship and obtaining citizenship of another State through a CbI programme is also increasingly seen an attractive option.

Some quick facts about St. Lucia’s programme

Basic Eligibility Requirements

  • Age Limit: Under the Citizenship by Investment Act No. 14 of 2015, a person who is 18 years or over may apply for citizenship of St. Lucia.
  • Dependents: Qualifying dependents include a spouse and a child and/or parent of the applicant or of his/her spouse once the child or parent meets certain criteria provided for in the Act.
  • Net worth: The applicant must have financial resources of at least US 3,000,000

In addition to these basic requirements, the applicant must fill out an application form, accompanied by the requisite information, documentation and fees and is subjected to due diligence checks.

All of this will be explained by the Authorised Agent. Authorised agents are licensed by the St. Lucia Financial Services Regulatory Authority and are authorised to act on the applicant’s behalf  in relation to the application for citizenship by investment.

Qualifying Investments: On approval of the application, the potential investor will be required to make the qualifying investment proposed in his or her application. Under Schedule 2 of the Citizenship by Investment Regulations Statutory Instrument No. 89 qualifying investments are:

  • Investment in the St. Lucia National Development Fund, with the level of minimum investment required depending on whether the applicant is applying alone, with a spouse and/or with dependents. For an applicant applying alone, the minimum threshold is US$ 200,000.
  • Investment in an approved real estate project. The minimum threshold is US$300,000.
  • Investment in an approved enterprise project. The minimum investment required depends on whether it is one or more than one applicant investing. For an applicant applying alone, the minimum investment is US$ 3,500,000 (plus no less than 3 permanent jobs).
  • Investment by purchasing Investment by purchase of non interest bearing Government bonds (5 years holding bond). For an applicant applying alone, the minimum threshold is US$ 500,000.

Benefits of St. Lucia Citizenship

  • St. Lucia allows for dual citizenship which means the investor is not forced to renounce his or her citizenship of another State.
  • The Citizenship by Investment Board is only allowed to grant a maximum of 500 applications annually which adds an element of exclusivity.
  • A St. Lucia passport allows for visa-free travel to over 90 countries, including the Schengen Area (26 European countries), as well as visa-free travel within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the  other rights of which CARICOM nationals benefit under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

For further information on St. Lucia’s Citizenship by Investment programme, please contact the St. Lucia Citizenship by Investment Unit.

For a general overview of CbI programmes across the Caribbean, please feel free to read my earlier article: Economic Citizenship by Investment Programmes in the Eastern Caribbean: A Brief Look.

DISCLAIMER: Please note that the information presented in this Article is for general information only and is not intended to be, nor should it be construed as, investment or legal advice. The Author is in no way affiliated with the St. Lucia Citizenship by Investment programme or any of the relevant authorities. The information is taken from sources deemed to be accurate at the time of publication and the Author of this article accepts no liability or responsibility for any errors which may be contained herein or any actions suffered as a result of reliance on the information presented.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

 

 

Has the Caribbean Basin Initiative Outlived its Usefulness to CARICOM countries?

Alicia Nicholls

This September the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) released its biennial report on the operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic and Recovery Act (CBERA), one of the components of the Caribbean Basin Initiative under which CARICOM countries currently enjoy non-reciprocal, preferential access to the US market for most merchandise exports.

Three years ago I authored an article questioning whether the CBI was still relevant and beneficial to CARICOM countries. In that article I had highlighted that while the CBI still has relevance for CARICOM countries, its structure meant that CARICOM countries have benefited unequally and risk losing any margin of preference if its WTO waiver is not extended. I had concluded that a reform of the CBI would have been a preferred option but that a CARICOM-US FTA which had a trade and development focus could be more beneficial in the long term to CARICOM countries once it allows for special and differential treatment and capacity building assistance.

The USITC reports that average CBERA utilisation rates fell in 2014 and that the impact, though positive, has been small and again limited to a few exports and a few countries. This prompts two questions: has the CBI outlived its usefulness and is it time for CARICOM countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US?

Current CARICOM-US Trading Arrangements

Most CARICOM countries currently enjoy non-reciprocal duty-free or reduced duty access for most merchandise exports (about 5,700 HTS 8-digit tariff lines) to the US market under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The CBI is comprised of CBERA (non-expiring) and CBTPA (expiring September 30, 2020). Haiti also enjoys additional preferences under the HOPE Acts (Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts of 2006 (HOPE I) and of 2008 (HOPE II)) and the Haitian Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 which give preferential treatment to Haitian apparel, textiles, and certain other goods.

The stated goal of the CBI is to contribute to the economic growth and development of beneficiaries. The seventeen Caribbean beneficiary countries and territories are: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Though a CARICOM country, Suriname is not a CBERA beneficiary.

In May 2013, CARICOM countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in Port of Spain, Trinidad following a meeting between CARICOM Heads of Government and US Vice President Joe Biden. The TIFA, an updated agreement to one signed in 1991, is not an FTA. While it outlines several objectives and goals, it does not create binding commitments or market access. It does however create a CARICOM-US Trade and Investment Council which will be charged with executing the agreement. An annex to the Agreement called the Initial Action Agenda sets out priority areas for action. Currently, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago are the only CARICOM countries which currently have bilateral investment treaties in force with the US.

Current Level of CARICOM-US Trade

The US is CARICOM countries’ largest trading partner for goods and services trade and a major tourism source market for CARICOM countries. However, the $8.5 billion USD worth of total US exports from CBERA countries (with and without preferences) only accounted for 0.36% of total US’ imports from the world, and declined from $8.9 billion in 2013 and $12 billion in 2012 (USITC 2015).

US product imports from CBERA countries are concentrated primarily in the energy and mining and manufacturing sectors (USITC 2015). Trinidad & Tobago, Haiti, The Bahamas, and Guyana jointly accounted for 89.1 percent of the value of US CBERA imports in 2014 (USITC 2015).

The USITC 2015 reports that CBERA utilisation rates, that is, CBERA imports as a percentage of total US imports from that country, have fluctuated over the past five years and have varied by country. After rising to 26.5% in 2013, average CBERA utilisation rates fell to 23.1% in 2014, although a few countries saw an increase in their utilisation rates during this period. This means that of the CBERA countries’ exports to the US in 2014 ($8.5 billion), only 23.1% ($1.97 billion), or less than a quarter, were done under CBERA. Most CARICOM merchandise exports to the US are therefore not under the CBERA but are either under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or under Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied rates.

According to the USITC Report, while Belize had the highest CBERA utilisation rate (62.5%) and was the fifth largest source of US imports under the CBERA in 2014, Trinidad & Tobago was the leading source of US imports under CBERA but registered the 6th highest CBERA utilisation rate for the same period. Trinidad & Tobago which has been the main beneficiary of CBERA due to its energy exports (mainly methanol and crude petroleum) has seen its total imports and utilisation rate decline due to declining US consumption, increased US production of crude oil and maintenance and shutdown of some factories in Trinidad (USITC 2015).

CBERA is of less importance for smaller islands of the region whose economies are services-based, mostly tourism and financial services. St. Lucia’s utilisation rate dropped from 51.7% in 2010 to just 7.5% in 2014. While Barbados saw its utilisation rate increase from a mere 3.8% in 2013 to 10.6% in 2014, this still is down from its rate of 17% in 2010.

The good news is that despite my prediction back in 2012, the WTO Council for Trade in Goods considered and approved the US’ waiver request for CBERA again and it is now up to the General Council to adopt it. Additionally, some of the products which are eligible for dutyfree access under the CBERA are not eligible under the GSP. However, more sobering is that the weaknesses of the CBI remain, including the exceptions in its product coverage, the lack of eligibility for services trade and certain stringent product eligibility requirements. Another problem is its unpredictability due to its unilateral nature. A beneficiary’s status may be revoked or the programme discontinued at any time. As an example, the US recently indicated it will suspend South Africa’s benefits under AGOA, a preferential programme for African countries, for allegedly failing to make continual progress towards eliminating barriers to U.S. trade and investment.

Generalised System of Preferences

Besides CBI, certain CARICOM countries also currently benefit under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the oldest of the US’ trade preference programmes. Similar to the CBI, the GSP is a unilateral arrangement providing non-reciprocal duty-free access to eligible products originating in qualifying countries. Unlike the CBI which currently applies only to Caribbean countries, according to the USTR Report 2015, as of January 1, 2015, there were 122 designated GSP beneficiary developing countries, of which 43 were LDCs.

Under the GSP less tariff categories and products benefit from preferences than under the CBERA. However, LDCs, such as Haiti, are entitled to additional product coverage.

The only CARICOM countries currently eligible for benefits under the US GSP are Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Eligibility of a country for beneficiary status is subject to both economic and political considerations. Among other things, the US President is prohibited by statute from designating any communist countries (with exceptions) or countries which have expropriated, imposed taxes or other measures on US property as GSP beneficiaries.

If he/she finds that a country is sufficiently competitive or developed, the President may withdraw, suspend or limit the GSP status of any beneficiary country. Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad & Tobago are not currently GSP beneficiaries.

The GSP expired on July 31 2013 and was renewed retroactively on June 29, 2015. It has been extended to December 31, 2017. The future of the GSP beyond December 2017 is uncertain. However, some in the US believe GSP benefits should only be extended to LDCs, in which case only Haiti would benefit among current CARICOM beneficiary countries. Some so-called import sensitive products for the US, especially those in which developing countries have a competitive advantage such as most textiles and apparel, are not eligible. GSP imports are also subject to more stringent rules of origin than those under CBERA.

Would an FTA with the US be the answer?

Several former CBERA beneficiaries have concluded FTAs with the US, including five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR in 2004) and Panama (US-Panama FTA in 2012). Given the issues outlined with both the CBI and the GSP, should CARICOM countries do the same?

Since the failure of the CARICOM-Canada negotiations, CARICOM still only has one FTA with a developed partner (the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU). CARIFORUM’s negotiation position during the EPA negotiations was strengthened by the presence of the Dominican Republic. Such would not be the case in FTA negotiations with the US.
US FTAs, even those with developing countries such as CAFTA-DR and US-Panama, are generally light on development provisions and strong on those which provide protection for US investors and their investments, and for intellectual property rights.

For a sense of the US’ negotiation prowess, just take into consideration that with just a few exceptions the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)’s investment chapter agreed to by 11 other negotiating partners is practically a carbon copy of the US’ Model BIT 2012. CARICOM countries will have to be strategic and clear on what they want to achieve and what are their deal breakers.

Priorities for CARICOM would be recognition of CARICOM countries’ small size and economic vulnerability and asymmetry in the commitments. As such they would likely be lobbying for special and differential treatment, development cooperation provisions, including technical assistance and capacity building to assist them, especially CARICOM lesser developed countries, in taking advantage of the market access opportunities an FTA with the US would open. With regards to services trade, CARICOM countries would likely seek enhanced commitments from the US in regards to (Mode 4) temporary entry for CARICOM natural persons.

Under the CBI, Caribbean countries are not required to extend duty-free treatment to like US imports into their territories. One of the main drawbacks to an FTA with the US will be the loss of tax revenues from the removal and reduction of tariffs on US imports as would be required under an FTA. One way to mitigate this would be lobbying for asymmetric and phased tariff removal, similar to what was committed to under the CARIFORUM-EPA with the EU. However, US FTAs, including CAFTA-DR are always ambitious in their scope in regards to liberalisation. Under the EPA, CARIFORUM was able to exclude a number of their most sensitive sectors from liberalisation. A deal breaker for any FTA with the US would be the extent to which CARICOM countries are able to protect nationally-important and sensitive industries from the stiff competition and possible death of these sectors and job losses if liberalised to competing US products too quickly. Civil society and industry consultations thus would be crucial to determining which sectors are most sensitive.

While an FTA with the US will likely increase the volume of US goods into CARICOM, the reverse is not necessarily guaranteed. Most CARICOM merchandise goods exports are already competing with other countries’ exports under normal trade conditions (i.e. at the MFN applied rate), and not under preferences. Therefore, the margin of preference secured for some CARICOM goods under a trade agreement may be negligible.

Investment treaty practice has evolved since the days when Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago signed their BITs with the US. The investor protections provided by a comprehensive investment chapter in a US-CARICOM FTA, coupled with robust investment promotion provisions, could serve as a signal for greater US investment to the region, while at the same time include development-friendly provisions and provisions which reinforce the right of the State to regulate.

As CARICOM service providers enjoy no preferential access to the US market, they face competition from service providers of countries which already have FTAs with the US. However, even when market access is created under an FTA for cross border services trade, there will be the need for mutual recognition agreements and visa waiver agreements in order to translate market access into market penetration.

The US will likely insist on a negative list approach to market access liberalisation of service sectors, the approach used in NAFTA and its subsequent FTAs. The negative list approach requires liberalisation of all sectors unless a reservation is specifically made in a country’s list of reservations. CARICOM countries and other developing countries have preferred to use the positive list approach used under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is a more development friendly approach which means only sectors specifically listed in a country’s schedule of commitments are liberalised and thus allows for the gradual liberalisation of sectors in keeping with each country’s development goals.
The US will also likely insist on no less favourable treatment than what CARICOM countries had agreed to with the EC under the EPA. CARICOM will also have to bear in mind that given a provision in the MFN clause in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the EU can insist on any more favourable treatment given to US than was given the EU under the EPA.

US treaty practice typically includes binding commitments on non-trade issues, such as labour. It has an on-going claim against Guatemala before the CAFTA-DR dispute settlement body in which it claims Guatemala has failed to meet its obligations under the CAFTA-DR agreement relating to effective enforcement of labour laws.

There are currently three main trade issues between the US and CARICOM countries which have to be addressed expeditiously even without an FTA. CARICOM rum exports are losing market share in the US market because of large subsidies given to rum producers in two US territories: the USVI and Puerto Rico. Secondly, the US/Antigua & Barbuda cross border gambling services dispute remains unresolved despite a WTO ruling in Antigua & Barbuda’s favour. An FTA will not necessarily resolve these issues as the DR which is a part of CAFTA-DR has complained about the rum issue as well.

Thirdly, the US has for a long time criticised copyright protection and enforcement in the Caribbean, a possible issue which might trigger disputes under any future US-CARICOM FTA. Caribbean countries constantly feature on the US Watch Lists under its annual Special 301 Report. The 2015 Special 301 Report is no different.

The Bottom Line

CARICOM countries should continue to take advantage of the non-reciprocal duty-free access to the US market provided by the CBI for their goods while these benefits last. However, while I do not think the CBI has outlived its usefulness just yet, it has several deficiencies which means it should not be treated as a long term strategy for boosting CARICOM trade with the US.

As mentioned, CBERA exports as a proportion of total CARICOM exports to the US are small and declining. The beneficial impact on regional exports has been unevenly spread and its unilateral nature, like the GSP, means benefits may be discontinued by the US at any time.

For the short term, the updated TIFA presents the best opportunity for CARICOM through the US-CARICOM Trade Council to lobby for reform of the CBI, address the long-standing rum and internet gambling disputes, and to negotiate concrete frameworks for increasing trade and investment between the US and CARICOM countries. Success on this front will not be automatic and will require strong regional cooperation, as well as effort on the part of both CARICOM and the US to ensure that concrete initiatives and commitments come out of these efforts.

However, given the importance of the US market for CARICOM and the growing importance of services-trade to regional economies, CARICOM will at some point  in the future have to consider, albeit cautiously, negotiating an FTA with the US as part of a long term plan to create a more predictable trade framework for US-CARICOM trade.

I say in the future because negotiations are an expensive and human-resource intensive exercise and require extensive research and stakeholder consultations. At the moment CARICOM countries are still grappling with the lingering effects of the 2008/2009 crisis on their economies and are also still struggling to implement many of the commitments made to the EU under the EPA. Progress on deepening CARICOM integration itself has ground to a halt and it would be easier to formulate a consolidated negotiating position as a more integrated region. I say cautiously because based on its current treaty practice the US is unlikely to extend the same level of special and differential treatment or development assistance which CARIFORUM was able to secure from the EU.

An interesting space to watch would be the on-going Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the US and EU. The EU is currently insisting on the inclusion of certain sustainable development provisions into the agreement. An example is its recently released proposed text for the investment chapter. It would be interesting to see whether these provisions make it into the final TTIP text and that could help make it easier for CARICOM to insist on some of the same provisions in any future FTA with the US.

For my previous article on the relevance of the CBI, please click here.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B. is a trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, international law and trade. Please note that the views expressed in this article are solely hers. You can also read more of her commentaries and follow her on Twitter @LicyLaw.

Economic Citizenship Programmes in the Eastern Caribbean: A Brief Look

Alicia Nicholls

In a world of eroded preferences for traditional Caribbean exports, the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean have had to find non-traditional ways to bolster their small open economies. There is growing global demand for alternative and second citizenship by mobile High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), a phenomenon on which an increasing number of states have sought to capitalise. At the Global Citizen Forum 2015 in Monaco last week, Prime Minister of St. Lucia, the Hon. Dr. Kenny Anthony announced his country’s intention to become the latest Caribbean state to offer economic citizenship. St. Lucia will join four other Caribbean countries: St. Kitts & Nevis, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica and Grenada which operate direct citizenship by investment programmes. This article explores the current programmes in the Eastern Caribbean and whether the offering of economic citizenship is worth the risks involved.

The concept of citizenship, that is, the status of holding the nationality of a State, is imbued with a whole package of legal, political and other rights and duties. All states of the English speaking Caribbean have citizenship on a jus soli basis, that is, the right to citizenship by virtue of being born in the territory, as well as citizenship through descent and naturalisation. Those states which offer economic citizenship stretch the notion of citizenship to give qualifying investors the right to full legal citizenship and the right to hold a passport for themselves and their families through making a qualifying investment into the local economy.

Many of these mobile HNWIs are from China, the Middle East and Russia, seeking economic and political security, a more favourable tax climate, and the benefits of hassle free travel a good second passport could bring. According to The Wealth Report 2015, “it is estimated that 76,200 Chinese millionaires emigrated or acquired alternative citizenship over the 10 years to 2013”. Additionally, the US’ system of nationality based taxation and the onerous reporting requirements under FATCA have caused many Americans living abroad to renounce their American citizenship in record numbers (1,335 in the first quarter of 2015 according to this article).

Economic citizenship and residency programmes are not unique to the Caribbean. Several countries such as Malta and Cyprus operate direct Citizenship by Investment programmes. Some countries offer Immigrant Investor Programmes which use the prospect of citizenship or permanent residence to attract highly skilled HNWIs. The US’ EB-5 visa is a prime example. Similar programmes are also offered by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Outside of this, there is a whole wealth and tax planning industry which has built up around advising HNW clients and their families on how and where they can get the best passport for their buck.

As countries known for their high standards of living, democratic principles, political stability, respect for the rule of law and healthy reputations internationally, it is little wonder several Eastern Caribbean countries have sought to leverage these pull factors and seek to get their share out of the second passport pie. The expected benefits to the host economy include foreign direct investment through purchasing real estate, funding for infrastructure development and the other economic benefits to be derived from HNWIs and their families spending in the economy.

The investor must meet the application requirements and go through stringent application procedures and invest in one of the options available which differs by country. In return, investors which take advantage of economic citizenship offered by one of those Eastern Caribbean states gets visa free travel to over 100 countries, a second passport, no requirement for residency, as well as second citizenship for themselves and their spouse and dependents. They also can take advantage of the tax benefits offered by a low tax jurisdiction, including no capital gains, wealth or inheritance taxes.

Below is a brief description of each programme:

St Kitts & Nevis – It is the oldest continuously operating citizenship by investment programme and has been in existence since 1984. Two options for investment: (1) making a non-refundable donation to the Sugar Industry Diversification Programme of a minimum of US$250,000 plus processing fees or (2) by investing in an approved real estate project worth at least US$400,000 plus registration and other costs.  While the investment in real estate is recoverable, the investor must hold the property for a minimum of 5 years. The next buyer also qualifies for citizenship. For further info: http://stkitts-citizenship.com/

Antigua & Barbuda – Three methods of investment: (1) Investment of at least US$400,000 in  an approved real estate project to be held for a period of no less than five years, (2) contribution of at least US$200,000 in the National Development Fund, (3) An investment of a minimum of US$1,500,000 directly into an eligible business as a sole investor or a joint investment involving at least 2 persons in an eligible business totalling at least US$5,000,000 and each of those persons individually invests at least US$400,000. For further info: http://cip.gov.ag/citizenship/

Dominica – Dominica’s programme requires the smallest minimum investment. Citizenship can be obtained through investment either in the Government Fund or the Real Estate Option. According to the website of the CBIU, the generated funds are utilised for public and private sector projects where a need is identified. To qualify for citizenship under the Government fund there are four investment categories with different contribution amounts, based on the number of dependents included in the application. For a single applicant, there is a non-refundable contribution of US$100,000 required. The contribution required increases where a spouse and dependents are involved. To qualify for citizenship of Dominica under the Real Estate Option under the Citizenship by Investment Program, an applicant must purchase authorized real estate to the minimum value of US$200,000 plus government fees which dependent on whether a spouse is included and number of dependents. For further info: http://cbiu.gov.dm/

Grenada – After a thirteen year hiatus, Grenada restarted its Citizenship by Investment programme in 2014. Application is by invitation only. Citizenship can be obtained by investment of a minimum of US$ 350,000 in an Approved Real Estate project plus fees and costs. The investment is subject to a minimum holding period of four (4) years. The second option is a non-refundable donation to the Island Transformation Fund which is not yet open. For further info: http://www.citizenship.gd/ 

St Lucia – St Lucia has indicated its programme will begin from January 2016 and details about the programme are not yet available.  It has stated that they expect significant economic benefits from the programme.

There is little data publicly available on the success of Caribbean CbI programmes. It would be interesting to know the number of applications received and approved on a yearly basis, the countries from which most applicants have come, and what have been the tangible benefits to the host countries. However, the IMF Staff Report  on St Kitts & Nevis noted the citizenship by investment programme in St. Kitts & Nevis, the region’s most successful CbI programme, is bearing fruit. It notes as follows:

Continued rapid inflows under the Citizenship-By Investment (CBI) program have led to a surge in construction activity, and supported a large increase in government and Sugar Industry Diversification Fund (SIDF) investments and spending, including on the People Employment Program (PEP). These factors, together with the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals fueled rapid GDP growth of about 6 percent in 2013 and 2014.

Entangled in the notion of economic citizenship are a whole set of moral and legal issues. For one, the definition of ‘spouse’ in the legislation of these Caribbean countries still means either of a man or woman who are married to each other. In light of competition from other CbI programmes, will this definition eventually be amended to allow gay HNWIs and their spouses to take advantage of these programmes?

There are also regulatory and national security implications, including concerns about the potential use of second passports to facilitate money laundering, organised crime and terrorist activity. Of course, there are stringent screening methods, including requirements of police certificates of character. After all, all countries prefer to attract investors of good character who are self-sufficient, and willing to make a significant economic investment to the country in which they are seeking citizenship. Under the Antigua & Barbuda programme for example, a person can be deprived of citizenship in several instances e.g: fraud, conviction or failure to spend at least 35 days in Antigua & Barbuda during the period of five calendar years after his registration. There is the potential for attracting ‘undesirables’, even with a rigorous programme.

A few countries worldwide have found that the potential investment inflows were not worth the risk or they could not cope with the volume of applications. Canada cancelled its Immigrant by Investor Programme, while Hong Kong has suspended its CIES programme. Barbados has clearly stated that for policy reasons it will not go the route of economic citizenship. It currently offers the Special Entry and Reside Programme (SERP) for qualifying HNWIs and their spouses/dependants. In order to qualify as an HNWI in Barbados, the investor must have assets of at less than US$ 5 million. In spite of this, Eastern Caribbean CbI programmes not only have to compete amongst themselves but also face increased competition globally from potentially more attractive CbI and residency programmes worldwide.

Moreover, countries which offer economic citizenship programmes do open themselves to reputational risks, especially if other States have doubts about the rigor of their screening procedures. The US Treasury has accused persons obtaining St Kitts & Nevis passports for financial crime  and Canada imposed visa requirements on St. Kitts & Nevis nationals on November 22, 2014. The merits of these actions are debatable. However, these are the kinds of risks which countries operating these programmes face. Moreover, they may result in holders of those passports, including natural born citizens, being blacklisted or subject to more scrutiny by foreign jurisdictions, which may redound to more harm than good for that State and undermine the very programme itself.

In light of the foregoing, any Caribbean state considering a Citizenship by Investment programme must not only consider the possible investment inflows but weigh them carefully against the potential reputational, security and other risks, as well as the sustainability of such a programme.

Disclaimer: This article is NOT intended to provide investment advice and the Author is not accountable to anyone who relies on the information in this article. The information was taken from sources deemed to be accurate and correct at the time of publication. For further information on the respective CbI programmes stated above, please contact the relevant authorities in the respective countries.

Alicia Nicholls, B.Sc., M.Sc., LL.B., is an international trade and development consultant with a keen interest in sustainable development, public international law and trade.

Is the Caribbean Basin Initiative still relevant to CARICOM countries?

Alicia Nicholls

For my latest article on CBI, click here.

In late December of last year, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released its ninth report to the US Congress on the operation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). As the CBI approaches almost thirty years in existence, it is worth pondering on whether the CBI, initially passed during the Cold War, is still relevant to CARICOM countries today.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative refers to the preferential trade concessions extended unilaterally by the United States under several key pieces of legislation to seventeen sovereign countries and dependent territories washed by the Caribbean Basin.  Instituted by the Reagan administration under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) in 1983, the CBI is said to represent a permanent commitment by the US to encourage the development of strong democratic governments and revitalized economies in the Caribbean Basin. The preferential treatment accorded under the CBERA includes duty-free treatment for most products, and in other cases, tariff rates which are much less than the most favoured nation (MFN) rate. Amendments to the CBERA and the passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) in 2000 and the Trade Act of 2002 have increased the number of items eligible for preferential treatment and granted NAFTA-parity to some items.  Haiti benefits from additional concessions, primarily for apparel, under the  Haiti Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2006,  the HOPE II Act of 2008 and the Haiti Economic Lift Programme (HELP) Act of 2010.

Trade under the CBI

The US is the Caribbean’s main trading partner and trade under the auspices of the CBI accounts for much of the US’ imports from CBI countries.  The USTR report reveals that in 2010 total US imports from CBI countries was $10.1 billion, representing 0.5% share of total US imports from the world. CBI countries were the eighteenth largest market for the US exports to the world. Although there were originally 24 beneficiary countries, five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic became parties to a free trade agreement with the US (CAFTA-DR), thus losing their beneficiary status. Panama has also recently signed an FTA with the US (Panama-US).

Some challenges

The CBI is a unilateral arrangement. The benefits are granted by the US to certain eligible goods from CBI beneficiary countries without reciprocal treatment being demanded for US goods. The CBI statutes outline several eligibility criteria which must be met before the president can grant such treatment to any beneficiary country. The CBERA was passed during the height of the Cold War and many of the eligibility criteria under the initial act and in subsequent acts have the objective of furthering US national security and foreign policy goals. In some cases, these eligibility criteria do work in the region’s interest. The recognition of internationally recognised workers’ rights and commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, to combat corruption and to  promote the rule of law are things which most CARICOM countries would readily demand of their governments. However, some criteria like the stipulation that no communist country can be a beneficiary country and the requirement of beneficiaries to provide  ‘equitable and reasonable access’  to their markets and basic commodity resources are much less innocuous and could arguably limit policy space and the right of the beneficiary countries to choose their own political and economic path to development without fear of repercussions.

Unilateral preferential arrangements like the CBI also bring with them a measure of uncertainty due to their unilateral nature.  CBI concessions can  be unilaterally limited, suspended or withdrawn in the case of non-compliance by a beneficiary country with the eligibility criteria or where imports from the country or a group of countries is deemed to cause ‘serious’ injury to domestic producers. This uncertainty is heightened by the increased international hostility towards non-reciprocal trading arrangements which has cast a shadow on the future of CBI. Like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the CBERA does not qualify under the WTO’s ‘Enabling Clause’ because it discriminates among developing countries and thus requires a waiver. Although the CBTPA extends the CBI through to September 2020 or until an FTA is signed with the US, the WTO waiver expires in 2014. This means that the  CBI preferences would no longer be legal under the WTO rules after 2014 unless another waiver is obtained.

Besides these inherent structural problems with the arrangement, not all countries in the region have benefited equally from the CBI. Its benefits have tended to be concentrated in a few countries.  Since the inclusion of petroleum products for preferential treatment, Trinidad & Tobago has benefited the most thanks to its resource base and manufacturing capacity.  With the exit of the CAFTA-DR countries, that country is now the leading CBI exporter to the US with petroleum products and methanol now making up the bulk (76%) of CBERA exports (from non-CAFTA-DR countries) to the US market in 2010 and almost all exports of such products come from Trinidad & Tobago.  Another ‘winner’ is Haiti. After Costa Rica joined the CAFTA-DR, Haiti became the second largest exporter to the US under the CBI. According to the USTR report, apparel not only accounts for over 90% of Haitian exports to the US but almost all of Haiti’s apparel imports enter under the CBTPA and the HOPE Acts.

Once a leading exporter of ethanol and apparel to the US under the CBI, Jamaica’s ethanol and apparel exports to the US have declined.  The Bahamas has in fact now superseded Jamaica as the third leading source of US imports under the CBI.  For some countries like Antigua & Barbuda and Barbados, the majority of exports to the US enter under normal trade relations (i.e. at the MFN rate) as opposed to under CBERA or the CBTPA. Not only has there been concentration in the gains from the CBI but the CBI has led to little economic or export diversification in CBI countries. Petroleum products and apparel account for most CBI exports to the US. Moreover, even before the exit of the CAFTA-DR countries, CBI countries’ share of the US import market has been on a downward trend from 3.1% in 1983 to 1984, to just 0.5% in 2010, according to the USITC.

Through their lobbying efforts and the aid of some empathetic members of the US Congress, CBI countries have succeeded in getting some important additional concessions which have helped make the CBI more beneficial. However, the CBI is a goods-only arrangement, meaning that only designated goods exports, as opposed to services exports, benefit from preferential access. Most CARICOM countries are now services-based economies and stand to benefit more from an arrangement which also provides market access for their service providers, particularly through Mode 4 (temporary movement of natural persons).  The CBI’s utilisation by regional exporters and its effectiveness have been limited by stringent rules of origin requirements and conditions, remaining non-tariff barriers to trade and declining margins of preference as the US continues to sign FTAs with other more competitive developing countries.  Some of these challenges were highlighted in a recent report. The argument can also be made that the CBI is based on an outdated school of thought which posits that free trade and increased exports automatically foment development.

Contemporary Relevance ?

Despite its many drawbacks and weaknesses, it is submitted that the CBI still remains relevant for CARICOM countries today even though some countries clearly benefit more than others and the developmental impact has been largely disappointing. It remains relevant because, for all its flaws, the CBI still provides a margin of preference for the region’s exports in a world where such non-reciprocal preferences are quickly shrinking away in favour of greater competition and a more ‘level’ playing field. The majority of the region’s exports which receive preferential treatment in the US market still enter under the CBI, as opposed to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which has less favourable preferences than the CBI. For some countries like Barbados, no exports to the US entered under the GSP for the past few years and exports enter either at the MFN rate or under the CBI. Moreover, the CBI’s continued attractiveness is evidenced by the fact that according to the USTR Report, Suriname has indicated its interest in receiving beneficiary status and is currently in talks with the US to this effect.

Though the extension and reform of the CBI to address the challenges outlined would be the preferred option for the region, it is unlikely that WTO members would be willing to grant another waiver, especially given the opposition that the current waiver encountered. With the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) off the table for the foreseeable future and the US actively engaged in pursuing FTAs, it is inevitable that CARICOM will at some point have to pursue an FTA with the US.  A CARICOM-US FTA which has a trade and development focus could be beneficial to CARICOM countries if it provides market access for the region’s  service providers, allows for special and differential treatment (especially for lesser developed CARICOM States) and includes technical and capacity building assistance to help the region meet its commitments and develop its export capacity to better capitalise on the market access gained. However, given the asymmetry in bargaining power between the US and CARICOM and the US approach to FTAs, it is probably unlikely that CARICOM would be able to gain from the US all of the concessions which it had gained from the EU with the Dominican Republic under the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

For my latest article on CBI, click here.

Alicia Nicholls is a trade policy specialist and law student at the University of the West Indies. You can contact her by email and follow her on Twitter at @licylaw.